THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Melvin Lasky

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Samuel Huntington, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Joseph Nye, and Stephen Solarz

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THE IMPERIAL TEMPTATION

THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND AMERICA'S PURPOSE

ROBERT W. TUCKER

DAVID C. HENDRICKSON

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—from the Introduction

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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The Catalytic State

Michael Lind

WHAT DO THE Soviet collapse, the Yugoslav civil war, the BCCI scandal, the fall of Margaret Thatcher, the American government's sponsorship of industrial research consortia, and the Iran-*contra* crisis have in common? All involve the collision of powerful global trends with older notions about the proper form and authority of the state. These trends include the pooling of sovereignty in some areas (the European Community), the contest for power between states and subnational ethnic groups in some countries (the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Canadian crises), and novel ways of enlisting private actors and non-nationals to carry out national commercial and foreign policy (research consortia like America's Sematech and Europe's Esprit, the *contras* funded by Iran and the Sultan of Brunei, the American Gulf War effort funded by Germany and Japan).

If there is a single formula that can encompass developments as diverse as European integration and Soviet disintegration, Japan's strategy of business-government collaboration, and America's strategy of having others pay for its foreign policy, it is this: the world-wide crisis of the integral state and the rise of what I shall call the catalytic state.

Webster's defines a catalyst as "a person or thing acting as the stimulus in bringing about or hastening a result." Catalysis is further defined as the alteration of a chemical process "by the addition of some substance which itself undergoes no permanent chemical change thereby." These definitions capture the two essential characteristics of a new type of advanced state that has become recognizable in recent years. A catalytic state is one that seeks its goals less by relying on its own resources than by acting as a dominant element in coalitions of other states, transnational institutions, and private sector groups, while retaining its distinct identity and its own goals. As a catalyst, this kind of state is one that seeks to be *indispensable* to the success or direction of particular strategic coalitions while remaining substantially *independent* from the other elements of the coalition, whether they are other governments, firms, or even foreign and domestic populations.

The goals of the state remain the same—legitimacy, prosperity, security. Successful states, however, are learning to employ more subtle means in pursuing these goals. The catalytic state prefers to move the world with a lever, not a club. In today's new conditions of strong institutions and reduced state authority, competition may favor catalytic states over rivals that cannot outgrow the categories and reflexes of the old-fashioned integral state. In the late nineteenth century, Jacob Burckhardt warned that the twentieth century would be the age of *les simplificateurs terribles*, terrible simplifiers. He was right;

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one need only think of Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Saddam. The twenty-first century promises to be the age of clever complicators. The meek may not inherit the earth. The sly almost certainly will.

From Suzerain to Integral State

THE MODERN state, defined as an entity with unquestioned control over land and population, a standing army and bureaucracy financed out of taxes, as well as a uniform legal and educational system, is a recent innovation, even in the West. From the decline of Rome until the seventeenth century, the most characteristic European political form was what might be called the suzerain state, usually a monarchy or empire claiming authority it could not fully enforce. In this era, the idea of sovereignty had not yet been clearly separated from that of property, as the office of a ruler was not entirely distinct from his person. Property and sovereignty were fused in the prerogatives of monarchs, churches, and cities, prerogatives that were recognized in a common religious and legal culture. Typically a suzerain state could draw on two sources of power—domains and subjects directly under the ruler's control, and other resources over which the state exercised only partial control through a system of feudal obligations.

The combination of a common moral culture and the weakness of even the greatest states meant that bargaining and negotiation, rather than command, occupied a central place in European affairs. A dynast seeking to go to war to vindicate a claim might have to plead his case in moral and legal terms, to avoid excommunication by the papacy. At the same time, he might have to haggle with magnates from whom he sought retinues of soldiers, or with military enterprisers recruiting mercenaries for cash. Rulers often sought loans from the great banking houses—Italian in the fourteenth century (the Salimbene, Peruzzi, Acciajuoli), German in the sixteenth (the Fuggers, Hochstetters, and Welsers). Medieval monarchs were less masters of their realms than impresarios—political Ziegfelds—frequently putting together collaborative efforts which just as frequently collapsed in bankruptcy and civil war.

By the early modern period, the European state was growing stronger relative to clerical, military, and commercial elites. Rulers gained increasing control of the assets of legitimacy, security, and production. Legitimacy came first, as monarchs took over much of the administration of justice and control over national churches from the papacy; even in countries like France and Austria where the Reformation did not take root, the state had effectively completed the nationalization of the church by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the final battle being fought over a state monopoly in education. As S.E. Finer notes, "Nationalism required the population to accept the nation as the supreme object of their devotion, to which they must not only sacrifice life and limb but all religious convictions."

The monopolization of armed force began somewhat later; as late as the Thirty Years War (1620–1648), the Hapsburg emperor felt compelled to murder the military entrepreneur, Wallenstein, whom he had empowered to crush rebellion in his realms. Louis XIV's reign, during which the French army grew from several thousand in 1661 to a peacetime force of over 150,000 by the 1680s, marked a turning point. As the army grew, it was institutionalized as a state bureaucracy, rather than a group of subcontractors. The French Revolution represented another huge step as the *levée en masse* inaugurated the modern practice of conscripting entire populations in "national" wars; shortly after the Napoleonic wars, privateering as an instrument of statecraft was renounced by the European powers. The ultimate step in the concentration of sovereign power, the monopolization of finance and industry by the state, did not come about until World War I, when Ludendorff created what was in effect the first totalitarian state in embattled imperial Germany.

This growth of the power of bureaucratic

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government in relation to other institutions, some of which were at once transnational and subnational (the church, the aristocracy), was justified in the West by the ideal of the integral state. Unlike the suzerain state, which was first among equals in a world of powerful institutions, the integral state possessed, at least in theory, complete, assured, and institutionalized control of the means of legitimacy, security and—in the socialist version—productivity.

Roughly speaking, three periods in the nationalization of culture, war, and the economy may be distinguished—a dynastic period, from the Wars of Religion to the French Revolution in 1789; a nationalist period, culminating in the national unifications of Germany and Italy (and perhaps the consolidation of the United States in the Civil War); and a supra-national, imperial phase, which lasted from the 1870s to 1945, perhaps even 1989. In this last phase, it was generally believed that advances in technology—the railroad, the telegraph, the steamship—meant that the future would belong to self-sufficient integral states of continental dimensions.

This idea was present among American imperialists and advocates of imperial federation in Britain, but it was taken to disastrous extremes in Germany. Imperial German *Weltpolitik* sought to make the new German nation-state the basis of a European superstate capable of competing with giants like the British Empire, America, and Russia. Hitler went further, seeking not only to integrate all social institutions through *Gleichshaltung* (coordination) but to create a homogeneous master race for his European empire through eugenics and mass murder. The Soviet Union represented a similarly ruthless attempt to establish a continental and supranational integral state.

The integral state came in liberal as well as illiberal versions. The welfare state, particularly in its European form, with cradle-to-grave state provision and nationalized industry, represented a constitutional and democratic embodiment of the ideal. As different as social democrats have been from communists and socialists in goals and methods, they shared a belief that progress meant the replacement of a bourgeois social order and a market economy by state-sponsored social levelling and state ownership of major industries.

One by one, the assets of legitimacy, power, and wealth were monopolized by ever more radical versions of the integral state, particularly in continental Europe. The priest was, as it were, replaced by a nationalist school teacher, the Fugger and Medici banking houses were expropriated, Wallenstein was drafted. As states grew more inclusive, they became fewer, through elimination in war. The roughly five hundred states in Europe in 1500 were reduced to about two dozen in 1900 (before increasing again with the break-up of the Hapsburg and Ottoman realms), while most of the rest of the world was carved up among a few European empires. From crown land, to nation-state, to continental superstate—until recently, history seemed to be moving in the direction of an ever more comprehensive state on an ever larger scale, corresponding to a homogeneous population.

Global Trends

TODAY SEVERAL global trends are countering and reversing the further development of integral statism. The most dramatic is what Samuel P. Huntington has called the "Third Wave" of democratization. Although authoritarianism remains the norm in the Muslim world and much of Asia and Africa, transitions to democratic or semi-democratic government have occurred in most of Latin America, much of the Soviet bloc, and parts of East Asia. With democracy has come liberalism; peoples once locked inside regimented states are joining (or, in some cases, re-joining) the larger world market economy and the global culture based in the West.

A revolution in communications has accompanied and bolstered the spread of de-

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mocracy and liberalism. The combination of advanced and inexpensive computing with the digitalization of phone networks, which permits computer and telephone networks to merge, may soon produce integrated service digital networks (ISDN), capable of transmitting voice, visual, facsimile, and digital data. The merger of computer and telephone systems might be followed shortly by a merger between ISDN and electronic banking. Although these and other developments are still a few years away, global business and politics are already reflecting the responses of markets and governments to the new technology. A computerized global financial market is developing, one that presents new challenges to the regulatory agencies of national governments. A wave of transnational investment, led in the 1960s by American investment in Europe and in recent decades by Japanese investment in America, has made it possible for the growth in transnational production to outstrip the growth in trade.

Finally, although most governments on earth are still dictatorships, state monopolies of information *do* seem to have been undermined by the increasing accessibility of radios, televisions, satellite dishes, VCRs, telephones, copiers, and fax machines. These permitted the formation of a dissident Soviet news network, Interfax, and the use of a U.S. academic computer network, BITNET, by Chinese students during the pro-democracy movement in 1989. The new communications technology may even have played a decisive role in the defeat of the Soviet coup in August. Boris Yeltsin, trapped in the Russian parliament building, addressed the nation and spoke with President Bush and other world leaders, while Mikhail Gorbachev, a prisoner in his Crimean dacha, followed events on the BBC and the Voice of America and taped a video message for clandestine circulation.

True, the new technology can also be used on behalf of autocracy; China, for example, has used television to encourage informants to turn in dissidents. On balance, however, the communications revolution seems to be shifting power away from the centralized state, to civil society and to newly empowered ethnic minorities in multinational states. If the symbol of totalitarianism was the loudspeaker, the symbols of the new era may well be the satellite dish, the VCR, and the fax machine.

The Resurgence of Society?

THE MOST popular interpretation of these events is the neoliberal one, which maintains that the state is withering away in the face of a resurgence of society, both from below in the form of popular movements, and from outside in the form of global finance and global corporations. Neoliberal analysts interpret the spread of democratization and the growth of transnational business and investment as evidence of a cumulative *devolution* of real power from the weakening institution of the state to non-state actors: private associations, subnational ethnic groups, transnational corporations, supra-national institutions like the EC and the UN.

That devolution, however, is more apparent than real. Neoliberals typically fail to distinguish between *circumstantial* devolution—a temporary and reversible delegation to other entities by states of some of their prerogatives—and *structural* devolution—the permanent and uncontrolled leaching of effective power from the state.

History provides dramatic examples of previous eras of structural devolution—the Dark Ages in Europe, for example, which saw centralized Roman imperial control replaced by semi-anarchic feudalism, and periods of warlordism between ages of Chinese dynastic centralization (most recently in the first half of this century). Some analysts, perceiving global structural devolution of state power, have indeed concluded that the territorial state will cease to exist, except perhaps in name. Some see the state being succeeded by the multinational corporation. Tom Clausen, the former president of the World Bank and head of the Bank of Amer-

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ica, believes that the evolution of supranational corporations "offers mankind perhaps the last real chance to build a world order that is less coercive than that offered by the nation-state."

At the other extreme, Martin van Creveld in *The Transformation of War* argues that, with the dispersal of coercive power among subnational and transnational groups, a new kind of anarchy will emerge:

> In most of Africa the entities by which [wars] are waged resemble tribes—indeed they *are* tribes, or whatever is left of them under the corrosive influence of modern civilization. In parts of Asia and Latin America the best analogy may be the robber barons who infested Europe during the early modern period, or else the vast feudal organizations that warred against each other in sixteenth-century Japan. In North America and Western Europe future warmaking entities will probably resemble the Assassins, the group which, motivated by religion and allegedly supporting itself on drugs, terrorized the medieval Middle East for two centuries.

These statements are based on several rather serious errors. One problem is the assumption that there is a conflict between state power and the freedom of the economy and civil society. This is not so. As any entrepreneur in Lebanon will explain, a strong state is a precondition for the growth of business. The greatest expansion in international trade has been among stable, well-governed, democratic states that have sought to promote the market as a matter of policy. Furthermore, it is precisely because an improved economy may translate into greater relative power and influence that authoritarian elites in former communist countries and elsewhere have risked initiating market reforms. By giving up power in some areas of social life, a state may actually increase its overall power.

Nor is there evidence of a universal trend toward the replacement of nation-states by blocs or alliances. In the area of transnational institutions, such devolution as exists has been circumstantial, not structural. The unanimity shown by the UN in the Gulf Crisis was an exception, not a new rule. During the Cold War, the extraordinary integration of Western militaries in response to the Soviet threat was not a harbinger of a future globalized security order, but a temporary measure. With the extinction not only of the Warsaw Pact but of the Soviet Empire, Western defense is being re-nationalized, under the rubrics of NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It remains to be seen whether the EC will provide an example of genuine, lasting transnationalism.

ANOTHER example of devolution that is only circumstantial and probably temporary is the "democratic international" that has been so instrumental in helping democratic movements in the Soviet bloc, Latin America, and the Philippines. In a very brief time, a new regime of international election-watchers and international funding of political parties and electoral infrastructures has developed to support democratic transitions. Although the CIA secretly funded foreign political parties at the height of the Cold War, this modern regime of overt foreign involvement in national elections traces its ancestry to the collaborative intervention of European Social Democrats in the politics of post-dictatorial Portugal and Spain in the 1970s. German Christian Democrats emulated the example of German and other European Social Democrats in overtly subsidizing like-minded political groups in Latin American countries. The United States then copied the European model when it established the National Endowment for Democracy, through which the U.S. government funds democratic activists overseas through the Democratic and Republican parties and American business and labor groups.

This "democratic international" will inevitably be the victim of its successes—and its failures. Once secure democratic governments are in place in ex-dictatorial regimes, foreign funding will cease to be regarded as humanitarian aid and will be considered cor-

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ruption, as it would be in the U.S. or Western Europe. Where democratization fails, resurgent or new dictatorships are not likely to permit overt foreign aid to domestic opposition groups.

Even the cases of malign devolution represented by international terrorism and drug trafficking cannot be used as evidence of a basic, universal weakening of the power of nation-states. For many groups, terrorism is a temporary strategy, which would no longer be necessary once their goal of separate statehood or governmental change is achieved. In addition, no terrorists are truly "international"—their organizations require territorial bases, either in sponsor states or in areas of countries that they control. Similarly, drug traffickers could not operate without the protection and aid of officials whom they corrupt. As the American invasion of Panama and arrest of Manuel Noriega demonstrated, the U.S. and other countries retain the potential power to suppress this modern form of piracy in neighboring countries, as well as within their borders; they are restrained by public opinion and diplomatic calculation, not by any lack of means.

The Reinvention of the State

ALL OF THIS suggests that the death of the integral state, in its Leninist and social democratic forms, should not be mistaken for the death of the state as such, even in the advanced capitalist world. The genuine global trends that neoliberals explain in terms of the devolution of state power to society can be more accurately explained as a *restructuring* of state-society relationships, the effect of which is an increasing convergence of Japan, Europe, and the United States (but not necessarily poorer and less developed countries) at the model of the catalytic state.

Concerns about preserving or improving their relative status are leading Western states to restructure themselves and alter established relationships with other institutions—businesses, research institutes and academies, other governments. During the age of the integral state, the characteristic institution—whether in industry, diplomacy or the military—was the state bureaucracy: the nationalized company, the professionalized foreign ministry, the regular armed forces. We are entering a new period in which the most important kind of state institution will be a partnership of government with non-state entities. In its only partial control of vital power resources, the catalytic state will resemble the pre-modern suzerain state more than the all-embracing integral state. The states that are most successful will be those which, possessing what Joseph S. Nye, Jr. calls "cooptive power," augment their conventional resources with ad hoc, complex "consortiums" composed of other states, multinational institutions, banks, corporations, unions, foundations, political parties, and foreign insurgents.

The features of the catalytic state are clearest in economic and technological policy. In the first half of the twentieth century, the major capitalist countries assumed new responsibilities for the welfare of their citizens, and committed themselves to increase productivity in order to pay the bill. Now, partly in order to better carry out these existing commitments, the governments of the major industrial states are assuming a new responsibility to promote technological innovation. Not just policies favoring particular industries, but policies promoting national *capacity* for continual innovation in the high-technology sectors of the economy are growing in importance. The "financial-commercial complex" is fusing with the "military-industrial complex" to produce a "technological complex" that is the basis of both national prosperity and national security in advanced capitalist states.

In this area, both Europe and America have been emulating Japan (often without success). Although government targeting of industries plays a much reduced role in today's Japan, there is no evidence that the Japanese government has lost its faith in promoting technological development through business-government cooperation.

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Enhancing the competitiveness of European high-tech industry is the purpose of initiatives like the European Airbus consortium, which has been gaining market share at the expense of the American aerospace industry, and the Eureka 95 high-definition television (HDTV) effort, a multinational development effort that has brought together such corporate giants as Bosch (Germany), Philips (the Netherlands), and Thomson (France) to compete with the Japanese video electronics industry.

In the United States, a similar dynamic is at work. While American trade negotiators, as part of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, continue to make the liberalization of Japanese social and market structures a goal, the U.S. has been quietly developing a mercantilist trade and technology policy without giving it that name. For decades, of course, military procurement has provided the United States with a de facto high-tech industrial policy.

Added to that are: the retaliatory trade regime established by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act; the reorganization of U.S. agencies along "Japanese" lines (the creation of a National Institute for Standards and Technology from the old National Bureau of Standards); government-encouraged creation of hi-tech research consortia, such as Sematech and the Microelectronics & Computer Technology Corp. (MCC); congressionally mandated studies of "key technologies"; and moves to relax antitrust restraints on banks in order to allow them better to compete with European and, especially, Asian rivals. The U.S. has also relaxed antitrust law in order to encourage joint research and manufacturing by American companies, along the lines of Japanese *keiretsu* and European consortia.

To this list must be added the numerous industrial policies actively pursued by individual states, each attempting to create its own "Silicon Valley" or "Research Triangle," as well as efforts to overhaul American education in order to promote international competitiveness. Whether any of these measures will actually enhance American competitiveness remains to be seen; the important point is that even before the Berlin Wall came down, economic rivalry with East Asia and Europe was inspiring the greatest rethinking and reorganization in American government and business since the Second World War and the Great Depression.

SCHOLARS WHO have attempted to deal with this transformation have focused too much on economics, narrowly defined. Chalmers Johnson, for example, has described Japan as a "developmental state," but only in the industrial and commercial sphere. Richard Rosecrance has spoken of a "mediative state" that "balances the pressures of international life on the one hand with domestic life on the other." Rather than apply the logic of the mediative state to military strategy and ideological and political struggles, however, he suggests that the "military-political world" may wither away, in favor of the "trading world." But this is nothing more than the erroneous distinction, criticized half a century ago by E.H. Carr, between "warfare" and "welfare" states (all states, Carr pointed out, are concerned with both security and welfare).*

What is at stake in technological rivalry goes far beyond conventional economics. The ultimate rationale of that rivalry is political and strategic independence, not the maximization of short-term profits or consumer welfare.

During the Gulf War, Belgium refused to sell Britain, its NATO and WEU ally, 155-mm artillery shells that were needed for the war effort. During earlier Mideast crises, Germany, France, and other NATO allies refused to grant overflight rights to the United States. The Japanese adopted a pro-Arab, anti-Israel diplomatic policy after the 1973 oil crisis. It is not difficult to imagine a future crisis in the Middle East or elsewhere in which Germany or Japan refuse to supply

*See J.D.B. Miller, "E.H. Carr: The Realists' Realist," *The National Interest* (Fall 1991).

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key components for U.S. military hardware. Multiple sourcing may reduce the risk—but not eliminate it.

An even greater concern should be the "third-party problem"—the transfer of technology between an industrial country friendly to the United States and a hostile foreign power. U.S.-allied relations have already been strained by such crises: the Soviet pipeline crisis of 1982, the Toshiba incident in 1987, the transfer of German technology to Libya and Iraq most recently. Such incidents will no doubt increase as U.S. diplomatic influence over Germany, Japan, and other industrial states diminishes with the withdrawal or irrelevance of the American military protectorate. The same logic, of course, will be followed by other advanced countries, in their dealings with us and with each other. For example, Japan must be concerned about the security implications of German help in developing Russia, and Chinese access, through commerce, to American technology.

THE LOGIC of the catalytic state extends beyond the economic realm, to the pursuit of security and prestige through proxy warfare, subsidy diplomacy, and the manipulation of international institutions and norms. Circumstances like those of the Gulf War permitting the great powers to employ conventional armed forces in attacks on foreign countries with a minimum of domestic dissent or international criticism will be rare. In order to achieve their goals in turbulent regions, the great powers will rely less on force and more on "packages" of economic aid or boycotts, security assistance, rhetorical and material support for insurgents and opposition politicians, and diplomatic pressure. The challenges of twenty-first century diplomacy will inspire ingenious new methods of short-term collaboration, to accomplish more with fewer resources.

This means that boundaries between trade policy, public diplomacy, and military strategy will become even more blurred. Public diplomacy will be used as a tool for military ends, economics will be an instrument of public diplomacy, the military may be used in the service of ideology and even commerce. To some extent this has always been true; during the Cold War, however, it was possible to treat the security competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the economic intercourse between America and its major trading partners largely in isolation from one another. In the generations ahead, academic economists who bemoan the "corruption" of trade policy by strategic considerations will be as disappointed as academic realists who consider commercial policy to be low politics, and ideological diplomacy to be an unworthy form of utopian moralizing.

Like their early-modern and medieval predecessors, future statesmen will probably devote a great deal of attention to arguments that conventional realists dismiss as "legalistic" and "moralistic." For better or for worse, the blessing of the new global clerisy of journalists and democratic activists will be important. Statesmen will be just as ruthless as ever; perhaps more so. But they will be hypocritical, like most rulers throughout history. Tomorrow's statesmen will resemble medieval kings, who could not annex a duchy without bribing the papacy and hiring lawyers to prove ancient title.

To the despair of those nostalgic for the days of high politics and blunt honesty, conflict in the future, however mundane or limited, will continue to be presented as quasi-theological crusade and quasi-juridical arbitration. Legitimacy, security and economics will be inextricably tangled, as military subsidies are disguised as economic development assistance and subversion of foreign states camouflaged as foreign-subsidized political development. Even minor conflicts will be accompanied by forum-shopping among international institutions—the UN, the CSCE, the World Court—by televised debates between opposing sides, by pseudo-events staged for the global media, by elaborate legal and constitutional disputations. Clashes like the Gulf War will be less typical than conflicts like the Nicaraguan civil war. An old-fashioned soldier's nightmare,

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the war of tomorrow will be a lawyer's and a journalist's dream.

Can America Adapt?

MAINSTREAM policy-makers and foreign policy-thinkers in the United States have optimistically tended to interpret the changes in the world as evidence of the irreversible devolution of state power to private groups, and the inevitable convergence of states at a single kind of constitutional, consumerist democracy. The same trends, as I have argued, can be interpreted quite differently, as leading to a new world order of competitive interdependence and the age of the catalytic state.

The Anglo-American world, which has never suffered from the extremes of the integral state tradition—absolutism, nationalism, and totalitarianism—should not find it too difficult to adopt a catalytic strategy in commercial and foreign affairs. America, even more than Britain, has a legacy of legalism and moralism, limited government, public policy through private institutions, and concurrent authorities. Both can find precedents for quasi-public, catalytic institutions and actors in the British East India Company and the Yankee filibusters who played such a large role in nineteenth-century American expansion into Florida, Texas, and Hawaii.

The United States has frequently pioneered the abandonment of norms of the decaying Western state system, in which integral states were supposed to fight decisive battles for limited goals with armies and fleets apart from civilian populations. From Wilson to Reagan, American leaders have led ideological crusades; they have treated foreign leaders from the Nazis and the Japanese high command to Noriega and Saddam Hussein not as rival sovereigns, but as outlaws to be captured, tried, and hanged or imprisoned; they have used food and trade as weapons; they have secretly or overtly subsidized foreign political parties, trade unions, and guerilla movements. These traditions, considered handicaps by realists thinking in the categories of 1900, may actually be assets in the world of 2000 or 2100 A.D. The United States, which Samuel Huntington has described as a "Tudor polity," may do well in a neo-Elizabethan world of quasi-religious conflicts, tributary states, merchant-adventurers, privateers, and assassins.

While the United States may be most comfortable with catalytic strategies in the new world of security and legitimacy politics, developments in the realm of productivity are challenging the American tradition of arm's-length relationships between government and business. Although the oldest economic tradition in the United States is Hamiltonian mercantilism, in recent generations close government-business relationships have been treated as exceptions—the regulation of monopolies, for example, or the industrial policy carried out by the Pentagon in the name of national security. The Republican Party—heir to the mercantilist, internal-improvements tradition of the Federalists, Whigs, and post-Civil War Republicans—has turned its back on the economic nationalism and pragmatism of its predecessors for a doctrinaire devotion to free trade. Michael Boskin, the president's economic adviser, has suggested that from an economic point of view it makes no difference whether the United States makes silicon chips or potato chips. Adam Smith knew better. In *The Wealth of Nations* he wrote:

> It is of importance that the Kingdom depend as little as possible for the manufactures necessary for its defence: and if these cannot be maintained at home, it is reasonable that all other branches of industry be taxed in order to support them.

The definition of industries that are truly "strategic" is not a difficult question. The administration, spurred by Congress, has issued lists of critical technologies (Commerce has identified twelve, the Defense Department twenty). While such lists may differ in detail, potato chip-making isn't on anybody's.

If the U.S. is to remain the dominant world power in the next century, a world-

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class "technological complex" will have to be consolidated, in part by government policy. Efforts at greater coordination of industry and government have been hampered until now by the inability of the federal government, in its present form, to coordinate itself. The greatest weakness of the United States, as a catalytic state, is its decentralized and adversarial form of government, which encourages paralysis and polarization. In a world in which the "deal" is as important as the "law," the executive will have to exercise a combination of powers, and democratic legitimacy must be sought by means that encourage consensus among groups rather than the cultivation and exaggeration of partisan differences.

Although the state remains the central actor in world politics, its most familiar incarnation, the integral state, is moribund as an ideal and as an institution. The future belongs to the catalytic state. The typical institutions of statecraft in a world of powerful non-state actors—national and transnational public-private consortia, ad hoc alliances and blocs, subsidized guerilla movements and political fronts—are evolving in the interstices of conventional world politics.

Post-modern politics may resemble the pre-modern politics of early-modern Europe or Renaissance Italy more than the *Realpolitik* of late nineteenth-century Europe. The Jesuits, the Fuggers, and the Wallensteins have returned, in new guises. Can Charles V, Cesare Borgia, and Machiavelli be far behind?□

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Advice for a Democratic President

We asked four Democrats with a serious interest in foreign policy what advice they would give a Democratic president, should one be elected in November.

The Economic Renewal of America

Samuel P. Huntington

THE FIRST priority of American foreign policy is identical with the first priority of American domestic policy. It is the economic renewal of the United States. Economic renewal differs from economic recovery. Economic recovery from the recession is an immediate, short-term problem which can be solved by applying appropriate stimuli to the economy. Economic renewal, in contrast, is a long-term imperative which requires fundamental changes in major elements of American life and culture. Yet it is essential both to future American prosperity and to the future American role in the world.

The need for economic renewal is written in the clear, familiar, and dismal facts of American economic performance. The measures of economic performance and of the forces that shape economic performance include GNP growth, productivity growth, technological innovation, savings rates, investment levels, educational quality, production of scientists and engineers, and resources committed to research and development:

—In almost all these areas except productivity American performance has not improved in recent years; in most areas, it has declined;

—In most areas, American performance lags behind that of other industrialized democracies;

—In every area, American performance lags behind that of Japan.

The failures of American economic performance are written not just in statistics but also in the fate of the giants of American industry. Pan American Airways, the first and for long the premier global airline, goes out of business. IBM, a company whose name for decades was synonymous with computers, confronts drastically declining profits and initiates a major reorganization. General Motors, the largest industrial corporation in the world, announces plant closings and the layoff of 74,000 employees. At one point—not long ago—these three companies dominated their industries worldwide. Now they are gone or staggering.

Domestically the deficiencies in American economic performance mean a lower standard of living for Americans and decreased ability to provide government services, such as health care, care for children and the aged, unemployment benefits, and other forms of support, which are the hallmark of a civilized society. In foreign relations, Amer-

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Some Measures Relating to Economic Performance

	U.S.	Japan	FRG, U.K. France *(avg.)*
Average Annual % Growth Overall Productivity			
1984–88	1.7	2.9	2.1
1976–80	.6		
Average Annual Gross Domestic Savings as % of GNP			
1985–89	13.7	33.3	21.8
1976–80	17.7		
Average Annual Gross Domestic Investment as % of GNP			
1985–89	15.5	29.9	20.2
1976–80	17.1		
R & D Personnel per 1,000 workers			
1988	6.7	13.5	12.0

Sources: The World Bank, *World Tables 1991;* Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics 1989;* Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs, *Japan 1992: An International Comparison;* IMD-World Economic Forum, *World Competitiveness Report 1991.*

ican economic deficiencies reduce the ability of the United States to provide for its security, to support its allies and friends, to influence the course of world events, and to encourage the spread of political democracy and market economies.

Deficient economic performance is particularly important to American foreign relations for two reasons. First, for the first time in fifty years the United States faces no significant military threat to its national security. For the United States, military power will still be important in dealing with threats from hostile Third World countries and movements. It will not be a decisive factor in U.S. relations with the other major states: Germany, Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and probably China. In these relationships, economic power will be central.

Second, for the first time in two hundred years, the United States faces a major economic threat. In terms of every other form of power—military (technologically superior and deployable forces), ideological (appeal of political and economic ideas), diplomatic (scope of alliances and friendly relationships), and cultural (jeans, rock, McDonald's, Coca Cola)—no country can conceivably equal the United States. In terms of economic power, however, Japan is rapidly overtaking the United States. And economic power is not only central to the relations among the major states, it is also the underpinning of virtually every other form of power.

Economic performance produces economic power. In the relations among nations the elements of economic power include: dominance of markets, a balance of trade surplus, a strong currency, foreign exchange reserves, net creditor position in relation to other countries, and ownership of companies, factories, real estate, and technologies in foreign countries. These forms of economic power generate political power; that is, the ability to use economic resources to produce military power, to provide incentives and sanctions to induce governments and corporations to act in desired ways, and to affect public opinion and private interests in other countries.

During the Cold War the United States was justifiably concerned with its balance of military power with the Soviet Union—the numbers of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, divisions, tanks, warships, aircraft on each side. These were the measures of military capability and of potential military performance. The United States now has far more reason to be concerned with the measures of its economic capability in relation to Japan. Happily the United States never had to test its military

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capability directly against that of the Soviets. If it had been required to do this, it probably would have won, although at a terrible cost. Unhappily the United States is continually testing its economic capabilities against that of Japan. Unhappily it is losing that competition, at increasing cost.

Since the United States defeated it militarily in World War II, Japan has unrelentingly followed a strategy designed to maximize its economic power. The key source of economic power is market control, and Japan has pursued market control, to the subordination of all other goals, including profit maximization. Consumer interests and other interests have been subordinated to producer interests. Japan has tolerated vast inefficiencies in those industries that are inherently domestic or that can be protected against foreign competition (e.g., retailing) in order to support and promote manufacturing industries that can earn foreign exchange.

The realist theory of international relations holds that anarchy characterizes the relations among nations, that hence each nation must act to protect its own security, and that hence each nation must attempt to maximize its power. Realist theorists emphasize the crucial significance of military power. The realist paradigm today, however, is most applicable to Japan. It has been and is, constantly, operating, in classic realist fashion, to increase its power, but only in the economic area. In the new world environment, however, economic power is what counts.

The overwhelming need in American foreign policy, consequently, is for the United States to develop the capacity to remain a superpower in a world where economic competition is central to the relationships among the major powers.

There are three broad approaches to the economic competitiveness issue. One is to more or less ignore the problem or to tinker with it at the margins, and hope that it will somehow naturally correct itself. This is, roughly speaking, the approach of the Bush administration. On the one hand, it articulates a hands-off policy of laissez faire epitomized by the remark attributed to Michael Boskin that it makes no difference whether we produce computer chips or potato chips; on the other hand, it negotiates special deals for voluntary restraints on imports from Japan and market shares on exports to Japan, thereby adopting in trade the system of quotas it condemns in employment. A second approach, advocated by Lee Iacocca and some members of Congress, is protectionism, which is a recipe for economic stagnation. A third approach is to formulate a strategy for economic renewal directed, as Governor Clinton has said, at both the 25 percent of the problem that is created by Japan and the 75 percent of the problem that originates in the United States. Vigorous presidential support for such a strategy is essential to head off self-defeating economic nationalism and Japan-bashing.

In the 1930s Franklin Roosevelt laid the foundations for the *welfare state*, which Lyndon Johnson reinvigorated in the late 1960s. The purpose of the welfare state is to use government resources to provide a basic standard of living to all members of society. After World War II Harry Truman and his successors brought the *national security state* into existence. This was designed to secure the United States against the political-military challenge of Soviet communism. It required the creation of a Department of Defense, a large military establishment, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and many other organizations and programs designed to further American goals in the Cold War.

From the 1950s through the 1980s the needs of economic welfare and well being competed with those of national security. That is not the case now. Instead domestic needs and strategic concerns combine to make economic renewal the number one American priority. In the future the American government will have to continue, in some measure, to promote welfare and security. To do this, however, it will increasingly have to become a *competitive state*, that is, a state whose purpose is to enhance American

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economic competitiveness and economic strength in relation to other countries.*

The United States responded to the Soviet political-military threat of the 1940s by developing a foreign policy of containment and a military strategy of deterrence, creating NATO, and engaging in the massive rearmament program laid out in NSC 68 in 1950. A new administration in 1993 should respond in similar fashion to the challenges posed by a world dominated by the economic competition among nations. It needs to develop an economic strategy equivalent to containment and deterrence, and programs for economic renewal even as NSC 68 was a program for military rearmament. It needs to create an economic strategy council, comparable to the National Security Council, to develop recommendations to promote renewal and competitiveness and to coordinate government activities to achieve these goals.

A program for economic renewal involves two elements. Domestically, it requires increased public investment in essential infrastructure, taxes on consumption such as a higher gasoline tax and a value-added tax, tax credits for savings and investment, increased government spending on research and development in key civilian technologies, and intensified efforts to improve the quality of American education and the scholastic achievement and technical skills of American students. On the international front, it means renewed attempts to move forward in the stalled GATT negotiations, vigorous promotion of the North American Free Trade Area, and pressure on Japan to make real progress in opening up its economy to foreign trade and investment with the threat of retaliatory sanctions in the form of tariffs if it does not.

The U.S., in short, must push for a level economic playing field and then field teams that can win on a level field. Economic renewal does not mean a retreat into isolationism. It is, instead, a prerequisite to the sustained involvement of the United States in world affairs. In the coming years the United States can significantly reduce its overall defense effort and its overseas military deployments. It will still have major interests which require an active role in the world and the economic capacity to support that role.

First, historically the United States has attempted to prevent any single country from achieving dominance either in Europe or in East Asia. At present no country is in a position to pose a similar threat. Consequently, the task now for American diplomacy is not, as it was during the Cold War, to contain an existing threat but to prevent the emergence of new ones. Promoting a stable equilibrium among the major Eurasian powers requires the United States to maintain a modest military presence in Europe and Asia and to help in the economic development of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.

Second, the U.S. will no longer have to compete with the Soviet Union throughout the Third World, but it will have continuing major security interests in the Persian Gulf area and in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. It also has broader security interests in limiting weapons proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Protecting these interests requires a highly capable although much smaller military force. It also requires the economic capability to provide rewards and sanctions.

Third, the United States has an interest in promoting the development of a congenial international environment, one characterized by human rights, democratic regimes, market economies, free trade, economic development, social justice, and a benign physical environment. U.S. ability to promote these goals is now subject to major resource constraints; economic renewal is essential if the United States is to move the world in desirable directions.

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*My thinking on this subject has been stimulated by Michael Lind's paper, "New Modes and Orders: State and Statecraft in a Changing World" (prepared for the Olin Institute's Changing Security Environment Project) in which he develops the concept of the "catalytic state." [An adapted version of that paper appears in this issue. -Ed.]

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Fourth, the United States has interests—and responsibilities—that flow from its position as the only superpower. Many key problems will only be resolved if the United States takes the initiative; few problems can be solved without American participation; almost no problem can be solved by the United States acting alone. As the only superpower the United States has an interest in setting the global agenda, nourishing and strengthening international institutions (such as the UN, GATT, World Bank, IMF) that are more likely to serve American interests than those of other countries, mediating major regional disputes, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, that do or could affect American interests, and incorporating "outside" powers (such as former Soviet republics, China, radical Islamic states) into the global community. U.S. ability to pursue these interests and perform these functions will be greatly impaired if it is an economically weak, hollow superpower.

The United States can only be involved and exercise leadership in the world if it is economically dynamic, productive, and strong. To stay abroad America must come home. And it must come home not to indulge or to isolate itself but to renew itself.□

Samuel P. Huntington is director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. His most recent book is The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.

End the "Torment of Secrecy"

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

THE COLD WAR ends on a pretty note. Across the nation audiences are watching the movie *JFK* in which a former CIA agent, sitting on a bench with the Washington Monument in view, explains to a district attorney that the president of the United States was murdered by the military in order to keep the Vietnam War going. Polls would suggest that an overwhelming proportion of American citizens believe something conspiratorial happened, and that whatever it was, the government isn't telling. (A *Time*/CNN poll: "Have the American people been told the truth about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy?" No: 72 percent. "Did Oswald do it alone, or was there a conspiracy?" Conspiracy: 73 percent.)

Edward A. Shils wrote about all this far back in the 1950s in his invaluable book *The Torment of Secrecy*. From Freemasons through Bolsheviks—and now to the Central Intelligence Agency!—

> The exfoliation and intertwinement of the various patterns of belief that the world is dominated by unseen circles of conspirators, operating behind our backs, is one of the characteristic features of modern society. It is radical in its fundamental distrust of the dominant institutions and authorities of modern society.

The instruments of evil come and go. There is, for example, this nostalgic note:

> The belief among Anglophobes and radicals of the extreme left and right that the British Foreign Office really runs the world and that every one of its numerous and obvious errors is only a deliberate deception intended to mislead its victims into thinking that they can relax their anxieties, is one of the most common of the conspiratorial ideas, and it is shared by "right" and "left."

Sad, of course. But not funny. You lose your liberties that way. Madison to Jefferson, 1793: "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad." I happen to believe that something of this has happened to us. There has been a loss of liberty. By which I am not talking about Red scares and loyalty oaths

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(Shils was), but rather liberty in the sense of easiness with ideas, awareness of options, sense of opportunities. The secrecy system has done this to us. The all-encompassing, smothering, suffocating secrecy system that we built up during the Cold War and which won't go away because its existence is itself a kind of secret.*

A Democratic president (Republican also) could do no greater service to the nation and to his administration than to set about an energetic, determined, *public* dismantling of the secrecy system. It is the only way I can think for the next president to free himself of the baggage of the Cold War as we enter an age of considerable instability in much of the world.

How do I know this? Well, of course, I don't know in the sense that we are not doing equations here. But I have put some time in this work. I served in the cabinet or subcabinet of four successive governments, beginning with the Kennedy administration. I went in a straight sequence from ambassador to India to ambassador at the United Nations to the Senate and the Select Committee.

By the end of the 1970s, I think it fair to say that I had had a fair share of foreign policy experience from the inside. Especially on that Intelligence Committee. And I had reached a judgment. Which was that the Soviet Union was about to collapse; that it would break up along ethnic lines; and that in the process, there could be a catastrophe as those warheads got divvied up.

NOW THIS was altogether at odds with everything everybody in Washington *knew*. My proposition was simple enough. Marxism-Leninism had two central predictions. The first was that socialist production would be more efficient than capitalist production. The second was that ethnicity, nationalism—choose your term—would disappear, to be supplanted by proletarian internationalism. Neither of these things had happened. Hence, there had to be a crisis of belief. This would lead to a crisis of the regime. QED.

I was a little short on details, I grant, but I had an argument. Even if implausible. The sort of thing George Will likens to the sign over the parish church: Important If True. No one in Washington could *conceive* that what I was saying might just possibly *be* true. It was not for lack of my saying it. In 1979, *Newsweek* had a forum on "The Eighties." What will happen? DPM: The Soviet Union could blow up, and the world with it! (Those nukes.) More. Senate Floor, January 10, 1980:

> The Soviet Union is a seriously troubled, even sick society. The indices of economic stagnation and even decline are extraordinary. The indices of social disorder—social pathology is not too strong a term—are even more so. The defining event of the decade might well be the break-up of the Soviet Empire. But that. . . could also be the defining danger of the decade.

New York University Commencement Address, May 24, 1984:

> The truth is that the Soviet idea is spent. It commands some influence in the world, and fear. But it summons no loyalty. History is moving away from it with astounding speed. I would not press the image, but it is as if the whole Marxist-Leninist ethos is hurtling off into a black hole in the Universe. . . . If we must learn to live with military parity, let us keep all the more in mind that we have consolidated an overwhelming economic advantage. . . . Our grand strategy should be to wait out the Soviet Union; its time is passing. . . . It will be clear that in the end freedom did prevail.

*We have an annual report on secrets produced by the Information Security Oversight Office. Last year we created 6,797,720 of them. But the secret of the report on secrets is that it only counts up to Top Secret. All the real secrets are higher than that with code names I am not at liberty to reveal, having taken a kind of vow of secrecy when I became vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

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Address to the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, November 28, 1984:

> The United States is not, and has never been militarily inferior to the Soviets. [Thinking this was] bad enough a mistake. But vastly more important is the underlying, pervasive mistake of not perceiving that the Soviet Union is a declining power.
>
> First that the Marxist-Leninist ideology is now largely a spent force in the world. . . . And second, Soviet society just isn't working. What was to have been a transformation in personal and social relations has simply turned into a mess.

November 1984 is a date of some significance. One month later (as he would describe it in 1990), Mikhail Gorbachev was on vacation in the Crimea and met with the man who would be his foreign minister.

> I shall use the words of E.A. Shevardnadze, with whom I took a walk when on vacation. I was employed on agrarian affairs and I usually took my vacation in December, in late fall or winter. We were walking and talking. He had studied Georgia well and tried to do things there. I had worked in Stavropol Kray and tried to do something there and had ended up in Moscow. We compared all that, and then he said that it had all gone rotten.

Now *they* knew that, and I knew that. But official Washington could not conceive it to be true. Here is Stansfield Turner, then director of Central Intelligence, in *open* congressional testimony in 1979:

> The USSR enters this period. . . with a per capital national output. . . in the same league with Italy, the UK, and Japan.
>
> Soviet GNP is just about three-fifths the United States'.

It was, as we now know, nearer to one-fifth. But this was knowable *then*. It wasn't hard to figure out. But no one could hear. The secrecy system dulled the senses. It cut off criticism. And ever so slightly it cautioned against seeming to be "soft." Threat analysis in the worst possible condition—there's the ticket. To promotion.

Stansfield Turner is a *mensch*. Last year, in *Foreign Affairs*, he wrote of "the enormity" of the intelligence community's "failure to forecast the magnitude of the Soviet crisis." Adding, "Today we hear some revisionist rumblings that the CIA did in fact see the Soviet collapse emerging after all." Some might, he conceded. But "On this one, the corporate view missed by a mile."

Some disagree. During a recent interview on the McNeil-Lehrer program (January 27,1992), the new director of the CIA had this to say:

> Jim Lehrer: [A]gain, to quote Senator Moynihan, he says that you and others for thirty-five years told the American presidents everything they wanted to know about the Soviet Union except the fact that it was collapsing. Is that a bad rap on you all, or did you just miss it?
>
> Robert Gates: I think it is a bad rap. I think that the CIA and the intelligence community from the late 1950s on documented in enormous detail the decline of the Soviet economy and the failures of that society. . . .

In fact, in 1986 the CIA said that the per capita income of East Germany was ahead of West Germany. Some knew better. Anders Aslund, the Swedish economist, wrote in the *Washington Post* (May 19, 1988): "Until recently the CIA stated that the national income per capita was higher in the Soviet Union than in Italy. Anyone who has visited both countries should be able to see for himself that such a statement is absurd."

A bad rap?

Owen Harries has written of the 1980s that conservatives correctly perceived totalitarianism as "an unmitigated evil that had to be fought at all costs." There is an alternative view. It is that the cold war institutions put in place in the late 1940s gradually mutated—from informing policy to making it. There was nothing conspiratorial about this. Organizations behave that way. But we ended up with a president who thought we might have to hold off the Reds at Harlingen, Texas. Two days' drive, as Mr. Reagan put it, from Nicaragua. Good Christ! And so we became

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the world's largest debtor, and now send our president around the world flogging old rags and spare parts. Acheson spotted it at the time:

> I had the gravest forebodings about this organization [the CIA] and warned the President that as set up neither he, the National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was doing or to control it.

But then, he had insufficient foreboding about that National Security Council. In short order, it would replace the State Department in the Executive Office Building, and the NSC director would at times displace the secretary of state. Not in public, of course; but in practice and on papers marked. . . well, I can't say.

Hence. Tell the world we have *no secrets any more.* If they would like to watch our satellites watching them, why, welcome. (A useful thing for "them" to know.) For what it's worth, in 1970 a Task Force organized by the Defense Science Board and headed by Dr. Frederick Seitz proposed just this!

> The Task Force noted that more might be gained than lost if our nation were to adopt—unilaterally, if necessary—a policy of complete openness in all areas of information.

". . . [A]ll areas." But then they decided it wasn't practical. But today it is. A presidential candidate who says so might just get a chance to do so. And end the torment of secrecy which has twisted us body and soul. I cite Shils' conclusion in this slightly different context: "It will lessen the tantalization of secrecy and will save the interior liberty and the sanity of American society."□

Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat) is the senior senator from New York.

The Best of Both Traditions

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

FOR FORTY YEARS, American strategy was defined primarily by the Soviet threat. Now the Soviet Union has collapsed and Americans are debating their future role in the world. Victory in the Cold War has been followed not by a mood of triumphalism, but unease. Many are calling for a return to domestic priorities and less attention to the outside world.

They have a point. The United States has important economic problems that go beyond the current recession. During the Reagan-Bush years, important industrial sectors such as consumer electronics and automobiles slipped badly. The net national savings rate dropped from roughly 8 percent in the 1970s to 5 percent in the late 1980s. The federal government's annual deficit ate up about 3 percent of net savings. The missing savings were made up by capital imports that transformed the United States into the world's largest debtor nation in absolute terms. If the U.S. savings rate remains low and it becomes more difficult to attract foreign capital, investment rates will drop and American productivity and growth will suffer. In addition, public infrastructures need repair, and public education needs improvement if we are to compete effectively in an information-based global economy.

Americans should be wary, however, of a false debate over domestic versus foreign policy needs. In a world of transnational interdependence, domestic and foreign policy are closely intertwined. Unless these domestic problems are addressed, our capacity to conduct an effective foreign policy will be diminished. Domestic reforms such as greater investment and better education are a precondition for a successful foreign policy.

The crucial choice that Americans face is not between domestic and foreign policy, but between consumption and investment. President Bush said that the United States has the

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will but not the wallet. The opposite is closer to the truth. America is a rich country that acts poor. We borrow instead of paying our bills. The United States spends about 31 percent of its GNP on all levels of government, less than any other rich country. If it were not for the political straightjacket of Ronald Reagan's budget deficit, the United States could afford *both* domestic and international security, particularly since military burdens will be lighter after the Cold War. Choices are still open.

The shape of the post-Cold War world will depend in large part on American strategic choices. If unwarranted pessimism and "declinism" lead America to withdraw from its alliances, or turn toward protectionism, Japanese and European anxieties will increase. Moreover as interdependence and the diffusion of power to non-state actors and small states grow, the implications for stability and welfare will depend heavily on whether the largest country takes a lead in organizing collective action. But economists have long noted that if the largest consumer of a collective good like world order does not take the lead in organizing its production, there is little likelihood that the good will be produced by others. That was the situation in the 1920s when the United States refused to join the collective security system of the League of Nations or to cooperate in preserving the stability of the international economy. Isolationist free-riding in the 1920s came back to haunt and hurt Americans a decade later. There is even less room for neo-isolationism today.

Not all Americans agree that American international leadership is important. Without the galvanizing challenge of a totalitarian threat such as fascism or communism, some would follow Pat Buchanan in encouraging America to turn its back on the world.

Why should Americans worry about preserving and mobilizing their power resources for international leadership? The simplest answer is that the realities of global interdependence require our concern. Drawing back from current international commitments will not stop technological change, or the development and global extension of an information-based economy, or a high degree of dependence upon transnational corporations.

Trade is three times more important to the U.S. economy today than it was in 1960. Terrorism, drug traffic, AIDS, and global warming will intrude upon us whether we like it or not. A nuclear weapon sold or stolen from a former Soviet republic could be brought into an American city in the hold of a freighter or the cargo bay of an airliner. Release of ozone-depleting chemicals overseas will increase skin cancer in the United States. A Caribbean country's inability to control drugs or disease will increase their flow across our borders. None of these threats will vanish before incantations of "America first."

Nor are there purely domestic solutions to such transnational problems. The withdrawal of the largest nation will reduce the ability of all states to manage global interdependence. Investing American resources in international leadership must be central to a new strategy.

There are also traditional geopolitical security problems that, if ignored, could come to haunt the United States. We have learned from history that if the strongest state does not lead, the prospects for instability increase. The Cold War may be over, but the reduced role of ideology does not mean the end of history. Nor does it permit us to be indifferent to the balance of power. Even if geopolitical risks are lower, a wise foreign policy is like a homeowner's insurance policy. You do not have to believe it is highly probable your house will catch on fire to make it wise to buy an insurance policy.

The United States has a continuing interest in the security of Europe for several reasons. Europe remains one of the world's centers of industrial and technological strength, and we have strong economic and cultural ties. Twice in this century, the United States has been drawn into European conflicts under the worst possible circumstances. The second Russian revolution is still in its early stages, and Russia retains

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substantial nuclear capabilities. An American security presence in Europe, even at greatly reduced troop levels, has a reassuring effect as European integration proceeds. The United States has a long-term interest in a secure and prosperous Western Europe that gradually draws the East European economies and societies toward market economies and democracy. The primary role will rest with the Europeans, but if the United States were to divorce itself from the process, it might find the future geopolitical situation less stable.

The United States also has geopolitical security interests and a major role to play in the Pacific. At this point, the United States is the only nation with both economic and military power sources in the region. Other Asian leaders support a continued American security presence because they do not want Japan to remilitarize. The domestic political consensus in Japan, moreover, still opposes militarization. The interest of the United States in a stable, balanced Asia and in obtaining Japanese help in other transnational tasks is best served by continuing our alliances and military presence in the region.

Many Americans fear that Japan will replace the Soviet Union as our primary challenger in the post-Cold War era. Some go so far as to predict a new "Cold War" with Japan and eventual military conflict. Such views are far too alarmist. One should not leap too quickly to the conclusion that all trends favor economic power in countries like Japan. While economic power may be a more important component of power resources after the Cold War era, other resources remain important, including military power. The United States has a more diversified "power portfolio" than Japan. Moreover, the United States is well endowed with what can be called "soft power"—the ability to attract others. With a universalistic culture that appeals to many different people and a major role in international institutions, the United States is in this respect well equipped. Fears that Japan will replace the United States or challenge it for a number one position in the 1990s are greatly exaggerated and rest on a severely constricted view of power in international politics. A little more self-confidence on the part of Americans and a little less anxiety about the rise of Japanese economic power would make U.S.-Japan cooperation on the many issues of common transnational concern a great deal easier.

Even so, it would be a mistake to deny that there are important problems in the United States-Japan relationship. As the two societies become more interdependent, policy differences will have a stronger effect. Mercantilist government policies as well as cultural and business practices have made the Japanese market less accessible to American companies than the American market is to Japanese ones. The United States can press Japan to open its markets without falling into the trap of full-blown protectionism that would eventually cripple the competitiveness of our industry in the global marketplace.

HOW WOULD a centrist Democratic foreign policy differ from that of George Bush? The Bush administration deserves credit for successes in the Cold and Gulf Wars. But Democrats can criticize Bush's policy before and at the end of the Gulf War, and the administration's slowness to respond to the collapse of Gorbachev's position. One might add to that the failure of the administration to place a high priority on the looming national security problem of proliferation, as evidenced by its lax export control policy before the Iraq war.

On a positive note, Democrats should put more stress on economic repairs at home and on human rights and democracy abroad. Such an approach may sound hopelessly utopian, but it is not. In the long run, liberal democracies are less likely than dictatorships to go to war with us. Our reputation for promoting democracy and human rights, furthermore, is an important part of our soft power advantage. A *purely* moralistic foreign policy is foolish, but a vision that includes morality is part of the new power reality.

In the past, American foreign policy oscillated between the cynical realist tradition

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of Teddy Roosevelt and Richard Nixon and the liberal idealist tradition of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter. Realists stressed the military balance of power among states; liberals focussed more on transnational values and international institutions. After the Cold War, Americans must learn how to combine the best of both traditions.

In this sense, the Bush administration has had half a foreign policy. By and large, the administration has been adept at the realist tasks of adapting to the unification of Germany, the maintenance of NATO, responding to the Soviet collapse, and preventing Saddam Hussein from gaining hegemony in the Middle East. President Bush has been less successful in articulating compelling values, creating durable institutions, and developing a persuasive vision of the future we should seek. A Democratic president should build on these realist foundations, but add the liberal tradition of democratic values, human rights, and stronger international institutions. He should also point out the close connection between domestic reforms and foreign policy strength. Investment in reform at home and multilateral leadership abroad can provide Americans with a vision of the future that includes both social and international security.□

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A Once-in-a-Lifetime Opportunity

Stephen J. Solarz

AS WE CONTEMPLATE a foreign policy for a Democratic administration, we must resist the temptation to think in partisan terms. The key is not whether a Democratic policy differs from that of the Republicans, but whether it serves the interests of the United States.

Indeed, in many areas and on many issues, the foreign policy of a Democratic president will be characterized by continuity rather than change. Regardless of who wins the election, we will surely remain in NATO; maintain our mutual security treaty with Japan; push for a new GATT agreement; oppose terrorism; seek to prevent nuclear proliferation; promote the Middle East peace process; and continue the effort to revitalize the United Nations. Undoubtedly there will be differences in emphasis and approach—a Democratic administration, for example, would be much more likely to condition most favored nation status for the PRC on progress in human rights. But the ultimate objectives of a Democratic foreign policy are likely to be fairly similar to those of the current administration.

Just as they have for the past half-century, our hopes for a more peaceful and prosperous world will require the United States to maintain an active involvement in world affairs. Although the end of the Cold War has dramatically reduced the threat to our physical survival, indifference to the world around us is even less a prescription for American security today than it was earlier in the century. The lessons of history, the imperatives of technology, the range of modern weaponry, and the emergence of a global economy all point to the conclusion that the United States cannot hide behind its ocean barriers, oblivious to the rest of the world.

With the dissolution of the bipolar world that characterized the Cold War into one infinitely more complex and less certain, Americans will be called upon to deal with a myriad of problems that in the past have been ignored or given short shrift. Among the many issues the next president will face, however, three stand out: First, the new administration will need to devise fresh strategies for the promotion and preservation of democracy. Second, it will need to maintain an international economic order characterized

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by free and fair trade rather than protectionism and xenophobia. And third, it will need to resolve regional disputes before they threaten global peace. How well the next administration handles problems in these three areas will go far in determining its ultimate place in history.

With the end of the Cold War, the promotion of political pluralism rather than the containment of communism must be our preeminent diplomatic objective. Why? Because the preservation of democracy where it already exists, and the promotion of democracy where despotism still prevails, is not only a reflection of American values, but also a requirement of American interests. Democratic countries are not only less likely to go to war, they are also more likely to respect human rights and to embrace the type of free market economics that encourages economic growth.

In those countries that are not already democratic, we ought to condition the offer of U.S. assistance, other than that needed to meet pressing humanitarian concerns, on specific democratic reforms and a real respect for fundamental human rights. In instances where assistance is not available as a lever, economic sanctions should be considered, although we must remember that sanctions work best when they are multilateral rather than unilateral.

We should also significantly expand the National Endowment for Democracy, which provides essential help in strengthening democratic organizations and institutions in fledgling democracies around the world. And we might consider establishing a new international broadcast service, a Radio Free Asia. Just as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty kept alive the flame of freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, so could a Radio Free Asia be a beacon of hope for hundreds of millions of oppressed people in the Far East.

One of the most significant challenges the next administration will face will be to facilitate a successful and stable transition from one-party dictatorship to multi-party democracy in the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Over the past several years we have witnessed in this region one of the profound political and human dramas of our times. It is very much in our interest to insure that this process goes forward. Indeed, given the enormity of the stakes, it would be inconceivable for us simply to stand aside, watching passively from the sidelines, while an entire region faces the very real possibility of disintegrating into chaos and anarchy.

The United States should take the lead in putting together a major package of Western assistance for these emerging democracies—something far beyond the limited assistance we are now providing. This aid should be made available only if the recipients are prepared to follow through with real, as opposed to superficial, political and economic reforms that are worked out in advance with the donor nations. Admittedly, Americans are increasingly skeptical about spending U.S. dollars overseas. But if we could help bring about the creation of market economies and parliamentary democracies in the former Soviet Union, while facilitating peaceful relations among the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, it would constitute the most significant triumph for U.S. diplomacy since the Marshall Plan and NATO saved Western Europe from the threat of communist subversion and Soviet expansionism more than forty years ago.

ULTIMATELY, the survival of democracy around the world will depend on the extent to which democratic governments are able to translate the promise of democracy into a better life for their people. It would be a serious mistake to take the survival of democracy for granted. Unless the leaders of the newly emerging democracies can demonstrate that political pluralism and economic security are compatible concepts, the people may look to demagogues and would-be dictators for a solution to the underlying social and economic problems that confront them.

In this contest between pluralism and poverty, the United States must take the lead

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in creating more open markets and an international free trade system. If democracy is to have a chance to succeed abroad, it is essential that we avoid the kind of protectionist policies that could lead to trade and tariff wars of the sort that contributed to the Great Depression and the Second World War.

Specifically, we must continue our efforts to create an open global trading system, which in practical terms means pushing forward with the current talks in an effort to obtain a GATT agreement. The negotiation of regional free trade agreements offers another possibility for promoting our objective of fashioning a global environment conducive to the unhampered flow of goods and services. In particular, emphasis should be given to completing the negotiations for a Mexican-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

Building an open international economic order will also require us to address our problems with Japan. For all the tensions that have developed with Tokyo in recent years, the U.S.-Japanese relationship remains our most important bilateral relationship. To be sure, where the Japanese (or any of our trade partners) have erected unjust and unfair barriers to U.S. exports, it may be necessary to threaten specific and limited retaliation in order to force the removal of these obstacles. But we must also keep in mind that it is impossible to envision a stable and prosperous twenty-first century without a peaceful and cooperative bilateral relationship between our two countries.

As one means of correcting our current trade imbalance with Japan, we should closely explore the possibility of negotiating a Japanese-American free trade agreement. By establishing a level playing field on which the two economies would compete, such an agreement would take away the argument of American protectionists that the rules of the economic game are biased in favor of Japan. If such an agreement proves impossible to reach, we should certainly take steps to remove specific irritants to the relationship. Above all, the next administration must insure that the relationship between Japan and the United States is one of cooperation, not conflict.

One of the great lessons of the twentieth century is that events thousands of miles from our shores, and remote from the concerns of most Americans—Sarajevo in 1914, Danzig in 1939, Pusan in 1950, Pleiku in 1965, and Bubiyan in 1990—have a way of intruding into American lives and exacting a heavy price in blood and treasure. But the lessons of this century also suggest that we can increase our prospects of avoiding involvement in foreign wars if we can resolve regional disputes before they break out into full-fledged conflict.

In the Middle East, for instance, American leadership will remain essential. The opening of face-to-face talks between the Arabs and the Israelis represents an encouraging start, but we must recognize that the negotiations are going to be long and arduous. We will have to display patience and persistence in carrying out our role as the honest broker. Without a willingness on the part of the United States to play an active part in narrowing differences between the parties, the prospects for peace will be grim.

Ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, and differences over how to divide the component elements of the Red Army all suggest that there is also a serious potential for conflict among the states of the former Soviet Union. A war between Russia and Ukraine, for instance, would make the current conflict between Serbia and Croatia look like a tea party. We must, therefore, make it absolutely clear to all the former Soviet republics that our aid depends upon the peaceful resolution of any differences they may have. We should also encourage the United Nations and the European Community to become more involved in efforts to maintain peace and resolve conflicts without a recourse to arms.

On the Korean peninsula it appears that progress is being made in the effort to persuade Pyongyang to forego its extraordinarily dangerous and destabilizing effort to obtain nuclear weapons. We should encourage this movement through a judicious combination

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of carrots and sticks. By indicating a willingness to move toward normalization of relations with the North in the context of Pyongyang's willingness to permit inspections of nuclear facilities, we can give the North Koreans a positive incentive to cooperate. And by making it clear to the North Koreans that their failure to permit inspection of their nuclear facilities will lead to efforts to secure Security Council sanctions and possibly other forms of concerted international action against them, we can generate significant disincentives for a continuation of their nuclear weapons programs.

THERE ARE, of course, many other issues that also cry out for vigorous U.S. leadership. We must give a higher priority to the problems of the global environment, including the depletion of the ozone layer, the population explosion, and acid rain, all of which require multilateral programs and action. We must reassess the purposes and methods of our foreign aid program, with a view toward shifting resources from security to economic development.

One of the most hopeful trends in recent years has been the more active role of the United Nations in resolving disputes in southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. We should seek ways to strengthen this and other international organizations. One means of solidifying support for the UN would be to make important regional powers such as Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, Egypt, and Nigeria permanent members of the Security Council, albeit without a veto. By elevating them, we would simply be acknowledging the reality that if we want other countries to work with us in establishing a peaceful and prosperous world, we have to allow them a voice in giving shape and substance to that vision.

Ultimately, of course, our capacity to influence events abroad will depend on our ability to strengthen our economy at home and to create a society that elicits admiration around the world. This should be our number one priority. A successful domestic policy does not guarantee an effective foreign policy, but a failure to solve our growing social and economic problems and to reestablish a competitive foundation for our industrial base will surely render an effective foreign policy over the long run impossible.

The policies of the next administration will have a profound impact on whether the twenty-first century will be a century of peace and prosperity or a century of war and want. The administration that takes office next January faces a once-in-a-generation opportunity. A new world is on the verge of creation. If we shirk our responsibilities, if we fail to seize this historic but fleeting moment, we will have frittered away what is undoubtedly the best chance in our lifetime to create a world of political freedom and economic and social justice. But if we act with boldness and creativity, we can usher in a better future not only for the American people but for all mankind. Surely this is a course to which the next administration—Democratic or Republican—should be committed.□

Stephen J. Solarz, a Democratic congressman from New York, is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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

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The Mark of History

Norman Stone

AMONG THE MOST surreal events in a surreal century was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was concluded in the early hours of March 3, 1918—curiously enough, the first diplomatic event ever to be filmed. Sitting there, sweating under the arc-lights in their high military collars and elaborate boots, are carved-faced or weasely representatives of the German Empire and its allies. On the other side are Russians—most of them Communists, but with some technical military advisers from the czarist army and navy. They had come to be humiliated; they were humiliated. For the treaty threw Russia "back to the frontiers of pre-Petrine Muscovy," as a German foreign secretary said. The czarist empire was destroyed.

Brest-Litovsk is now "the forgotten peace," the title of Wheeler-Bennett's classic book on the subject. It was in force for only a few months, because the German army collapsed on the Western Front and its eastern deals were thereby annulled. In November and December, German garrisons withdrew from the far-flung areas in which they were stationed—Lithuania, Finland, even Georgia (from which the German foreign office could dream of "a German land route to China.") Easily the largest of these occupied territories was Ukraine: it was the richest part of the Russian Empire, and the chief point of the meeting at Brest-Litovsk. Its soil and climate made it the granary of the empire, and it had minerals, some of them rare, in quantity. With over thirty million people in a country larger than France, and with its own language, Ukraine had some claim to independence. If it became independent, that would be the end of Russia: with Ukraine, Russia would be a United States; without it, a Canada. At Brest-Litovsk the Germans recognized Ukrainian independence.

Lenin forced his followers to accept this, for the time being. The revolutionaries did not have the strength to take on the German army, and they resisted, therefore, in different ways. Meanwhile, a German army, under General von Eichhorn, moved ponderously into Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, and other industrial centers. In a faint echo of today, a German "Economic Staff," made up of bankers and industrialists, also arrived to inspect Ukraine's resources. Its secretary—another surreal touch—was one Kurt Riezler, who had been the private secretary of the German chancellor, and whose diaries revealed the German plot to wage war in 1914. In later life, as a professor at Chicago, he was to chair a conference of scientists called by President Truman to debate the morality of dropping the A-bomb on Japan. The Austrians, who occupied Odessa, added another curious feature when, from Vienna to Kiev,

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they instituted the first regular civilian airflight in the world.

Ukraine, protected by the Central Powers, thus came into existence. Its flag was the present-day one—blue for the Black Sea, yellow for the corn fields—and a government sat in the old imperial governor-general's palaces in Kiev. This government was not a success. Its members were often students. It came under attack from all quarters. Communists gained control of towns and villages in the center and east, and in order to stop them the German army fanned out over Ukraine: "self-important little German lieutenants," in Mikhail Bulgakov's phrase, bullied the peasants. They even arrested the government in its parliament and replaced it with another. Its head was a czarist grandee, Pavlo Skoropadsky, who knew only kitchen-Ukrainian, though he took an ancient title of Cossack chieftains—"Hetman" or *Ataman*, roughly meaning "warlord." When the Germans withdrew, so did he.

In the upshot, there was multi-cornered warring in Ukraine—Communists, White Russians, Ukrainian nationalists, Poles, even some peasant anarchists. By 1921, Communists were in charge, and in 1924 the bulk of the country was formally included in the Soviet Union, while the western part was taken by Poland. Thus Ukraine's first modern effort at independence ended in failure, and debate as to the causes of this still goes on. Was it just that Ukraine was an artificial concept, used at Brest-Litovsk for the purposes of the Germans, but without much appeal for Ukrainians who really felt quite close to Russians? Was it the inexperience of the Ukrainian leaders? Was failure the result of the bad behavior of Germans, Poles, and Russians, and not therefore a reflection on the quality of Ukrainian nationalism? Opinions varied. The whole question boiled down to this: How Russian was Ukraine? This is still a question today, as Ukraine embarks upon another period of independence.

There are, not surprisingly, various versions of the history behind all this. In London, at Holland Park, exiled Ukrainians put up a statue of Grand Duke Wolodymyr—a millennium ago the ruler of Kiev, spreading Christianity in his lands. Russians smirk when they see this, for to them he is Grand Duke Vladimir, creator in the year 980 A.D. of the first Russian state, Kievan Rus; not Ukrainian at all. Rus developed brilliantly for a time, one testimony to it being the fantastic cave monastery in Kiev. It is a vast warren, inside which, in a miraculous state of preservation (maybe literally—so far the scientists have never been able to explain it) repose the earthly remains of endless monks and Kievan rulers. It is guarded by ever more elaborate churches; even now, Kiev is best-known for its skyline, across the river Dnieper, of golden domes.

Rus spread out, not as one single state, but as a set of principalities—"all the Ruses"—and one of them was to be Kiev's successor, Moscow, which had *its* fantastic collection of churches and monasteries. Kievan Rus was on the map of Christendom, though it was the Christendom of Constantinople, not Rome. It had grand international connections—one curiosity being that the daughter of Harold shot-in-the-eye-at-Hastings married into the ruling family. (Via further marriages, in Hungary and Flanders, one descendant was Philippa of Hainault, who married Edward III of England, so that the present Queen Elizabeth II descends from both victor and defeated at Hastings.) But Rus did not last. In the early thirteenth century the Mongols swept in, the last of the great migrations. Kiev was devastated. Muscovy was dominated from the thirteenth to the end of the fifteenth century by the Mongols, and then defeated them. The ruler of Muscovy, the czar with his Kremlin, thus took over as "Autocrat of all the Russias," i.e. the principalities of old Rus. But not in fact all of them, for the Kievan ones came under Poland.

The Polish Impact

THE POLES dominated all Ukraine in various ways from the fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, and some of it to the twentieth. This vast, under-

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

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populated, flat, and rich country was tempting to its neighbors. Poland plunged in, her military magnates carving out great estates for themselves, and Jesuits built baroque churches far to the east of today's Poland. There were also Mongols—now called Tatars—who had their own Khanate in the Crimea; and, as an added peculiarity, the Crimea also contained a Rip van Winkel population of Goths, descendants of the destroyers of the Roman Empire who had stayed behind in the Crimea. (They died out, but survived long enough for an enterprising sixteenth-century Fleming to record their speech, so that we know much more about Germanic philology than we might otherwise have known.) Under the Poles, Catholicism came in; so did serfdom, which the magnates imposed in order to work their estates. These were already exporting to the West, along the river routes, and soon much of the middleman activity was undertaken by migrant Germans or, more particularly, Jews. They arrived in great numbers in south-eastern Poland and Ukraine. On the Ukrainian side, there were people who fled from the Catholicism and the serfdom.

There were also people who fled from the increasing exactions of Muscovy. Such were the Cossacks, who have been claimed as the first Ukrainian nationalists. In this vast land they found a safe haven on a great island in the river Dnieper, at Zaporozhe. Mad courage, strong drink, outstanding horsemanship, and an exhilarating dance, the *gopak*, have gone down in history as their stock in trade. Their relations with Catholics and Jews may be imagined. In the seventeenth century, under their Hetman, Bohdan Chmelnitsky, they pushed the Poles far to the west, but they needed help from Muscovy, which did not come free. In 1654, at the Treaty of Pereyaslavl, they accepted union with that land. There were rebellions thereafter, the best known being that of Hetman Mazeppa, in alliance with Swedes and Turks, at the start of the eighteenth century. But from the seventeenth century on, half of Ukraine was ruled from Moscow. The country remained so divided until 1945, when Stalin reunified it. Not surprisingly, there are very considerable differences between what had been the Polish and Russian parts.

The Poles lost more of Ukraine to Russia in the later eighteenth century, and the rest,

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when Poland collapsed as a state, fell to the Habsburg Empire—Austria-Hungary, as it later became known. Here, in the province of Galicia, the towns were Polish-speaking, with large Jewish settlements and sometimes a German element. The largest of them was Lvov, now Lviv, a spectacular baroque city which was the commercial center of the Polish part of Ukraine. The estates were in the hands of Polish noblemen, some of them splendid grandees. Nearly everyone who acquired an education took up Polish, the gentleman's language. There had of course been Ukrainian noblemen, but in the western areas they too became Polonized (there are a great many Ukrainian names in Poland).

Without the sponsorship of an aristocracy or a middle-class or a state or even a unified province, the Ukrainian language, in an age before mass primary schooling, did not stand much chance. The peasants spoke an obviously Slavonic tongue, but one divided into many dialects. Collectively these Ukrainians were known as "Ruthenes"—a word that came from a Polish dog-Latin expression, meaning "Russians," that is, inhabitants of Rus. Most of them were illiterate until the late nineteenth century. Those who lived on the southern, Hungarian side of the Carpathian mountains were often so poor, and their diets so bad, that the young men's voices did not break before adulthood, allowing many to escape conscription.

The divisions of the "Ruthenes" go on and on. If readers will bear with one of these boxes-within-boxes European complications, about which there was (and is) much feeling: there were tribes—Boyki, Lemki, and Hutzuls—each with a different dialect, and each in turn differing from the Ukrainian spoken on the Russian side of the border. A mining director in the Donbass told me last year that even now, if he visits his family in Ternopil, in the western part of Ukraine, they cannot really understand each other. The basic difference is that the dialects of "Ruthene" were closer to Polish, or Slovak, whereas in eastern Ukraine the language was closer to Russian. In the case of the Hungarian "Ruthenes" on the southern side of the mountains, the difference was so substantial that the Hungarians, in an effort to divide and rule, made a plausible case that Ruthenes were a nationality separate from Ukrainians. Recently there have been mass-meetings in sub-Carpathian Ukraine for autonomous status—a possible source of future trouble, particularly given the siting of several missiles in this fog-shrouded, forest-mountain region.

There is another very important difference between east and west Ukrainians: religion. Under Russian rule, it was of course Orthodoxy that spread, and Ukrainians were well to the fore in the Russian Church. But as Polish Catholicism advanced in the sixteenth century, some of the Orthodox made their peace with Rome. This took the form of a compromise. Orthodox rites and practices were maintained, including the marriage of priests (this still causes problems). But the authority of the Roman Pope was accepted otherwise, which means that the services are now conducted in the Ukrainian vernacular, not in Church Slavonic. These Greek-Catholic "Uniate" churches predominated in the Polish and Hungarian parts of Ukraine, though Orthodoxy also survived. Relations between Orthodox, Uniate, and Catholic were not generally good; Uniates had had much trouble from Polish Catholicism before 1939, and were suppressed by Stalin after the Second World War. Their re-emergence, with the handing-back of St. George's Cathedral in Lviv, is only very recent, and quarrels are already going on as to whether the Orthodox, who had been tolerated by Moscow, should hand back churches. Uniates regard themselves as the spear-head of Ukrainian nationalism.

Their church, in Austro-Polish days, did much for education, fostered the literary language, and, out of a mainly peasant mass, also fostered a small middle-class that, before 1914, was beginning to thrive. Last year, visiting Lviv, I met a martyr of the cause, V. Shukevich, who since the age of twelve had served decades in the camps and been blinded there, because his father had led the last

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partisan resistance movement against Stalin. He showed me photographs of his family—standard middle-class Central European respectability, with the daughters playing the piano while the sons learned Latin. I had been accustomed, while studying Austro-Hungarian history, to regard "Ruthenes" as just peasants. To discover a real middle-class came as a surprise. But historians have been able to show that, even among the peasants, a substantial enough class of reasonably prosperous farmers was developing before 1914, with educational institutions to match. The Austro-Polish university system, as far back as 1877, took cognizance, and various classes were conducted in Ukrainian at the University of Lviv. Most Poles at that time, and between the wars, regarded the "Ruthenes" as crypto-Poles: in the 1840s some had even accused the Austrians of having "invented the Ruthenes" in order to have an argument against Polish nationalism. The history-writing behind such sentiments can be imagined.

Late in 1918, as Poland was being reconstituted, the Ukrainians briefly seized Lviv and proclaimed their own state, uniting it with the east Ukraine as the Germans moved out of Kiev in January 1919. The Poles soon re-took Lviv, and marched east, briefly occupying Kiev themselves in May 1920. The war between Poland and the Bolsheviks ended with a division of Ukraine. The border was some way to the east of the old Austrian one: the Poles took most of Volhynia and Podolia, where there were many Polish land-owners. There was much tension in the inter-war period, and the situation generally seems to have had much in common with that of the English Pale in Ireland: a great deal of day-to-day amity and collaboration, and the occasional unpredictable upsurge of hatred fomented by people from "outside." The Polish administration was more of a nuisance than a tyranny to the Ukrainians; in the end the two sides did have much in common.

But there were endless problems, and in 1939 when the Germans and Russians marched in, there were eruptions. Nazis and Communists exploited the gulf between Ukrainians and Poles; there were atrocities in Volhynia. In 1945, Stalin took over most of the Polish part of Ukraine, five million Poles being bodily moved out to the Poland of today's borders. There was still in southern Poland a population of Ukrainians—the Lemki. You can to this day see their villages: wooden stave churches, with very sharply-pointed roofs that do not let the snow settle, and with cottages that are colored blue, on the premise—true or not—that flies avoid blue. But there are very few Lemki left. In 1945, as Stalin took eastern Poland, the Poles took eastern Germany in compensation, moving its people out, and dumping them in rump Germany. They also decided to use the opportunity to finish what was left of their Ukrainian question. They uprooted the Lemki in the south, and packed them off to live in the ex-German lands of the northwest. Their descendants were Polonized, though there is still one Ukrainian deputy in the Polish parliament, and a Greek-Catholic church in Przemysl was recently given back to the Uniates.

There *are* possible tensions still between Ukrainians and Poles, and the Lviv press *can* be resentful of Polish pretensions. Border-crossing can be made quite difficult and irritating (the frontier was closed last year for a time because so many Russians were trying to escape through it to Poland). Among exiled Poles and Ukrainians of the older generation not much love seems to be lost, and there will be problems over smart practices by Polish traders in Lviv and Kiev, cheating peasants who can be naive about inflations. But on the whole the curtain has come down on Act V of the Polish-Ukrainian tragedy, and we can begin a new play, with a new Ukraine. As in the thirteenth century, the Poles—with, in the main, the cooperation of Germans—are looking west, not east.

Surviving Russia

NOWADAYS the great problem for Ukraine is relations with Russia. This is a long story. The western Ukrainians unquestionably had a national identity—their

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own churches, language, potential territory, etc.—and nowadays they vote overwhelmingly for independence and for the non-Communist Vyacheslav Chornovil as president (another heroic figure with years in the camps to his credit). In eastern Ukraine, starting very roughly at the line from Kiev to Odessa, we are in a different country. It too voted overwhelmingly for independence. But it also voted for Leonid Kravchuk as president, a man who for years and years was the chief of ideology of the Communist Party in the Ukrainian SSR. He won the election and now reigns in the fancy-Stalinist buildings of the government in Kiev, names his own people to represent Ukraine in the West, and of late, rather surrealistically, we have had Sir Geoffrey Howe and Professor Shirley Williams, from Anglo-Harvard, turning up as "Europe" on his door-step. That he has nuclear weapons helps. That he gets half of the officer corps of the old Soviet navy in Sevastopol on his side helps. That he can sew up elections helps. It is an interesting business, a testimony to much cunning. What lies behind it?

Ukraine in the early days was "Little Russia"—joining White Russia and Red Russia (=the Carpathians) in the company of Great Russia (=Moscow and Siberia). These were the "Ruses." Languages varied, but in most "Ruses" Church Slavonic was a common bond, and by the late eighteenth century literary Russian had been fixed. Church Slavonic usages had more effect upon it than upon literary Ukrainian, and literary Ukrainian had more in the way of Polish influence, but the two sides understood each other quite easily, as would, say, Norwegians and Swedes. For many years, "Little Russians" did not seem to be the products of another civilization at all—they just came from somewhere else, with their own accent (tending to replace "g" with an "h," unknown further north). They were Orthodox. That—and the difference with Catholicism—mattered greatly. Until the age of mass-nationalism got under way in the nineteenth century, you felt greater solidarity with someone of the same faith than with someone of the same language, and "Little Russians" on the whole had good relations with Great Russians.

Besides, "Little Russians" were of good value. Russians called Ukraine "our Italy"—a land of sun and song, where the people were rather fun, and had some historical monuments. Ukrainians would turn up in Muscovy with a reasonably good Western education, because they had attended institutions that commanded respect—academies set up by the Polish Catholic Orders in Counter-Reformation times, and, later, serving sprigs of the Polish nobility who still owned much of the Ukrainian land. True, there were problems. The open nature of the southerners clashed with the suspicious orderliness of the northerners, as tended to happen in every country large enough to have a north and a south that were climatically different. In France they used to say, "C'est le Nord qui travaille et le Midi qui gouverne." The South charmed, sang, fornicated, and let other people do the work. The North devilled away without imagination at accounts, laws, appointments, hygiene and other charmless Protestant virtues. Northerners sneered at Ukrainians as *khokhli*—the plume of hair which was kept from the otherwise bald head of a Cossack, shaved in order not to have head-lice. Ukrainians sneered at Northerners as *katsapy*—the goat-beard waggling away upon earnest, preachy accountant-faces.

But in the eighteenth century pushy Ukrainians made their way into Muscovy. The gentry became "Russified," speaking the Great Russian dialect as imperial titles were distributed among friends. (Much the same process happened in Scotland at about the same time, as penniless tribal heads entered the English aristocracy.) There were spectacular Ukrainian promotions. One Oleksa Rozumovsky, a Ukrainian singer of great talent, married Peter the Great's daughter Empress Elizabeth, and turned into Prince Alexey Razumovsky—acquiring a title from the Holy Roman emperor, and having descendants to whom Beethoven dedicated the middle String Quartets. Metaphor is not too strained if we

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say that the great tune of eighteenth-century Russia was the combining of the military instruments of Ukraine with the accounting skills of the Protestant Balts. The result? A place that had been barbarous and bankrupt in 1700 defeated Napoleon a century later. These military skills of Ukraine, incidentally, have continued and, until the show collapsed, Ukrainians supplied a disproportionately large share of the non-commissioned officers of the Soviet armed forces.

A Matter of Language

IN THE LATE nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with only brief interruptions, the Ukrainian language was not respected in the Russian state. It counted either as the pidgin of peasants or, where spoken in the western Ukraine, as an ugly Polonized version of corrupt Russian—a view very recently repeated even by Solzhenitsyn in his essay in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on "The Regeneration of Russia." I will confess here a personal mistake: I had always assumed that this line was correct. Europe in the late nineteenth century did see various languages take on literary form, in a way that past ages would never have imagined possible. Modern Slovene propaganda is quite honest about this, to its great credit. The Flemish in Belgium had a language, originally Dutch, that split into endless peasant dialects which were mutually incomprehensible, the done thing being to talk French. Flemish was in fact something of an invention by foreigners—French priests, even a Scotsman by the name of John McLeod.

I had always assumed that Ukrainian was in this category. It is a perfectly worthy one—after all, what was English in the tenth century but a sort of Germanic Creole, simplified in order for herrings to be exchanged in the North Sea? Peoples looking for mass education and whose aristocracies and upper middle-classes had assimilated another culture invariably try to standardize and modernize a peasant tongue lacking modern expressions. Yes, some of the process is bound to be vainglorious and even bogus. But you can never get round the root of the problem, which is simply: How does one make a seven-year-old literate in a language that is not its parents'?

As things turn out, the Ukrainian language is not quite straightforwardly in such a category. There were a distinctive literature and educational institutions. Ukrainian was written with its own form of Cyrillic. True, on the Polish, Catholic side of the border, it was not the educated man's language, though the churches did keep it going. On the Russian side, matters were more complex until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century. Quite serious scholars used the Ukrainian variant of Russian and, according to Professor Isabela de Madariaga, our main authority on the reign of Catherine the Great, there was a Ukrainian mafia at work in the eighteenth century. By the end of that century, they were all over St. Petersburg, and Russian governors of Ukraine would easily "go native." Bezborodko, Razumovsky, Repnin, Kapnist, Kochubey—some of the greatest names in old Russia were Ukrainian. In the early nineteenth century, scholars would explore Ukrainian dialects with a view to furthering pan-Slavic causes: what *was* the unity of the Slavs? In those days, "Little Russia" was perfectly respectable in Great Russian eyes, and the two got along together quite well.*

Ukrainian writers sometimes go much further than this. They will argue, for instance in *Za Vilnu Ukrainu*, the first free newspaper in Ukraine, issued since 1990 in Lviv, that Ukrainian is as old as Sanskrit, that it was the language of old Rus, that "Russian" is a Ukrainian pidgin. They will say that, despite the Mongols, Ukraine remained part of Europe and had European educational and cultural institutions, whereas "Russia" was a deformed country, two centuries of Mongol rule having introduced ways that were definitely non-European, such as all-powerful rulers claiming mandates of heaven. Without

*There is a very good book on this in English: David Saunders' *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985).

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too much difficulty they might also argue that land-holding in Ukraine was different, in that there was less tolerance of wasteful communal agriculture than in Russia, and hence greater productivity. In other words, Ukraine would have been the successor to Rus as upholder of Europe in the east had it not been for treacherous Poles and barbarian Russo-Mongols. If they were to go on, Ukrainian patriots might even claim that a great proportion of the "Russian" composers and writers—Gogol for one—was really Ukrainian, just writing in Russian.

SOME OF THIS is politically only a harmless curiosity, of some interest to historians. In much the same way, I, as a Scotsman, would say of England that her civilization, though obviously bigger and richer than Scotland's, would have gone to sleep had it not been for Edinburgh and Glasgow. This does not make me a Scottish nationalist. However, even moderate Ukrainian patriots were driven into nationalism by the behavior of Moscow in the last century. Allowed to develop a culture which they themselves could regard with respect, and which was not at all far removed from Moscow's, they would never have turned into separatists. Given a civilized Russian state, in other words, there would not have been a problem. In eastern and central Ukraine, relations between Ukrainians and Russians were quite close, with much inter-marriage, and a popular dialect that was a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian. Orthodoxy prevailed, though there was (and is) tension as to whether there should be a head in Ukraine or in Moscow. When it came to fighting at the end of 1917, there was great difficulty in actually getting the two sides to fight, Ukrainian nationalist forces relying mainly on troops from the west.

However, the czarist government of the late nineteenth century created great problems because it reversed the tolerant policies of the past and Russified public life and public education. Not only Ukrainian suffered, but other languages like Estonian. In Ukraine, people had tried to develop the language and literature along much the same lines as in the past. In the late nineteenth century, Ivan Franko wrote social-realist novels *à la* Zola, and Taras Shevchenko pioneered the literary language. There were efforts at Ukrainian education, originating from west of the Austrian border. The czarist government would have none of it. Successive ministers of education insisted on Russification. It helped of course that the cities—Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv—had a large Russian-speaking population. And at a time when a revolutionary atmosphere prevailed, it served the government's purpose to divide the local Russians from the Ukrainians. In any event, in the Russian part of Ukraine the Ukrainian language was purposely pushed toward a quaint, peasant status. Ambitious Ukrainians either turned to Russian, or, in a few cases, took up nationalism in consort with their fellows across the Austrian border.

The question was which side could more effectively mobilize the peasants—who *did* speak Ukrainian but who also, usually, had good relations with Russians, even if they were their landlords. In 1918, the starting-point of this essay, the peasantry was very far from clearly Ukrainian-nationalist. None of the Kiev governments managed to enlist its unqualified support. On the contrary, the Bolsheviks managed to find allies in the villages and the cities—"the workers and peasants" of legend. We still need to have a decent study of this, but the fact is that the first Ukrainian republic found support from the masses only in patches, mainly in west Ukraine. In the east, there were anarchist bands and the conservative forces seemed to lack roots, while the nationalists meant little. At any rate, the Bolsheviks had no great difficulty in taking control, once the Germans, the Whites, and the Poles had been removed.

Should one argue from this, as nationalists do, that Ukraine was just too weak, and her leaders too inexperienced? That the Germans were too German? Or does one say, as

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E.H. Carr did, that Ukrainian nationalism in Russia was artificial and easily pushed over? Is it true that the Ukrainian nationalists were as anti-Semitic as has been claimed and, if so, why? The pogroms of the nationalists have entered legend, but, on the other hand, Professor Israel Getzler, if I do not take his name in vain, told me that Ukrainians liked their daughters to marry Jews, on the grounds that Jews did not drink and were good fathers. With the opening of new sources for Ukrainian history, we may find answers to some of these questions.

When Lenin took over Ukraine, it was on the understanding that Ukrainian culture would be allowed to flourish. So it was—for the decade in which some Bolshevik promises were actually kept. Orest Subtelny's good recent history of Ukraine gives an account of the boom in schools, newspapers, and theaters in the 1920s. Stalin put a stop to all that, and went back to the Russification of the czars. The Ukrainian intelligentsia was imprisoned and executed. And the discrimination against Ukrainian continued in one way or another right up to 1990: in that year, the year of Ukrainian independence, you could not buy a typewriter in Kiev with the three distinctive Ukrainian letters.

But Stalin went beyond that, striking at the very roots of Ukraine. The collectivization of agriculture after 1929 particularly affected Ukraine, where there were a great many (good) individual farmers. Their grain-reserves were taken away, even the seed corn. Starvation began, and went on—a man-made famine, forcing the Ukrainians into the collectives. Eight million people starved to death, a process recently revealed fully in Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*.

IN THE 1930s and beyond, it can be legitimately claimed that an effort was made to wipe out Ukraine. Kiev turned into a dreary and mournful "Sovcit" like Kharkiv and Odessa, the land ruined, the churches knocked down, the intelligentsia in camps. But Stalin also reunified the ruin he had created. In 1939, as part of his bargain with Hitler, he took the Ukrainian parts of Poland, and shipped the Poles out of them (sometimes murderously). The "Ukrainian SSR," stretching from the north-east shores of the Black Sea to the Hungarian border south of the Carpathians, had its seat at the United Nations. In that way, Stalin could claim to have satisfied Ukrainian nationalism. But the state that he created existed by virtue of millions of Ukrainian corpses, and its main language was Russian—the language of the cities, of administration, of schools.

Underlying it all was of course a mass of resentment. In the Second World War, there had been Ukrainians who looked to Germany, as in 1918, for a way out. The Ukrainians who had lived in pre-war Poland were often loyal to pre-war Poland, but there were some, especially in conditions of defeat, who looked for terms. They did so especially in June 1941, when the invading Germans found that the NKVD, in departing, had massacred all the inmates in the prisons of Lviv and nearby Drohobych. A Ukrainian SS Division did indeed exist. But there was also a resistance-movement—my General Shukevich—which fought all-comers on the grounds that Ukraine had the right to exist as an independent nation, looking west. The resistance movement was not finished until 1952, and the Stalinists blinded the little boy of its leader.

In this essay, I hope to have shown various things from the history of Ukraine that will be a guide for the future. In this part of the world, more than most, history matters. It has come back at us with a vengeance, with the declaration of an independent Ukraine, and President Bush and our foreign services really *should* have understood.

Inhabitants of Ukraine have had enough of ambiguity. They want to be part of Christendom, where they have always belonged. They like Europe, by which they mean America. They have had a very bad time of it in our century, but they deserve well of the next. Ukraine was Stalin's biggest victim. May it be his greatest retribution—with our help.□

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
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The Awakening

George Urban

TRAVELLING IN Ukraine and Russia in November-December 1991, I found the range of Ukrainian lifestyles and the scale of fears and hopes about Ukrainian independence surprising, even though I had prepared myself for the sort of transition familiar to us from the Third World—an under-educated and apathetic peasantry being pushed along the road of national consciousness and reform by a small, highly educated, Westernized, and articulate intelligentsia. Some farmers I met less than fifty miles from Kiev found it difficult to understand what precisely the December 1 elections and the national referendum were about, and were curious to know what was "expected" of them (echoes of the Soviet and czarist past). Others, when asked about their voting intentions, said they would "of course" vote for the man in power because men in power were bound "to know best"; otherwise they would not be in power. And vote they did, in a majority, for Leonid Kravchuk.

I doubt whether Kravchuk's position as president will prove secure even in the medium term. His *apparat* is that of the old Communist Party and he has, despite his *volte face*, much to answer for. For thirty years, he was a party functionary and as late as 1989–1990, he was the head of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Department for Ideology. "It was only three years ago that I knew the real truth about the famine in the Ukraine," Kravchuk stated on Moscow TV on February 11, 1992. The man most likely to do well at the next elections is Vyacheslav Chornovil, head of the nationalist *Rukh* movement. There are also other very able and Western-oriented potential candidates such as Levko Lukianenko on the center-right, and Ihor Yukhnovskii in the center, who struck me as likely to attract confidence.

In particular, there is Ivan Drach, president of *Rukh* and a highly respected national poet, with whom I spent the best part of a day. Drach is cast in the mold of those nineteenth-century South and Central European literary nationalists (Mazzini, Petöfi, Mickiewicz) who had inspired and eventually won the struggle for the emancipation of their nations. Walking in the footsteps of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's own nineteenth-century poet-statesman, Drach may prove to be a seminal figure in the independent Ukraine, not unlike Havel in Czechoslovakia, though with a less telling record of resistance.

My host throughout the visit was Ivan Hel, deputy chairman of the West Ukrainian Parliament and a lay preacher with a long record of resistance and suffering. It tells us

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something about the disparity between the speed of reforms at the top and the apparent reluctance with which reforms are pursued in the bureaucracy that Hel had received his rehabilitation only a day or two before my arrival in Lviv. He read to me some of the words he had spoken to his accusers before being given an eighteen-year prison sentence many years ago. Here was a rare instance of a (relatively) happy ending to a familiar modern story, for Hel's predictions about the irrepressibility of religious freedom and national aspirations have been borne out by the facts, and he is fortunate to be alive to see them.

Chornovil had gone through a similar ordeal (sixteen years) and Lukianenko a worse one (twenty-seven years in prison). I found the latter a drawn, remarkably calm, pensive, almost saint-like figure who, while talking practical politics, seemed nevertheless to have his mind's eye fixed on something deeper than the hustings, as though his many years behind bars had given him a glimpse of a more profound spiritual universe and perhaps of some peace that passes a non-prisoner's understanding.

Chornovil struck me as politically the most astute of the leading presidential candidates (apart from Kravchuk himself); he did, in fact, attract 24 percent of the national vote, despite *Rukh*'s unpreparedness. It would have taken him another six months, Chornovil told me, to prepare the ground for a better result than the polls indicated would be coming his way, but one day before the elections he still thought there would be a run-off that he could win. He has been, as we now know, proven wrong. Yet I am persuaded that his chances of being at the head of a future Ukraine are strong, and it would assist him, and us, if the West's relations with him and the causes he represents were, and were clearly seen to be, friendly and productive.

I talked to Lukianenko as he was about to open a concert dedicated to Polish-Ukrainian folk and religious songs that had been banned under communist rule and had to be learned, or relearned, by the audience from the visiting choir. The learning process went on in the intervals and after the concert, with a couple of accordion-playing Ukrainians teaching an enthusiastic audience the words and the notes they had not been allowed to hear for half a century. In an environment in which so many of the wounds of history are still open and so many questions remain unanswered, the message and example of people like Lukianenko and Chornovil stand out with a force that cannot be described in the tired vocabulary of our daily commerce of news and opinion. They are big with symbols and undertones of meaning which we in the pampered and often cynical West have all but forgotten.

The night after the Lukianenko concert I was struck by another musical-political phenomenon: the intense audience "participation" at the (unbelievably) first performance in Ukraine of any music by Mahler—his second symphony, better known as the "Resurrection." Nothing could have been more appropriate on the eve of Ukrainian independence. It was perhaps no coincidence that the conductor was an American and the theater the one in which Stolypin had been assassinated. It boasts among its neighbors a building that served as headquarters for the GPU, then for the Gestapo, then for the NKVD, and finally for the KGB. The ground for Mahler's "Resurrection" had been well prepared by history.

Dumping Grounds of the Spirit

VISITING THE provinces in Ukraine and Russia, one is struck by a sense of utter physical and spiritual desolation. Even though I had been expecting very little, I was surprised to see that the (Orthodox) Christian mode of life, and the idea of Christianity as a guide to the resolution of national and social conflicts, have been as good as wiped out. The very notion that a Christian community may provide answers to man's natural quest for a spiritual existence, or even just consolation, seemed foreign to the minds of most farming

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people I met. I did not run into any opposition when raising such matters—simply incomprehension. "Does he think we are children? Is he telling us fairy tales?" seemed to be written on their faces, although they were too courteous to say so.

The visible symbols of Christianity—churches, shrines, religious buildings—are in most places still used as dumping grounds and storage places. I attended a country wedding only thirty miles from Kiev—a sad affair, by any standards. Conducted in a squalid "cultural palace" (a cross between a disused garage and a dilapidated movie theater), it followed the lines of the old atheistic ritual. The marriage vow, the singing, the admonitory speeches were those ordained by the erstwhile communist state—but no one objected.

I nevertheless did run into a few people who had courageously had their children baptized; even they seemed to inhabit a world remarkably remote from the life of the church. A postwoman, mother of five, could not say whether her children had been baptized into the Ukrainian or Russian Orthodox Church. A young father of two said he and his father were atheists and party members. His wife could not be bothered with questions of religion, but his grandfather had been a Christian and a "kulak" and had been liquidated for his pains under Stalin. I was given this information in a matter-of-fact voice, but in half-sentences and a muted tone, as though the spirit of a vengeful past were still hanging over the walls of the squalid apartment building in which this family of four (occupying a single room) lived, sharing a cook-house with eight other families and doing without a bathroom altogether.

The persecution of religion and the slaughter of the Ukrainian peasantry in 1930–32 are not topics ordinary people will readily discuss. The demand for retribution, "war crimes" trials, and the like is weak if not altogether absent. I found this, too, surprising, for among members of the political class and the intellectuals (the two tend to coincide) these topics provide much of the rationale for Ukrainian independence. The peasantry seems to have been deprived not only of any desire to "go back" to private farming, but also of that perennial element of Russian/Ukrainian life—immersion in the culture of Orthodoxy. The three Ukrainian churches are well aware of the spiritual wasteland facing them in the provinces and of the need to make a fresh beginning. The field for missionary work is wide open, but one wonders whether the churches are mature enough to understand what is required of them. The Russian Orthodox Church is mired in the sins of collaboration with the former KGB, while the energies of the other churches are absorbed by inter-denominational conflicts of an ugly and most un-Christian kind.

THE TWO LARGE cities I visited were different. Both in Kiev and (especially) Lviv, some churches have been reopened; others have been reasonably well preserved as museums. I attended a Ukrainian Orthodox service at St. Sophia in Kiev. Many of the leaders and future leaders of the country were present and a vast congregation carrying national and religious banners filled the square outside. In Lviv, St. George's is back in the possession of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, and attendance is said to be good, though I was rather impressed by the opposite. The modest size of most congregations should not surprise us. The daily grind for scraping together food, fuel, and other consumer goods is all absorbing and time consuming. Empty stomachs are not conducive to religious reflection outside the world of asceticism.

One of the most interesting developments I noticed in Ukraine (and elsewhere in Eastern Europe) is the city-based and intellectual character of religious revival. It is not so much the simple tiller of the earth who is trying to find his way back to Christianity by making sense of the seasons and the puzzles of human existence, as it is the educated sections of society, which have probably spent many a long Slavic night wrestling with their consciences and arguing over the moral vacuity of this or that ideology.

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Communism, it may be broadly stated, has left its mark most effectively on the countryside, not least because it was there that the persecution of the religious was most acutely felt and social cohesion most effectively destroyed by collectivization and the man-made famine of 1930–32. The urban areas proved more intractable. There, libraries, galleries, theaters were able to keep alive some sensitivity to religious experience and a readiness to embrace or re-embrace national, as distinct from proletarian, values and modes of being.

In the nineteenth century, city-based dissent was the root of a rich crop of anarchists and revolutionaries who fought Orthodoxy and czarism. The same base has now brought forth religious and nationalistic dissent, or at least a greater sensitivity to nationhood, and more courage to speak openly about it, than exists in the countryside. This is a paradox which should occupy historians for some time to come, but one wonders whether paradox is the right word, for the conventional wisdom that farming people are "naturally" religious and city dwellers "naturally" skeptical rests on literary stereotypes that have never been tested.

But my case is open to argument. It is possible that the literary stereotypes are valid, that it is the "religiosity" of the peasants that has induced them to accept communism with the same passivity with which they once assimilated caesaro-papism, and that it is the skepticism of the city-based intelligentsia that has induced them to reject the "religion" of communism in much the same way that they once rejected autocracy and Orthodoxy. In which case nothing has changed except the color of the banners fluttering in the same wind, pointing in the same direction.

Taking Exception

EVERY NATION, when examined closely enough, is "exceptional," at least in its own eyes, and has special claims on some other nation's sympathy or gratitude, or reason to nurture special resentments for wrongs suffered—usually at the hands of neighboring nations. But the survival, or resuscitation, of such sentiments does not fit in with the requirements of an increasingly interdependent and shrinking world. Indeed, it is deeply hostile to it.

Ukrainian exceptionalism turns out to be similar to other Eastern European "exceptionalisms," past and present. It consists of the belief that Ukraine had been uniquely responsible for the defense of Christendom (Europe) against the Mongol aggressors and therefore deserves special recognition and special support. But Romanians, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgarians make similar claims on the strength of their resistance to Ottoman Turkish rule, and with as little chance of success. Both claims have a large piece of truth in them, but as a rationale for exacting privileged Western sympathy and privileged assistance, they are anachronistic and out of tune with Western thinking. Indeed, this exceptionalism is one of the features of Ukrainian nationalism that grates on a Western ear.

Ukrainian exceptionalism manifests itself in certain religious attitudes, too. There is a belief doing the rounds which holds that the Ukrainian people possess an unusual spirituality that sets them apart from Russians and all other nations. This strikes me as yet another variant of the chosen-race idea dear to the *amour propre* of almost every nation. We should not, of course, point a finger at those Ukrainians (mainly in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) who sincerely believe in Ukraine's privileged mission. For them, this may well be a reassuring and even indispensable assumption at a time of devastation and nation-building. But the Russian clergy believe something very similar about the chosen nature of the Russian people, and Polish nationalists about the God-chosen character of Poland. In the last century, Adam Mickiewicz predicted that Poland would redeem all Christian nations as Jesus had redeemed mankind, and his celebrated play *Dziadi* (banned under Stalinism) said just that. No overall Christian good is served, in my opinion, by claiming privileged access to God on

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national grounds. It is, alas, a practice we encounter in history again and again—with usually calamitous results.

One should not make too much of such (as one hopes) temporary delusions of grandeur. In these heady days of freshly won sovereignty, nothing less was to have been expected. But if Ukraine wants to move closer to the European Community (and we know that it does), it will discover soon enough that nurturing a sense of exceptionalism will serve it poorly.

At the same time, it seems to me important that accusations to the effect that Ukraine (or Russia, for that matter) is already on its way to "fascism" or "clerico-fascism" should be shown up for the smears they are. Such misrepresentations are dear to the prejudices of sections of both the American and European left-liberal press. They may yet poison our relations with the East and put us at a disadvantage in dealing with our friends there. All the evidence points in a different direction. Today's nationalism in Ukraine and Russia is the benign kind of the mid-nineteenth century, in which the search for national sovereignty and the search for representative democracy went hand in hand and were in most cases indistinguishable from each other. They were acclaimed and supported in their time by American presidents and many of the leaders of Western Europe. Our leaders should do no less.

The most telling proof that Ukrainian rebirth is not heading in anything like the direction of "fascism" is the active membership of many of the country's 500,000 Jews in the national movement *Rukh*. *Rukh* was launched and is now being conducted with strong Jewish participation. One of its founding members, Alexander Burakovsky, is of Jewish faith and so are several nationalist leaders. The Jewish community, like other religious and ethnic groups, wants more schools and religious instruction, and the means to develop its cultural identity, but its prospects are no worse, and arguably they are better, than those of other minorities in a generally lamentable situation. Last year's commemorative week to honor the victims of Babi Yar was jointly organized by the Ukrainian Jewish Center and *Rukh*; synagogues are being opened and diplomatic relations with Israel are about to be established.

It is, of course, impossible to predict whether, under certain conditions, some dormant strain of anti-Semitism might not reawaken. But, on present form, neither the government under Kravchuk, nor an alternative administration headed by the *Rukh* movement, would tolerate any such developments.

Little Russia—and Big

I FOUND THE idea of a distinct Ukrainian nationhood even less clearly defined in the minds of most Ukrainians than I had been led to believe by earlier observers and the evidence of recent Ukrainian history. Much of the confusion centers on language. Visits I made to the countryside in the Kiev area, and conversations I had with politically minded people in Kiev itself just before the December 1 referendum, confirmed my earlier (November 1990) impression that Russian and a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian are the predominant languages even in the capital, and that most people outside the formerly Habsburg/Polish Lviv region still find it hard to decide whether they are Russians or Ukrainians. The "Great-Russian" versus "Little Russian" controversy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which brought Russification in its wake but also gave birth to Ukrainian national consciousness, seems to have lost none of its relevance.

In Galicia, and especially in Lviv, Ukrainian is mostly spoken as the language of daily intercourse, and the Ukrainian identity of most people seems clear. But even in these western parts of the country, one notices a certain deference to the Russian language. In "polite society" and whenever a "cultured" tone is called for in public discourse the Russian language is almost automatically resorted to. The historical roots of this linguis-

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tic snobbery would take us into another report. Suffice it to make two observations.

First, because of ruthless Russification in the nineteenth century and under communism, the Ukrainian language is genuinely underdeveloped and difficult to use effectively at the higher reaches of scholarship and culture. At the University of Kiev, for example, Western literature is generally taught in Russian, not Ukrainian, because the Ukrainian vocabulary and scholarly apparatus are inadequate. Second, the predominance of Russian should hold no terror for the protagonists of Ukrainian national identity. A look at history tells us why. In nineteenth-century Central Europe, too, the languages of the "native" peoples (Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Croatian) were at a grave disadvantage vis-à-vis the imperial language of the Habsburgs (which was German, and later also Hungarian). But with the assertion of national consciousness after the French Revolution, and the struggle of 1848 for national independence, there began an unprecedented flowering of national languages and cultures virtually throughout the Habsburg territories. Today, it is German that is hardly understood in the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The increasing use of the Ukrainian language and the spread of a distinctively Ukrainian culture will, I believe, follow this nineteenth-century pattern; but it may take half a century.

WHETHER THE Russian-speaking population in the eastern parts of Ukraine would happily go along with an emphatic country-wide assertion of Ukrainian culture is difficult to say. If sanity prevails, there will be no such assertion in Russian-speaking areas. Certainly the Ukrainian authorities have committed themselves to respecting minority rights in language, culture, and political organizations both in the domains of the individual and of ethnic groups collectively. Discrimination is, therefore, ruled out, at least in theory.

Yet the facts of history and geography tend to resist paper resolutions. There are strong and vociferous pockets of Russian, Tatar, and other minorities in Ukraine, especially in the Crimea, which was ceded to Ukraine as recently as 1954 in Moscow's celebration of the tercentenary of Russian-Ukrainian unity. Some look to Moscow for encouragement, and it may well be that a future Russia (even if not Yeltsin's) will use these minorities as bargaining chips in the settlement of various issues (of which there are many) between the two states.

The Ukrainian political class, both in government and opposition, insist that it would countenance no such Russian tactics, and that is what the leaders I met squarely told me. They seem to be determined to have at their disposal entirely independent Ukrainian armed forces as a guarantee of state sovereignty. The swearing-in of certain troops is well under way. Remembering the fate after World War I of the short-lived independent Ukraine, which had no such forces, the caution of the Ukrainian leaders strikes me, for one, as rational.

My own reading is that certain conflicts between Ukraine and Russia will be hard to avoid, especially between Kravchuk's Ukraine and Yeltsin's Russia. Kravchuk is a prince of the old communist oligarchy and heads the old *apparat* (with the signs reversed) almost intact. It is as though, after the Führer's fall, one of Hitler's Gauleiters had changed his mind about Nazism, pinned his flag to the mast of liberal democracy and carried on governing at the head of a renamed but unchanged Nazi establishment.

Yeltsin, on the other hand, is the great scourge of communism and everything it stands for despite (or is it because of?) his own party background. Kravchuk's fight for Ukrainian independence is, therefore, genuine enough in that it is inspired both by fear of a mighty Russia and fear of a man who is unlikely to tolerate crypto-communists as his neighbors. I see the Western (and human) interest best served if Ukrainian independence were given full backing, including support for a Ukrainian conventional army and the international recognition of Ukraine as

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one of the principal legatees of the former USSR. Our hasty acceptance of Russia as sole legatee is unjust and may therefore prove destabilizing. But Kravchuk and his *apparat* are to be treated with detachment. We want to be closely associated with an independent, free, and democratic Ukraine, but not with the men whom the Ukrainian public will increasingly see as chips off the old communist block and treat accordingly.

Under Western Eyes

A WORD OR TWO has to be said here about the type of people engaged in patriotic/nationalist activity, and their psychological environment. By Western standards these are naive people. Their naivete is their strength, the source of their appeal, but also their Achilles' heel. They have taken our admonitions about human rights, self-determination, and especially our commitments under the Helsinki documents very seriously. Their trust in the words of Western governments and politicians is (or has been until recently) almost absolute. This innocent folly is compounded by an unspoken desire to see all things said and done in the West in a light which the facts, as we know them, do not warrant. "There must be a better world" is the cry that colors all their assumptions, and that better world is projected onto the West.

But now they are beginning to be "street wise" about Western self-interest, as this is being asserted on their soil, and they are appalled by what they see. Some are beginning to trace "moral equivalence" between the activities of western commercial enterprises and the various Soviet-inspired communist mafias under the *ancien regime*. Right or wrong, I cannot help feeling that with just a little more wisdom, imagination, and humility, we could have arranged our entree into the ex-Soviet world better and with more dignity. Businessmen and economists are not our most convincing representatives, even though their cooperation is now desperately needed.

But naivete in the successor states will not last. What is most likely to happen is what is already happening in Central and Eastern Europe: the idealistic "forums" and "movements" and their highly educated leaders are giving way to professional politicians. In Ukraine, we are still in the first phase of the post-imperial awakening. It is still the writers and poets who dominate national politics, and it is they who have taken our human rights pledges and shortwave broadcasts most to heart. Our governments will find the next group of leaders easier to deal with, which may be a good thing for our bureaucrats but not so good for Eastern Europe or, as I believe, mankind. For the new breed will be short of that penetrating credibility that a Havel, a Walesa, and the East German Protestant pastors carried in their knapsacks when the first strides were made to a free post-communist order.

It is these idealistic leaders in Ukraine who were most puzzled ("offended" would be a more appropriate term) first by Mrs. Thatcher's and then President Bush's ill-considered observations in Kiev. I was asked time and time again: why did they fly in the face of their governments' public commitments—and their own? Did they think keeping in with Gorbachev was more important than keeping the friendship and respect of fifty-two million Ukrainians? Did they think they could turn the tide of history?

Some tough lessons are waiting to be learned by our politicians. One is the "use-a-single-yardstick" rule, which is, as we well know, hard enough to apply even in our old democracies. But in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe expectations are geared to all those fine principles (echoes of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points) that we have, over the past fifty years, written into our declarations, and for which our foreign broadcasting establishments have created so many famous echo-chambers. It is unworthy of us *and* counterproductive to tell Ukrainians or Armenians that what is right for Frenchmen, Britons, Czechs, or Poles is not right for them because it might disturb "nuclear stability" or (earlier) Gorbachev's rule. It is

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wholly futile, not to say foolish, to give them lectures about the "poisonous brew" of nationalism at a time when it is national consciousness and national identity that have played so prominent a role in the removal of the communist system. When British leaders say they are "proud to be British," they might do worse than reflect that it is not for them to reject the same pride in nationhood when uttered by Ukrainians.

But double standards are not the only source of our weakness. Our long hesitation to offer support to and shape separatist aspirations in the former Soviet Union is another. Our politicians have either not understood, or have been unable to summon the courage to tell us, that having won a "war" with the Soviet Union, an equally significant task is now awaiting us—that of making sure that democracy in the successor states does not degenerate first into anarchy and then into some form of dictatorship of the Left or Right.

DO OUR LEADERS realize that it is our own security that demands the stabilization of the ex-Soviet economy? Can they visualize the implications of the post-Soviet democratic states facing their first test—and failing it? Can we afford to see it happen any more than the proliferation of nuclear arms? These are not rhetorical questions; I was asked them in Ukraine and Russia too often for comfort. A state of intra-Commonwealth military anarchy is already upon us. A "cold war"—and *a fortiori* a hot one—between Ukraine and Russia could not leave Germany and NATO unaffected, much less Poland and the rest of Central Europe. What price standing back—or declaring *non possumus?*

Earlier arguments that Western aid and transfers would only postpone the day of radical reform of the Soviet economy no longer hold and have not held for some time. Far-sighted statesmanship (if such can be imagined) should step on any notion of a "peace dividend" and accord peace-building in the ex-Soviet world the same urgency that it once accorded the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Space defense is important, but there is more pressing work to be done to fill bellies and remove the threat of a post-totalitarian cataclysm. It would be ironic if nations that did not react violently to the depredations of communism did so to their freshly won democratic order. But it would be equally damaging for East and West alike if democracy and the free market came to be associated with Western aloofness, or any intimation that we are really quite happy to see the "barbarians" stew in their own juice.

Beyond material aid and "know-how," our friends and partners-in-fate in the East expect guidance from us in matters of what constitute a decent human existence and a worthy code of conduct vis-à-vis our neighbors. They think we can tell them not only how to make imperfect Man more comfortable, but how to make him better. The false gods have failed them, but the pain and the turbulence they are now undergoing give us, and them, no conclusive indication of whether these are birth pangs of a new world, or the final agony of an expiring despotism. The search for an answer should be ours as much as it is theirs. American triumphalism should be conspicuous by its absence.

Some of the problems with which Ukrainians and Russians confront us are obscure, metaphysical, and very Slavic. They take us into first and last things in human and extra-human existence. They do not sit well with our pragmatic and utilitarian turn of mind. But these are the questions history has put on our agenda; we may not always like them, but we cannot evade them. It may well be that our distant successors, chronicling the decline and fall of the Soviet empire, will say of our age that the world's re-orientation toward a saner and less warlike order had its roots in the great seed-bed of Slavic suffering.□

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Encounter at the Cafe Dnieper

On my first day in Kiev, while waiting for my guide at the Cafe Dnieper, a man tapped me on the shoulder and said in good English: "You are George Urban aren't you?" I confirmed that that's who I was and asked: "And who are you, and how do you know my name?"

"Ah," he replied taking off his fur hat, "thereby hangs a long tale which I haven't got time to tell you right now because a party of German businessmen I'm escorting to Simferopol is waiting in a car downstairs. Let me just say this: I had heard from your interpreter, Olesya, a former colleague of mine, that she was meeting the Austrian Airlines' flight from Vienna with you on board. My German guests were on the same plane, so I decided to try to make myself known to George Urban."

"But why did you want to?", I asked, "And how is it that my name means anything to you?"

"Well," he went on, speaking at great speed partly in English, partly in German, "This may surprise you. I had been an officer of the KGB ending up with the rank of colonel. As we can now talk about these things quite freely, I want you to know that for many years I was a spy, and that is why I had to learn German and English, and other languages too. At one time I was the head of the USSR's entire spy network in the Middle East. But then—I fell from grace. . . "

"This is all highly interesting, but how do I come into your story?", I enquired.

"Oh, that's very simple. When I was being trained for intelligence work as a young officer, one of the Western journals we had to study as part of our syllabus was *Encounter* magazine because that, we were told, would give us an insight into the enemy's thinking and ideological machinations at the most sophisticated level. Now, your name and your writings figured prominently in *Encounter* for many years. I had to study you," he said with great emphasis, "*study you!* How could I forget your name?"

My interest was now aroused. "And did you find our writings in *Encounter* useful as a clue to what the "enemy" was plotting?"

"Useful, useful—I found it so fascinating that gradually you and your colleagues weaned me away from my oath and my ideology and made me into a dissident. You see, the *Encounter* syllabus was too persuasive. It spawned doubt, then occasional insubordination and finally open dissent in the mind of a master spy! I first read you as a threat and then as a source of inspiration. Can you beat that?!", he said with a broad grin on his face. "I was arrested and given a prison sentence, and when things began to change under Gorbachev I was released and took up a post as professor of German literature at Kiev University where your guide, Olesya, too is a lecturer. In any case," he said, "I have to rush; let me just thank you and *Encounter* for having done what you have for us."

"And what, may I ask, are you doing now?"

"Oh, here is my card—I'm a businessman. I'm in East-West trade. Phone me at any time if you need contacts either here in Kiev, or in Hassfurt in Germany, or in Eastern Europe, because we have offices in Sofia, Sopron, Prague, and elsewhere. I'll be glad to be of service. Just ask for Sergei. . .Sergei Ponomarchuk. . .Professor Dr. Sergei Ponomarchuk. Perhaps we can do business together. . . "

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The Geopolitical Dimension

Ian Brzezinski

OF THE DRAMATIC events transforming the European chessboard over the last two years, Ukraine's independence was geopolitically the most significant. Whereas the revolutions of 1989 rolled back Soviet hegemony, the overwhelming vote for independence in Ukraine last December catalyzed the collapse of the continent's last multinational empire and eliminated the final vestiges of Europe's Cold War state system.

The surprisingly peaceful implosion of the Soviet empire has transformed European geopolitics in several critical ways. First, Europe has returned to its original geographic definition. The European identity is no longer defined through a western community of developed nations but now involves a heterogeneous, pan-European association of states.

Second, the newly independent central and east European countries have opted against neutrality on the Swedish model and seek to align themselves as much as possible with the West. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary respond coolly to suggestions that a neutral belt be developed between Western Europe and Russia. The future security order of Europe will depend largely on the geopolitical alignments that develop among these and the other recently independent states, and on their relations with Western Europe and Russia, respectively.

Third, the question "Is Russia a European state?" is now historically timely. The answer will be derived to a significant extent from how Russia and Ukraine manage their separation. A non-imperial Russia is more likely to be a European Russia.

European security is, thus, in a state of flux. One of the more important new players and one whose behavior is, in the nature of things, difficult to predict is Ukraine, a newly independent nation larger than France, with a population of fifty-two million, a strong scientific-industrial base, a robust agriculture, an intensifying national identity, and, most important, a history that interlocks with that of Russia.

How Ukraine affects Europe will largely be determined by how, and how effectively, it consolidates its sovereignty. Critical challenges include economic reform, the institutionalization of democratic governance, and the establishment of national security structures, including defense forces. Equally, if not more important, will be the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism.

As a republic whose size increased from 172,000 to 232,000 square miles as a consequence of World War II and the administrative attachment of Crimea in 1954, Ukraine faces a plethora of territorial disputes and ethnic tensions. Since independence, movements for greater autonomy have gained mo-

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mentum in the Donbass region to the east and in the Transcarpathian region to the west. The Crimean parliament has recently issued a declaration of sovereignty. The minorities, including Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Greeks, and, most importantly, Russians, fear that they will be subjected to a Ukrainian version of Russian chauvinism.

Despite the near universal support for independence reflected by the December referendum, Ukraine's political culture remains divided. Support for independence was strongest in the western provinces, where Ukrainian nationalism has its deepest roots. In the more Russified districts in the east, the republic's industrial heartland, support for independence was based more on economic calculation—there is more food available in Ukraine than in Russia—than on nationalism.

Ukrainian statehood may be jeopardized by two increasingly disgruntled constituencies: the officers and soldiers of the former Red Army, and the managers and workers of Ukraine's industrial complex, much of which is situated in northeastern Ukraine. Both constituencies are angered and frustrated by their declining material well being, and both include factions whose loyalty to Ukraine is far from certain. Their grievances could well precipitate confrontations between those who blame Russia and the former Soviet Union for their problems, and those who see a better future through the reassertion of Moscow's control. All of this may stimulate Ukrainian insecurity concerning Russia, heighten nationalist sentiments, and push these sentiments toward chauvinist extremes, thereby exacerbating external and internal tensions.

Russia's Reaction

RUSSIA IS and will remain Ukraine's most important strategic concern. This is especially true because most Russians still find it difficult to accept the reality of an independent Ukraine. It runs against Russia's historical heritage, which reaches back to the eleventh-century Kievan-Rus Empire that dominated much of what later became Muscovy and Ukraine.

The discredited former defense minister, Marshal Dmitri Yazov, doubtlessly reflected the sentiments of many Russians, particularly the military, when he commented last year that "dividing the Soviet Union once again into princely kingdoms, as in Russia's past, would only hasten the conquest of Russia by foreign armies." Even Anatoli Sobchak, the democratically minded mayor of St. Petersburg, warned the Ukrainians as recently as January that their independence should entail a severe territorial price. Sobchak justified his argument by the legalism that any seceding republic "should return to its former borders [i.e. its borders at the time it originally became a republic] and all subsequent acquisitions should be the subject of negotiations." As these acquisitions are very substantive in the case of Ukraine, any attempt to apply such a principle would involve head-on conflict.

Nevertheless, these sentiments are gaining momentum in the Russian Parliament. In late January it voted 166 to 13 to examine the legality of Khrushchev's transfer of Crimea to Ukrainian jurisdiction, thereby setting a legislative precedent for reviewing the status of western Ukraine (acquired in 1939) and portions of Ukraine's northeastern frontier with Russia (drawn in the 1920s).

Russia's psychological reluctance to regard Ukrainian sovereignty as a *fait accompli* is reinforced by geopolitical concerns. An independent Ukraine is a major strategic loss to Russia. Ukraine's economy accounted for nearly 25 percent of the Soviet Empire's agricultural output and 22 percent of its industrial output (and an even higher percentage of armaments). While St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea has been Russia's window to the West, Ukraine's warm water ports on the Black Sea were the gateways, first of Russia, then of the Soviet Union, to the world. These facilities handled more than a fifth of the Soviet Union's exports. Ukraine includes the majority of the strategic highways, railroads, and pipelines connecting Russia to Central

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and Western Europe. Thus, the loss of Ukraine pushes Russia geographically a giant step farther away from Europe.

In this regard, the current strife over the distribution of the Black Sea fleet is more than a confrontation over the symbols of sovereignty. It defines the unpleasant realities that Ukrainian independence presents to Russia's own sense of historical identity. This was reflected in a recent article by Fleet Admiral I. Kapitanets, first deputy chief of the navy, entitled "An Indivisible Navy":

> The Black Sea theater in itself was and is of great strategic and political significance. This is why from time immemorial Russia has maintained a strong fleet there. The Black Sea straits alone are important for they represent the only possible outlet for our fleet—both military and civilian—to the Mediterranean and the ocean beyond. . . . It must also be borne in mind that historically the territories adjacent to the Black Sea coast of Ukraine and Crimea were never part of Ukraine prior to its voluntary joining with Russia.

Ukraine's geopolitical objective in the division of the Black Sea fleet's 320 combatant ships is to minimize Russia's presence in the Black Sea. While Ukraine does have an interest in developing a merchant marine to complement its export of bulk products, such as grain and coal, it itself has no need for a blue-water navy. Ukraine only needs forces sufficient for coastal defense. The threats to its national security are found along its land borders. Maintaining a blue-water fleet would be prohibitively expensive.

Moreover, the Black Sea fleet, which is locked in by the Dardanelles, is far from a world-class flotilla. Aside from a few modern ships (such as the Slava-class cruiser), the vast majority of the fleet's major combatants are aging hulls whose greatest value is probably the scrap metal they offer. Nonetheless, the fleet's magnitude and ports enable Russia to be the dominant player in the Black Sea. That is why Kiev regards a large Russian navy in the Black Sea as a direct threat to Ukraine's economic future and indicative of Russia's historical political aspirations.

Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that even a democratic Russia's strategy toward what it regards as cultural and strategic dismemberment will be one of subtle but only tactical accommodation. In developing its relationship with Ukraine, Russia will attempt to leave everything open, to let nothing gel, and not to force any critical issues between the two republics. Viewing an independent Ukraine not as an enduring reality but as a historical aberration that will eventually correct itself, Moscow will simply wait for the Ukrainian state to fail.

Kiev's Response

TO COUNTER Russia's strategy and to consolidate its sovereignty, Ukraine is likely to turn to other nations for support. Of the Western powers, Germany will probably be the source of greatest assistance. It has the longest history of interest in Ukraine. In both World Wars, the Germans flirted with Ukrainian nationalist aspirations (though Hitler ultimately suppressed them). Today, having provided over $40 billion in economic aid and credits to the former Soviet Union (compared with America's $5 billion), Germany is well positioned to establish a large economic presence in Ukraine. Following the lead set last year by the German foreign minister, German businessmen and bankers are flocking to Kiev. Given Germany's strong influence in Moscow, Kiev is likely to regard close relations with Berlin as an important source of political reassurance against the Kremlin.

But while Ukraine looks to Germany as a key source for foreign investment—for the simple reason that other Western nations have not shown equal interest—it will be more comfortable in turning to Poland as a key partner in restraining a potential resurgence of Russian imperialism. Poland represents a large and (by Eastern European standards) capable armed force and shares an extensive border with Ukraine. At issue is

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whether their parallel experiences under Soviet hegemony will serve as the basis for a historically new relationship of trust and cooperation.

Despite shared concerns about Russian power, Poland and Ukraine themselves have a long history of conflict. Both have considered the region of Galicia to be an integral part of their respective cultures and histories. In the seventeenth-century Treaty of Andrusovo, most of Ukraine passed from Polish to Russian hegemony, thereby ending the brief attempt at Ukrainian/Cossack independence. Polish-Ukrainian animosity flared repeatedly in the course of this century, most recently in the form of partisan warfare during World War II. Today—and, it is prudent to add, so far—despite voiced misgivings from Poland concerning an excessive Ukrainian military potential, indications for warmer relations are positive. Poland, though potentially fearful of German-Ukrainian encirclement, strongly supported Ukrainian national aspirations and made great efforts to ensure that it was the first to recognize Ukrainian statehood.

From the Ukrainian perspective, a close association with the Polish, Czech-Slovak, and Hungarian cooperative triangle would be of even greater strategic benefit. Of the Central Europeans, Hungary has made the most significant economic inroads into Ukraine, while in the twentieth century Ukrainian nationalists had their warmest relationship with Prague. Collaboration with the "Troika" would enhance Ukraine's sense of security by linking Ukraine with the three Central European states that are most rapidly developing close relations with NATO and the European Community. Moreover, such a strategy by Kiev would not necessarily threaten Russia with exclusion from Europe. Indeed, considering Russian-Ukrainian economic interdependence, Ukraine's entry into a greater Europe could prove to be Russia's quickest—even though geographically longer—avenue to the same end.

Beyond seeking economic support from Germany and strategic reinforcement with Poland, as well as with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Ukraine is likely to seek a mutually reassuring relationship with Turkey. Ukraine and Turkey have several geopolitical interests in common: a Caucasus that is not dominated by Moscow; a Crimea that is not restored to Russia; and a Black Sea region that the two can dominate politically and exploit economically. For Turkey, a free Ukraine creates a check on old Russian southward aspirations.

Ukraine and the New Europe

EVEN THOUGH Ukrainian independence occurred just last December, several postulates can already be made regarding Kiev's future conduct and impact on the European state system. First, despite President Leonid Kravchuk's repeated assertions that his nation will not join any military bloc, Ukraine is not likely to pursue a policy of true neutrality. The economic need to integrate into the West and the threat posed by Russia will drive Ukraine to develop a network of informal associations and relationships with Western Europe, and with the Westward-leaning Central Europeans.

Second, unless Russia poses an immediate security threat (for example, on the Crimean issue), Ukraine will probably build-down its military inheritance from the Soviet Union toward some form of a "non-offensive defense" posture. (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are moving in that direction already.) This will ensure that Ukraine's defense policies are constant with what the West expects of its new eastern neighbors, and it will help placate Polish and Czecho-Slovak concerns about an overly capable Ukrainian military. However, the social and financial costs associated with such a build-down will strain Ukraine's already weak economy.

An issue of global concern related to Ukraine's defense posture is its disposition toward nuclear weapons. While progress has been made toward the removal and destruction of nuclear weapons on its territory, it

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must be realized that Ukraine will remain a de facto nuclear power—some of the former Soviet Union's finest nuclear scientists and research facilities can be found there. How Kiev assesses the balance between the geopolitical benefits and liabilities of being nuclear-free is likely to depend on how secure it feels from Russian hegemony and how productively it regards its evolving relationship with the West.

Third, the most important consequence of Ukrainian independence will be the effect its consolidation will have on Russia's relationship with Europe. A Ukraine that remains vulnerable and unstable as a sovereign state will be an enticement for a Russian strategy designed to regain what many Russians regard as their country's historically rightful and geopolitically vital territory. A Russia thus encouraged is likely to remain an imperial power. But a consolidated Ukraine, one that facilitates Russia's linkages to the West, will help to encourage Russia to redefine its national identity, shedding its imperial ambitions, and its historic sense of isolation and insecurity. In this way, Ukraine may prove to be the key to Russia's own process of Europeanization.

Admittedly, the consolidation of Ukrainian independence will be complicated by its economic interdependence with Russia. But assuming Ukrainian economic recovery moves forward successfully and that Ukrainian markets gradually shift westward, that interdependence will not only decrease, but the Ukrainian economy could emerge as a critical facilitator of the expansion of Russia's trade with the West. The preservation of economic links between Ukraine and Russia is, thus, not only inevitable but a long-range interest of both countries.

The geopolitical significance of Ukraine's appearance on the map of Europe and of its potential impact on the evolution of what was once a powerful empire points to a basic conclusion: It is clearly not in the interest of the West for Ukraine's second attempt at independence in this century to be a failure. The first, in the wake of World War I, occurred under the shadow of the rise of Bolshevism in Russia. The second is occurring as part of the democratic wave that is sweeping the final vestiges of that Bolshevism away. An intelligent and historically sensitive Western policy, therefore, should have as its strategic objectives the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood and the enhancement of its security, through its inclusion in a wider European state system and the normalization of Ukrainian-Russian relations.□

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Barking Up a Fallen Tree

The Death of Low-Intensity Conflict

Seth Cropsey

DURING THE COLD War small wars grew, like mushrooms, in the shadow of nuclear annihilation. The balance of terror imposed by American and Soviet nuclear arsenals discouraged both superpowers from direct confrontation. Moscow took its ambitions to the Third World, and Washington reluctantly followed. It was not long before American strategists responded with a set of ideas on how to prevent, or if necessary fight, small wars far from the central front in Europe. Their doctrine came to be known as low-intensity conflict, or LIC.

LIC doctrine was based on three ideas. First, the brushfire conflicts the Kremlin conducted in the Third World were considered a real threat to American and Western interests. Second, to succeed in winning a small war all of the appropriate resources of the United States—diplomatic as well as military—had to be focused and applied. Third, because no official below the president possessed the power to coordinate such an effort, the government's way of doing business had to be changed.

So long as the Third World acted as an arena for conflict between Washington and Moscow, LIC made sense. Today, with American-Soviet relations transformed, the reasons for LIC doctrine have almost vanished. We need, instead, to prepare U.S. special operations forces for a military role better suited to protect American interests in a transformed world, such as restricting weapons proliferation to regimes like those of Saddam Hussein and Kim Il Sung.

These changes will not come easily. In the years since Vietnam, LIC advocates in the military establishment, who once thought of themselves as rebels, have erected a bureaucratic redoubt of their own, complete with all the familiar trappings: congressional supporters, military service adherents, and Pentagon officials. Service doctrine marches loyally on. The Army's 1991 public assessment of key issues facing it in the future opens with an assertive statement about the "demanding challenges of low-intensity conflict." The Army, it says, "provides support to allied and friendly nations through peacekeeping, [and] nation-building assistance." The stakes are larger than the outcome of bureaucratic squabbling within the Defense Department. Whether the U.S. government reconsiders the doctrine of low-intensity conflict in light of today's circumstances will be crucial to the success of tomorrow's foreign policy.

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From Insurgency to Triumph

FOLLOWING the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 neither superpower wished to visit the brink again. Tensions would thereafter be resolved by indirect confrontation. Moscow and Beijing cynically exploited colonial resentment and poverty in the Third World. Che Guevara brought revolution to the Bolivian jungles. The Viet Cong stepped up its Kremlin-supported efforts to topple South Vietnam. Chinese and Soviet advisers, weapons, and financial support flooded into the Third World from the Congo to Thailand. Americans were confronted with a lexicon of revolutionary acronyms and names: FRELIMO, the Soviets' client in Mozambique; MPLA, their Angolan puppet; ZANU, the Soviet's party in Rhodesia, and ZAPU, China's favorite; the Pathet Lao in Laos; and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

The U.S. response was hesitant. The CIA and the military sent arms and advisers to Latin America, Africa, and Asia. But Vietnam became the game board on which the greatest number of pieces was concentrated. Considerable Soviet investment opposed great American effort. All the classic signs of a low-intensity conflict exhibited themselves: peasants who turned insurgent at night, wholesale intimidation of civilians, and escalation to operations in the field as the insurgency triumphed.

The doctrine of low-intensity conflict was born of the Vietnam debacle. After the Vietnam War, many defense intellectuals concluded that the United States might have achieved victory in the mid–1960s, before the Hanoi-supported insurgency escalated into a more violent conflict. An early success, it was believed, might have averted risks of direct confrontation with China or the Soviet Union—fear of which contributed to irresolute prosecution of the war and the consequent loss of public support. A range of ideas about how to defeat future insurgencies directed at Third World friends and allies of the United States came to be identified by the name of the activity they aimed to defeat: low-intensity conflict.

In LIC, force is but one of several keys to victory. Others include "nation-building," psychological operations, security and humanitarian assistance, infrastructure support, and, of course, diplomacy. Soldiers trained to participate in LIC need language skills, the ability to teach indigenous forces how to protect themselves, awareness of cultural differences, and weapons of technological sophistication suitable to the experience of the people who require help. Specially trained soldiers, however, are not enough. Central to success in LIC is the integration of military and nonmilitary tools.

Defined thus, the perception at the heart of LIC doctrine is solid. Britain's 1956 suppression of Malaysia's communist insurgency and Philippine Defense Minister Ramon Magasaysay's 1952 defeat of the Huk rebellion reflected similar insights. As often happens, however, what began as a sound perception degenerated into a dogma, while yesterday's insurgency has become today's vested interest. In translating LIC doctrine from theory to practice, advocates have made fundamental mistakes. Their efforts to reform American strategic policy-making have been as misguided as their attempts to reform American strategic culture.

The Bureaucratization of LIC

WHILE THE strongest intellectual support for LIC came from writers as diverse as Herman Kahn, Robert Komer, and Bing West, the push for real reform came from Congress. It was driven by a group of dedicated Army officers, both active and retired, whose experience in special operations units convinced them that the U.S. would never succeed in LIC without fundamental changes.

Although its objective was the release of hostages and had no connection with guerrillas or insurgencies, the Carter administration's disastrous military attempt in 1980 to rescue American government personnel held

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by Iran became the springboard for legislative action. The failure of the mission exposed the U.S. military's unpreparedness to conduct successful special operations.

In 1986, legislation was enacted that established a bureaucratic home in the civilian and military sectors of the Defense Department for both special operations and low-intensity conflict. The marriage of the two is questionable. Special operations (i.e. missions undertaken by small units of highly trained elite forces such as Navy SEALs and Army Rangers) is a specific military tool, while low-intensity conflict is one objective to which the tool may be applied.

However questionable this blending of special operations and LIC may have been from a military standpoint, it made political sense. For one thing, it purchased the support of liberals like Senator Edward Kennedy, who understood that forcing the military's participation in LIC was one way to dull the teeth of the conventional armed forces. Kennedy issued a press release after the legislation passed noting that "Third World conflict is unique in that it centers more on political, social, and economic concerns as the main battlefields, rather than on the clash of armed forces." The new law urged the president to name an assistant on the National Security Council staff who would coordinate government-wide LIC efforts.

The law's little band of Pentagon supporters basked in the inconstant glow of congressional approval. Officers who had long argued against the centrality of the tank in Army doctrine and a procurement system that clanked along in parallel treads felt vindicated by congressional recognition and refreshed by the hope of progress. Spurred on by the encouragement of then Secretary of the Army Jack Marsh and Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer as well as a new marine commandant, General Al Grey, LIC advocates sallied forth to convert the conventional American military.

They assembled under two offices Congress established in the defense department: the position of a four-star officer responsible for training and equipping the special operations forces of the three military departments, and another position for an assistant secretary who was to provide the secretary of defense with civilian advice on special operations *and* low-intensity conflict. Into both organizations has flowed an uninterrupted stream of talented officers seeking to draw upon their combat experience in every low-intensity conflict and employment of special operations forces since Vietnam.

MANY OBSTACLES, however, have appeared. At the direction of Congress, the civilian-led office inside the Pentagon advises the secretary of defense and represents the needs of special operations forces at senior Defense Department deliberations, such as those involving the budget and in certain dealings with Congress. However, the entire budget for special operations forces personnel, operating costs, equipment, and research for *all* the military departments equals less than one percent of the total DOD budget. This is as it should be; massive infusions would only corrode and destroy the qualities which make these forces "special." At the same time, this budgetary insignificance deadens the prospect that special operations, even under imaginative leadership, will ever receive the serious, prolonged attention hoped for by congressional supporters.

So the new LIC bureaucracy has looked around for other projects. At the Pentagon, the office of the secretary of defense now wants to draw up a plan for LIC directing the military services to identify all the equipment in their inventories that could be used in a low-intensity conflict. Other plans are still afoot from the same quarter to create a separate, and presumably inviolable, budget account for LIC such as currently exists for all nuclear or conventional weapons. And Congress, under prodding from Pentagon LIC advocates, may soon add to the forest of reports it already demands of the Defense Department one on low-intensity conflict "activities," i.e. progress toward achieving the LIC agenda inside the bureaucracy.

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The most ambitious proponents of LIC inside the Pentagon continue to press for the empowerment of a congressionally directed board dedicated solely to coordinating U.S. involvement in LIC. This board, chaired by a senior NSC staff member, would consist of representatives from such high-level departments as Defense, State, Commerce, CIA, Justice, and the USIA. Despite occasional pressure from Congress, both the Reagan and Bush administrations have so far resisted this innovation, for good reason. The ability to coordinate policies of the different cabinet-level departments and direct their actions is, after all, one of the president's few relatively unchecked powers. The president is not going to surrender effective authority over foreign policy to a staff assistant, nor would he likely allow such an official to instruct his cabinet officers.

In frustration, the Pentagon's LIC advocates have labored to improve the Defense Department's receptivity to current ideas about LIC and to ensure their employment as doctrine in the real world. This is also the subject to which the interests of special operations officers naturally gravitate. Unlike the members of the conventional military's "unions" which specialize in aviation, ship driving, or armor, these officers are rarely promoted to senior rank for effectively managing the construction of a weapons system or providing some other useful service. With few exceptions, they emerge from careers that have been built in the field and emphasize command and the operational skills of elite troops: sniping, swimming, demolitions, parachuting, ambush, hostage rescue, and operation of small boats. Their interest as junior officers was in combat, and as senior officers in guiding the policy that determines how their specialty is applied in the field.

SOLIC (the office Congress established at Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflicts), however, lacks the fundamental bureaucratic building block needed to participate in policy decisions: an in-box. Congress, by law, succeeded in increasing Defense Department attention to special operations and low-intensity conflict, but it could not displace the existing Pentagon structure that already provided the secretary of defense with substantive advice on every country and region of the world in which the U.S. has a security interest.

Bullets are not abstractions and active challenges to U.S. security are not theories. When the Aquino government was besieged by rebellious army officers in the autumn of 1989, when the U.S. invaded Panama several weeks later, when U.S. embassy personnel faced danger in Liberia's civil strife in the summer of 1990, the secretary of defense had no interest in special operations budget issues, and no use for propositions of a general nature about LIC's applicability. What the secretary needs during crises is accurate analysis of intelligence by experts who can make educated predictions about the likely effects of different courses of action. Such advice is provided today by the Pentagon's office for international security affairs, and by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was available before the SOLIC office was created. Unless another office supplants these advisory bodies, the secretary of defense will continue to look to them in crises—not to the LIC bureaucracy.

Against the American Grain

ILL-CONCEIVED institutional reforms are only one of the problems that afflict the LIC movement. LIC advocates have also been too ambitious and optimistic in their hope to transform American strategic and political culture.

Great Britain at its height approached major international goals with a combination of diplomacy and force, and ancient Rome became famous as an intimidator. American foreign policy, by contrast, has often been characterized by extraordinary reluctance followed by extraordinary violence.

American statesmen and soldiers may agree with Clausewitz that war is an extension of politics by other means. Nevertheless, American politicians have never made clear to the public or to foreign leaders exactly what tripwire separates American diplomacy

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from force. On the one hand, Fidel Castro has, with impunity, transformed an island off the coast of Florida into an armed camp for the export of hemispheric instability. On the other hand, a thousand miles further from the U.S., Manuel Noriega was toppled by overwhelming military force within a week after his troops killed and roughed up some American military personnel one weekend. As these examples suggest, the link between diplomacy and force seems far from clear to American policy-makers themselves.

The LIC proponents have been correct about many things. They recognized that because an insurgency draws power from both political and military sources, defeating one requires exactly the combination of diplomacy and military force that is least suited to the traditional conduct of U.S. foreign policy. They understood that mounting a successful insurgency lay in shattering the ties of a people to their government and then wielding the jagged pieces of former allegiance to seize control of power. In practical terms, this requires first the shrewd management of non-military instruments from the provision of medical care, clothing, or police protection, to ideological indoctrination, threats, and the occasional example of an execution or unexplained disappearance. If these tactics were not sufficient, the insurgency turned to the systematic assassination of government officials, to armed rebellion consisting of well known guerilla hit-and-run tactics, and concluded—if necessary—in open conventional warfare as did Vietnam. LIC proponents were correct, furthermore, in thinking that helping a friendly government threatened by such measures was beyond the traditional skills of military men trained in conventional operations like dogfights, sea battles, or tank warfare. Providing appropriate U.S. assistance was just as far out of the grasp of diplomats whose experience was better suited to relaying messages, advising their superiors, and crafting positions.

But advocates of LIC doctrine never satisfactorily addressed the problem of American strategic culture. For this reason, policy-makers who followed their prescriptions would risk losing the ground on which any policy rests—American popular support. This might not be a concern of traditional military theory, narrowly defined, but it needed to be addressed by an approach that claimed, precisely, to integrate military policy with politics.

Containment of communism provided a mostly solid base for public approval. The enemy was large, ambitious, and possessed superior numbers of weapons. He declared he would bury us, and his ideology scorned all that the West cherished. Before retiring in exhaustion, his domestic repression and foreign adventures claimed a measureless toll of blood and suffering that stretched across the great continents and darkened the lives of millions. The struggle against him was a struggle against evil.

In spite of all this, Americans were still divided on how communism should actually be opposed. The lesson is clear: Americans' interest in the world beyond our shores is limited. Public opinion can be marshalled best when people believe that the nation and its moral principles are seriously threatened—and only then with difficulty.

Death and Transfiguration

EVEN DURING the Cold War, U.S. participation in anything except the occasional low-intensity conflict was probably not possible. A policy of engaging in LIC certainly could not hope to win popular support today. American interests may be advanced by the victory of the more democratic faction in a Liberia or a Cambodia, but the American public is not likely to be convinced that a victory of the rival claimant for power in those remote places constitutes a danger. What, after all, is the common threat today?

The end of the Cold War thus presents the most formidable obstacle to future U.S. participation in LIC. The fuel of insurgency around the world—poverty and the perception of injustice—remains, but great power interest no longer serves as a fuse. For the

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first time since World War II there is no place on the globe where Soviet-backed forces are contending with those supported by the U.S. The importance of the Third World has disappeared along with the rivalry of the superpowers.

Opposing factions throughout the Third World have gotten the message. Following the departure of Havana's proxy troops, an agreement signed last May between Angola's two warring antagonists has ended sixteen years of civil bloodshed. Disheartened and disorganized, Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam fled his country the same month after realizing that the gravy train which delivered $10 billion in Soviet military aid to his regime in the previous decade had been derailed. In Afghanistan the *mujaheddin* are ignored by Washington and Moscow alike. The crusade to drive the Soviets out has become an old-fashioned armed struggle for domestic power, and the country continues its dusty slide into tribal warfare and ethnic violence. The few reports that appear in the Western press offer a picture of resentment and disappointment at the loss of American interest that followed the Kremlin's withdrawal.

Closer to the U.S., the Miskito Indians are still at odds with central authorities in Managua, but that government is now headed by an elected leader, Violetta Chamorro, and the big issue today in northeastern Nicaragua is not guerilla war but who controls the rights to forests of cedar and mahogany trees that businessmen from Texas covet. The author of the short-lived Sandinista success, Fidel Castro, is struggling to stay in power. He will not be exporting revolution anytime soon. Half a globe away, Hun Sen's communist regime in Phnom Penh retains control of the country, but under an agreement reached in August 1991, elections are to be held in the spring of 1993. U.S. support for the non-communists last year was minuscule, about $5 million, and all of it non-lethal. Moscow cut off its supply of arms to Hun Sen in the spring of 1990 leaving Hanoi with the check for future military support. Vietnam, one of the three poorest countries in Asia, and China—which is not far ahead—are now backing different factions in the Cambodian dispute. It will probably be resolved in the next year, but in any case, Washington and Moscow are as removed from the picture in Southeast Asia as they are in every other corner of the globe where they once contended.

The Pentagon, however, seems not to have noticed. The pain of spending cuts is a mere irritant compared to the trauma of changing basic ideas. At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia more than two dozen Air Force and Army personnel work together at the Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC) to answer such questions as, "What is LIC?" Noting that Operation Desert Shield was intended to demonstrate U.S. resolve to Iraq, the CLIC described the largest military logistical feat in history as a low-intensity conflict operation. CLIC papers available to the public today include such titles as "African Coastal Security" and "The Role of Working Dogs in LIC," subjects whose application to future U.S. defense interests is dubious.

A study the CLIC published in 1989 recommends the creation of sub-unified commanders to handle LIC for the regional unified commands, a proposal that would enlarge the already swollen bureaucracies that surround U.S. theater commanders who execute presidential commands in the field. In the summer of 1991, the CLIC embarked upon an "LIC Instability Indicators Study" to discover "generic instability indicators" and "instability indicators," which, one assumes, will clothe with scientific respectability the matter of predicting terrorism and civil bloodshed in countries infested with weak political institutions, poverty, and ethnic hatreds.

It is tempting to dismiss this momentum left over from the Cold War as one wrinkle among thousands in a bureaucratic shirt which has yet to feel the new iron's heat. However, there are reasons to take the matter seriously. The ideas on how to win an LIC in the field are sensible, their usefulness proven. Low-intensity conflict is not going to disappear. The issue is to locate the places where it will affect substantial American interests.

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In the former Soviet republics, humanitarian assistance is badly needed. The republics could immediately use the medical and technical expertise that is part of the services advertised by LIC. In addition, foreign internal defense—an LIC term of art used to describe assistance such as military training provided to another country's defense forces—could become a highly valued tool as the United States competes with China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey for influence in the post-Soviet Muslim republics. As part of the larger effort to moderate the Central Asian states, U.S. involvement in this region is needed to prevent the spread of radical Islamic regimes that could threaten American interests. Equally important, American influence in the republics will help guard against possible Russian re-expansion.

The Arabic language abilities of U.S. Army special forces personnel, the experience they have gained teaching Central American militaries respect for the rights of civilians, and U.S. military skills in organization and the construction of facilities, should be concentrated on selected Arab states. Where they can stimulate private enterprise rather than increase dependency on outside monies, the resources of the U.S. Agency for International Development should be marshaled. This weaving together of the strengths of different federal agencies is the central LIC idea. In the Middle East, its logical targets are such Arab states as Kuwait, Egypt, and Morocco where the chances of abrupt changes in regime or the overthrow of leaders are relatively small. In these countries the LIC ideas intersect with interests the U.S. will maintain far into the next century.

The same is true in one other part of the world—America's own backyard, Central and South America. The international community's military alliances are loosening and looking very much as though they will recast themselves along lines of trade. As the European trading bloc gains position and the likelihood of an Asian one takes shape, the U.S. economic interest in our own hemisphere is certain to grow stronger. Latin American instability may therefore become a more pressing matter than it is now.

Keeping foreign powers from taking advantage of Latin American instability has been a long-standing, proper, and successful U.S. policy. At different times it has kept Germany and the Soviets from establishing an influential position in this hemisphere. The immediate threat from South America today, however, is homegrown. There are no signs that the criminal trafficking in narcotics which has spread outward from its Andean cradle will be controlled any time soon. Never has the U.S. stake been greater in building various political institutions, promoting democracy, and encouraging the economic reforms which are the only antidotes to the region's ancient diseases—violence, the rule of tyrants, and poverty.

From LIC to Special Operations

THE PENTAGON also needs to straighten out its efforts in the special operations and low-intensity conflict world. The two categories have always been a mismatch. Americans will not support a general policy of involvement—at any level—in the affairs of Third World countries whose fates are not clearly linked to ours; and the U.S. military, fresh from victories in Panama and the Middle East that reinforce its traditional preference for large forces and overwhelmingly superior firepower, will not soon be convinced of the need for the subtle doctrines of LIC.

LIC should be jettisoned from the responsibilities of the secretary of defense's assistant for special operations and low-intensity conflict. This will help end the squandering of bureaucratic energy on doomed schemes to transform the Pentagon's strategic consciousness and plans to reorder the organization of the entire government's foreign policy apparatus. It will also help the secretary of defense's office concentrate on applying practical LIC ideas to areas of the world that combine politically viable American interests with the need for that doctrine.

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Special operations forces should receive the training, equipment, and critical intelligence support that would enable them to contribute toward countering today's version of the Black Death—the spreading pestilence of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Because Congress added LIC to the responsibilities of the position it created in the secretary of defense's office to oversee special operations forces, the two different missions compete, if unintentionally, with one another. Carpet-bombing the military services and Joint Chiefs with bureaucratic missives designed to assure LIC's triumph as the reigning U.S. military strategy diverts energy from important efforts like building a stealth aircraft that can fly long distances, slip through increasingly sophisticated radars, deposit, and then extract special operations forces. Time devoted to the former comes at the expense of the latter, and it is time the U.S. can ill afford.

Never again should a power as hostile to democracy and as militarily capable of destroying the United States as the Soviet Union be allowed to assemble. Regional tyrants with nuclear ambitions like Saddam Hussein must be discouraged and where necessary destroyed. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney estimates that by the end of the decade, more than two dozen developing nations will possess ballistic missiles, and of these, fifteen will be manufacturing their own. The trend is toward rockets with greater ranges, and weapons of growing destructiveness to place aboard them. Among others, Libya, Syria, Iran, Vietnam, and North Korea have chemical weapons programs today. By the year 2000, thirty developing countries will have joined them, ten will be able to field biological weapons, and eight are expected to have become nuclear powers.

Special operations forces are one very important instrument in enforcing an international non-proliferation policy. Where grand coalitions cannot be mustered, and next-door access to logistics centers and airfields is denied, small, highly trained groups of elite troops might be needed to disable or eliminate nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons-producing facilities and the missiles that would deliver their products.

However, to train and equip these forces for such extraordinarily complicated missions will require the concentrated attention of responsible civilian and military officials who are now distracted by the chimerical pursuit of a reshaped strategic culture and a reformation of American foreign policy-making. But even the most proficient special operations units, like the Navy SEALs, cannot provide an answer to every weapons proliferation problem. In other cases, such as in a potential nuclear exchange on the Asian subcontinent, the political justification for American involvement would be very murky.

RATHER THAN persist in the quixotic effort to reorganize foreign policy-making by creating a mini-cabinet in the NSC, and rather than continue unrequited efforts to woo the Pentagon into embracing an idea of conflict at odds with the approach underlying every important American military victory, LIC advocates should lower their sights to the real world. They should abandon grand schemes and apply their energy to particular, sustainable goals of American foreign policy.

The importance of success in low-intensity conflict has lessened because of America's new relationship with the successor states of the former USSR. Where it could once be argued that, besides the strategic and conventional rings of the Cold War circus, LIC occupied a third, prominent, and active center of attention, today it is barely a sideshow. If LIC advocates recognize this, they can apply their good ideas in the service of foreign policy. If such recognition continues to elude them, the proponents of low-intensity conflict will, ironically, end up doing exactly what they have charged the conventional military with since Vietnam: fighting the last war.□

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Protest, Scandal, Guilt

After the Police State

Melvin J. Lasky

THERE IS NO escaping the ironies of history. At the very moment that a grand and long-awaited counter-revolution subverted the "social experiment" first established by the old October Revolution of 1917, new experiments in social engineering have converted half of the European continent into a vast laboratory of programmatic theory. Reformers vow to produce not only "freedom now" but also associated benefits such as bread and land, law and order, culture and leisure, and an altogether agreeable pursuit of happiness. Theirs is a radical project of root-and-branch reconstruction that would have confounded Burke, dismayed Tocqueville, and flabbergasted Raymond Aron.

There can be no tinkering with old institutions; there is no hope nor time for gradual reforms, for pragmatic revisions and small and tentative steps forward, for all the virtuous methods which eclectically and magnificently made for a triumphant West. From Berlin to Vladivostock, the terrain is swarming with a ragtag army of advisers: Harvard economists who have learned to compute with rubles and zlotys; London City accountants, flushed with the half-successes of Thatcherite privatization; Solidarity and *samizdat* sociologists, fresh out of the underground; charming wheeler-dealers of Magyar ebullience; stolid Swiss businessmen, justifiably convinced that small is still beautiful; Wall Street ideologues, with their panacea of a beneficent *Bourse*; and, last but not (by a long shot) least, billionaire *Bundesbankers* from western Germany who, if they were patriots, would put their money into poor eastern Germany but have learned properly that profit can be made everywhere.

Even in their own bailiwick, the five new *Bundesländer* which voted to be absorbed into a reunified Greater Germany have not exactly seen a future that works. Despite the vast amounts of money being thrown at the dismal problems of the ex-DDR, the once-proud cities of Leipzig and Dresden still look like slums, and eastern German factories produce shoddy and non-competitive goods. As for the introduction of the Capitalist System, the longed-for alternative to the odious arrangements of Marx-Lenin-Genghis Khan provenance, how can you have capitalism when nobody knows who owns anything? Who owns an apartment-house in Chemnitz? A farming estate in Mecklenburg? A work-shop in Rostock? A department store in Halle? The Jewish family expropriated in 1933? The aristocratic land-owners, some of whom were hanged after July 20, 1944? The middle-class refugees who fled the communist system in the 1950s and 1960s? Or some of those forlorn souls, "the masses," who remained to live and work in the DDR? There

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are a myriad of conflicting claims and a shortage of reliable judges and experienced courts to fairly adjudicate them.

The introduction of something recognizably like a system of capitalist democracy with its private property and rule of law is proving to be neither straightforward nor swift. The West German *Treuhand*, the federal privatization agency that inherited an immense structure of a nationalized command-economy and an utterly socialized infrastructure (down to the last hair salon and grocery shop), had a Plan to privatize everything in One Blow, but has settled for the snail's pace of selling factories and shops one by one, if it ever succeeds in finding optimistic (or deluded) buyers. The news from the freedom fronts in Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, and East Berlin is depressingly similar.

The illusion of the West (including the West Germans) was that the major problems of a post-communist and post-Soviet society were technical; with the application of the general principles of what made the West great (mainly a free market and free elections), everything would fall into place. But the crux of the matter, especially in Germany East-and-West, has to do not with technics but, surprisingly enough, with ethics. The evil that the imperial men have done has lived after them. And it is diverting and distorting the best-laid plans of a new generation of social engineers, including even some who would be engineers-of-the-soul, who were led into the perennial delusion that, amid the chaos of such poverty and disarray, a new (if equally starry-eyed) experiment was called for. It is not only that we want to build a democracy without true and tried democrats, a free enterprise system without entrepreneurs, a liberal polity without liberals; we are having to deal with Old Adam, with human behavior marred by such unplanned and incalculable factors as anger and excitability, impatience and irritability, lingering resentment and frustration, and an amorphous grudge against unfair destiny.

Truth Marches—Single File

THE EXPLOSIVE debate in Germany about the evil empire that the *Stasi* police-state had administered for over forty years has been mainly shaped and colored by the outbursts of rage that the popular poet and songwriter Wolf Biermann directed against a curiously indifferent German public opinion. The DDR had stripped him of his youthful communist ideals, censored his poems, forbade his songs and public performances, and finally taken away his citizenship (in the Eastern and "better Germany," as he erratically thought), leaving him stranded in an alien and hateful Western bourgeois society.

The ten days in November 1989 changed his mental world. His old *Vaterland*, the Workers and Peasants State, was in ruins; and he was glad. His anger was now pitiless and almost uncontrollable. He stood with the Citizens Committees to guard the East Berlin document centers which some anti-communist demonstrators, in their rowdy enthusiasm, tried to incinerate. Buried somewhere in those archives was not only his life, but the full story of that odious "social experiment."

And then someone gave him a few pages of his own *Stasi* dossier. At the next possible opportunity, a fine occasion at which he was being awarded the Georg Büchner prize for literature, he blew his top and for an hour denounced "Sascha *Arschloch* (asshole)." The unfortunate Sascha Anderson is a young poet, a protégé of Biermann who modelled himself after the master, wrote like him, sang like him, organized protest petitions and defense committees when the party stopped his books and concerts, continued to be a devoted friend when both had been exiled to the West—and, the entire time, informed on Biermann to the *Stasi*. Intimately detailed reports, under a half-dozen code names, were found preserved in duplicate; not even the special *Stasi* commandoes who had infiltrated the anti-communist crowds in the first post-Wall days had managed to destroy all the telltale evidence.

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Biermann's reverberating denunciation of the personal betrayal inflamed intellectual and political opinion. Humdrum concerns of mass German unemployment in the east and the faltering reconstruction of a new post-DDR democratic society as a part of the western German Federal Republic receded into the background. The revolt against the lie was on: only the bitter, painful truth could make a people free.

THERE WERE hundreds of miles of stored underground archives, indexed and cross-filed; a few filched pages had already turned up here and there in sinister attempts to blackmail culprits or even their victims. The ugly facts might demoralize the entire ex-East German population, might even provoke hot-heads to revenge. The Bonn government was in a moral and practical quandary about how to proceed—after all, the Americans in 1945 seized the Nazi document center and kept it off-limits and out-of-bounds for almost half a century.

Biermann's accusations succeeded in arousing opinion; a comissioner, a decent and intelligent Rostock theologian named Gauck, was appointed to sift through the files, and a special new law was hastily patched together to give Pastor Gauck his guidelines as to who might get access to all those miserable pieces of paper with all the secret names, dates, and addresses: who denounced whom and got some writer, trade-unionist, or student landed in jail (no TV crews, no investigative reporters, *bitte*!). When the day came, the first Monday in January of this year, thousands stormed into Pastor Gauck's offices in a former *Stasi* police headquarters on the *Behrenstrasse* in East Berlin. Truth was on the march, but had to stand in line.

On that first day, writers emerged from the record rooms crushed by the revelations in their own dossiers (the only ones they were permitted to inspect) that almost none of their friends had proven trustworthy. A political dissident vowed to confront the doctors in his home-town hospital who had, on secret-police instructions to "incapacitate and destroy," been systematically poisoning him (only his own exasperation with his own fatigue and indolence, which led him to throw away all his pills and medicines, saved him). A pacifist woman came out in a red-eyed state of shock—she had just been reading all the intimate details of her political and personal life, down to the last slogan for a leaflet and the midnight quarrel in bed—and discovered, in cross-checking the code-name, that it was her own husband who had been the *Stasi* informer. I even saw an old lady, pitifully weeping because she had not been admitted to the archives—after all, her own son had been arrested for having tried to flee over the border, whereupon her husband had lost his teaching post—and she just had to know "the full story." The apologetic Gauck official tried to persuade her, hopelessly, that she didn't happen to have an official dossier, and sometimes these things just happen. . .

A WEEK LATER Wolf Biermann turned up to further his investigations. During his time in the DDR—he was "expelled" in 1976—some seventy *Stasi* agents had been assigned to deal with him; their reports had filled over 100 *Ordner* files, each with 300-odd pages. As he made his way through the *paparazzi* of the excluded press corps to leaf through 40,000 pages in an afternoon, he looked (I thought) a little crestfallen. Partly no doubt, it was the prospect of the overpowering stench of the past; but then he had also been having a trying time of it, since his loud, rude, sensational *mot de Cambronne* violated all the decent rules of neo-German moderate discussion. He was denounced for his paranoia, accused of seeing spies everywhere. He was called, by Günter Grass, a narrow little Grand Inquisitor.

Especially bitter and painful was a public falling-out with his old friend and comrade-in-arms Lev Sinovievich Kopelev, a prominent Russian dissident writer who (since his expulsion from Moscow in 1981) has been living in Germany, and who in these parts is probably more famous and influential than Solzhenitsyn. Kopelev has written a long

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autobiography that has Koestler-Silone qualities of enlightened disenchantment, and as a Jew and a contrite ex-Bolshevik he has, with his massive frame and over-full Tolstoyan beard, become an impressive figure of moral and intellectual authority. (I met him in Moscow and we put flowers on the grave of Boris Pasternak in Peredelkino.) But, under the influence of the late Heinrich Böll, a hapless mixture of political courage and ideological confusion, Kopelev subscribed to a theory of moral and/or immoral equivalence in which Brezhnev's anti-communism (his repressive campaign against true idealists) and Reagan's anti-communism (the Cold War's "Star Wars" and all that) were the two great twin evils of our time. He and Böll published a best-selling paperback book (*Antikommunismus*, 1984) which, although it helped to convince the German Left that the Soviet system was indeed tyrannical, increased the chronic discomfort of the local intelligentsia with "the (dangerous) defense of the (so-called) Free World." Like Thomas Mann who coined their favorite quote (something about anti-communism being the "greatest stupidity of the twentieth century"), Böll and Kopelev could not handle the fact that Hitler and Goebbels also hated the Soviet system.

SO IT WAS that Wolf Biermann, waving pieces of paper in his hand with the names of "commie informers, spies and agents," became Senator Joe McCarthy *redivivus*. He had only barely recovered from the revulsion felt by his friends on the Left after he had come out in support of the American-led "Desert War"—that is, for the defense of Israel, to prevent yet another massacre of the Jews by Iraq with poison gas supplied, in part, by German chemical companies. Battered but unbowed, he then took on the *Stasi* heritage—what the Germans learned to call in the post-Nazi era *Apperzeptionsverweigerung*, the timid attempt to avoid looking at what had just been happening around them.

Kopelev was horrified. The West was even more rotten than he and Böll had feared. In a personal letter to Biermann he gave vent to his "anger, resentment, sadness." Biermann was a friend and comrade no more, for he had become (in a phrase with Hitlerian connotations), "a hanging judge," *ein Blutrichter*.

Biermann was astonished. He couldn't quite understand "out of what depths of the Slavic soul" a thoughtful man, a devotee of Pasternak and Sakharov, could oppose a belated rising of the German conscience against the second totalitarian system which they were ill-fated enough to live under and with. The old repressive society had to be exposed in all its repressiveness: above all, its cynical mendacities and faithless double-dealing. *Fiat justitia ne pereat mundus*. Let truth and justice rule and our world will *not* go under.

The letters were published in *Der Spiegel* (January 13, 1992). It was splendid and very moving stuff, not on a profound par with other turbulent debates of the polemical German past (Heine vs. Marx, Nietzsche contra Wagner), but a significant and liberating turning-point for all that. The collapse of the Soviet satellite, the DDR, and the subsequent reunification of the German Reich (or almost all of it) had been subject to diplomatic negotiations, military realignments, economic calculations, and juridical formalities. Now it had all become a *moral* question.

When Wolf Biermann emerged from Pastor Gauck's document-center he was depressed (or chastened) enough not to want to give the eager press corps any more names of Iagos behind the arras, any more sensational unmasking of some smiler with a knife. Let's face it: compared with Hitler and Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot, the Ulbricht-Honecker dictatorship was a bloodless regime. We do not have to count corpses, only honestly go about the intellectual business of picking up the pieces of shattered reputations ("deceitful Stefan Heym, burnt-out Günter Grass") and to work out from the ruins of utopian and revolutionary theory a

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viable handful of principles that would serve to sustain a free and human society. Biermann, for all his lingering wrath, was careful not to give any of his enemies a peg to tarnish him again with charges of "denunciation" and "slander."

Nevertheless, his indictment of a totalitarian society which so many of his countrymen wanted to put quickly behind them—some with guilt feelings from the past, some with understandable haste to get on with the future—became even more biting and incisive. What were those dreadful seventy agents, assigned by the comrades on high to "expose ruthlessly the class enemy" in order to valiantly "defend the achievements of the revolution," really up to? Biermann liked to take his icy dip in the Baltic on wintry mornings, and one agent posed on the lonely nudist beach as a lifeguard (without a swimsuit, naturally). Several others arranged for the pilfering of the post, the stealing of manuscripts (or carbon copies thereof), the bugging of apartments and autos (and the cottage in the country), the chronic disruption of the phone connections. More subtle operators were assigned to offer shady temptations with drugs, alcohol, and teenagers. The more intellectual members of the cadre spent their time working up all the artful chicanery into high strategy of police operations, indeed almost into a theory of political guile which borrowed more from Machiavelli than Marx, more from Celine or Genet than Freud and Max Weber. Hostile ideological elements were to be neutralized by systematic measures of prevention, containment, harassment, misfortune, seduction, illness, and personality decomposition (*Zersetzung*).

One dissident writer whom I ran into in the Gauck offices in East Berlin—he is an ex-DDR jailbird and turns up regularly to research his own trumped-up case—said bemusedly, when I asked him what he had learned from his dossier that day that (1) those car accidents of the last several years were not accidental; (2) the over-stuffing of his post box with mysteriously ordered hardcore porn literature was not a haphazard postal oversight; and (3) the rumor that he was (despite a wife and two children) a closet homosexual was not a wild neighborly misunderstanding but gossip that was part of a recorded tactic of purposeful defamation.

As for Biermann, he could now catch up with transcripts of the pillow-talk of a dozen love affairs; with the full text of imprudent lyrics to a subversive song (he says a *Stasi* lyricist had slightly improved them) which he thought he had cautiously thrown away; with the real names of all his literary friends and musical associates which only appear in the innumerable day-and-night reports under their code-names ("Willi. . .Olga. . . Kurt. . . Sylvia Faust," and suchlike).

Could the hated KGB have been more thorough than the German *Stasi?* The hated Hungarian AVO more vicious? Or the Polish UDBA more imaginative? Somehow one doubts it.

The Good German

AMONG THE HALF-dozen Eastern European satellites and the ex-Soviet republics, there appear to be few symptoms of deep psychological disorientation equivalent to those that have swept up the Germans (both *Ossies* and *Wessies*) into a maelstrom of polemic, recrimination, and moral quandary. Can it be that this political neurosis which involves a whole people measuring up to the foul misdeeds committed in their name is a peculiar German susceptibility?

Today, not unlike the early years after the end of World War II, there is a guilt-ridden preoccupation with crime and punishment, with opportunistic collaborationism, with writers who wrote to the tune of their censors, with soldiers and policemen who shot first and explained afterwards that they were only doing their duty, with theologians who put negotiating little favors on behalf of their harassed church and bedraggled flock before the grand demands of religious conscience. Should *Stasi* chief Mielke be allowed to get away with it (as Himmler did)? Must one try to haul back Erich Honecker from the

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ex-USSR, or North Korea, or wherever he is currently hiding out, to stand trial for his crimes (as in the case of Eichmann in Argentina)? Isn't there one single standard of justice for SS (and indeed *Wehrmacht*) military excesses and for the DDR/SED/*Stasi* shoot-to-kill policies along the Berlin Wall? (A Berlin court recently sentenced to prison several young sharpshooters in the communist Border Patrol for "doing their duty," which, as the presiding judge sternly declared, could never include shooting runaway refugees in the back.)

Why is this marshland of moral and legal problems so conspicuously less entangling in Warsaw and Budapest and (for the time being) Moscow? It could be that widespread popular opposition, based on Solidarity and Catholic Church resistance, gave the Poles a certain strength of national self-confidence.

IN PRAGUE, my impression was that the Czechs were far more cynical in their realistic grasp of how tentacular the monster was, accepting and ignoring it like any army of "Soldier Schweiks"; or, in many circles, proud of how much subtler they were, how very Kafkian in their sense of universal deviousness. I was told the story of Vaclav Havel, sitting at his presidential desk, poring over his own liberated secret-police file. A friend (Jiři Grůsa, a fellow Charter 77 victim) asked what he intended to do. "I hope," Havel said, "I have already forgotten it." Victims are perfectly entitled to forget what they cannot forgive. The art of forgetting, as Grůsa opines, is being rewarded by the return of the old Czech spirit of "happy practicality."

As for the Hungarians, if you have an informer as an enemy you don't need a friend—especially if he speedily destroys the documents, as most of "the Network" archives were destroyed, and the leftovers are cunningly peppered with so many fake or irrelevant names as to make them practically useless. A writer in Budapest whom I know reports that shadowy speculation is rife but relatively harmless. The real secrets of the past remain. . . secret. Can it be true that at least 10 percent of the old *samizdat* opposition literature (as retired Police General Horvath boasted) was written by double-agents? Is it a fact that some thirty or forty MP's in the new Hungarian parliament are seasoned veterans of the Kadar police apparatus?

In soul-searching contrast to the sang-froid I have found in these other capitals, the Germans in the first two years of post-communist democracy have tortured themselves in summarily removing three *Ossie* minister-presidents, and the chairmen of both the Social Democrat and Christian Democratic parties in the ex-DDR. At the moment another minister-president, Manfred Stolpe of Brandenburg, who had been widely touted to be the next president of the reunified German nation, is tottering. The former president of the DDR in its last days—Lothar de Maizière, a quiet little musicologist who, with Chancellor Kohl, negotiated brilliantly a historic transition—fell into disgrace in the most tragically unsettling circumstances. Were they all innocent or understandable "fellow travellers" who tried to do a little good under the old tyrannical regime in order to prevent greater evil? Were some of them (as one impeccably anti-Nazi socialist, von Dohnanyi, has passionately argued) comparable to the heroes of the July 20 resistance under Hitler (Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, General Oster, Admiral Canaris, Count von Moltke), allowing themselves to be tarnished unto martyrdom in a twilight zone of opposition and collaboration, idealism and duplicity? The Germans have it infinitely more difficult than their neighbors, dealing as they must with the double past of Nazism and communism, standing in between two large mirrors reflecting everything endlessly.

The heartaches are unceasing. How much, for example, can be true of the latest dispiriting revelation (based on some suggestive documentation) that Mephistophelian *Stasi* agents were actually the real initiators of the vaunted East German uprising? These are times that are trying the Teutonic soul.

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Truth and Consequences

IT IS NOT as if nobody in the land has any notion of what the tribulations amount to in terms of German history and the fateful rebirth of yet another German Reich with a magnetic capital in Berlin. Most of the debate on this topic is *Schaumschlagerei*, mere foam and froth whipped up by pseudo-psychologists in the press and on the never-ending German TV talk-shows on twenty-three available channels.

In the midst of these stormy debates, one editor of Munich's *Süddeutsche Zeitung* put the alternatives in all their unacceptable starkness: "To forgive, forget, and repress?—or to attack, condemn, and punish!" Josef Joffe waxes eloquent about how deeply inspiring is the popular demand in the *Behrenstrasse* for the "full story." What future can be built on hidden fears and suspicions? On this poisonous ground no democratic community can put down roots, for only a spirit of democratic confidence can fertilize the tree of liberty. Worthy words for a credo of radical reconstruction; but then comes an even worthier quotation, moving in the opposite direction, from Abe Lincoln: "With malice toward none, with charity for all. . . to bind up the wounds of the nation. . . ."

There are two words which no current discussion of communism's legacy in Germany can escape. The first formerly referred to the old challenge of coping with Hitler, called *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, mastering or conquering the past. The second is the new challenge of facing up to a guilt incurred in yet another insidious span of totalitarianism, *aufarbeiten*, to "work up" and honestly make something of the naked truth. Both stereotypes beg and befog the question of whether any people in history have ever conquered the past—from the French with their Napoleonic legendry back to the Israelites with their Masada mythology. As for the "working up," to what new ethical and civic heights would the *Aufarbeitung* conceivably ascend? Even the best and the brightest, or the most pious and prescient, crammed full of historical knowledge, fortified in the new faith that truth had made free, armed with a sense of the tragic past, have rarely shown themselves to be superior citizens, impeccable libertarians, reliable paladins of peace and justice.

No, there is no grand Kantian design for dealing with the imperatives of emerging with a good conscience from totalitarianism and trying to build a viable new Europe. I rather imagine that the Germans in due time will be putting aside their traditional penchant for philosophical agendas and reconciling themselves in the style of the Czechs (and their other East European neighbors) to pragmatism, even to unhappy practicality; for any other way lies unmanageable neurosis.

Will the truth, in point of hard political fact, make the Germans free? Perhaps. Pastor Gauck believes in his Bible, especially St. John 8:32. But perhaps here, as elsewhere, the New Testament's rigor needs the redress of the Old Testament's Solomonic wisdom.□

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New Zealand—Land of the Bungee-Jumpers

Rowan Callick

MOST OF THE world needs good peripheral vision to see New Zealand—the farthest flung of the white-settler states that Europe spawned in the post-Columbus era. But this country of 3.4 million is constantly doing its best to grab attention, like an adolescent jumping up and down above the adults in a family video line-up. In the last decade, New Zealand has proudly led the anti-nuclear movement, destroying its major defense treaty in the process. In the same period, it has pushed economic deregulation and privatization further and faster than any other country.

Such radicalism appears weirdly aberrant to most visitors to this delightful land of milk, honey, and sheep, with its pristine alps and fjords, its highly productive farms, its proud record of loyalty to the Western alliance—participating in every major military engagement this century, from the Boer War to Vietnam, and even on a minor scale in the Gulf War. Its values and lifestyle appear dominantly—and rather drearily—bourgeois, agrarian, and provincial. But in fact New Zealand has always prided itself in being apart from the pack—while at the same time remaining almost obsessively concerned about how it is viewed by its peers, its big brothers overseas. Such a dichotomy both reflects and spawns insecurity.

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"Plenty of Government"

SHORTLY BEFORE the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 regularized the relationship between the white settlers, the indigenous inhabitants (the Maori), and the British crown, an English-born son of French emigres, Baron Charles Philip Hippolytus de Thierry, attempted to found a feudal kingdom in New Zealand, promising free trade and medicine. "The first and most exotic," historian Sir Keith Sinclair described it, "of a long line of utopias to be built in New Zealand's cloud-land." Today, increasing numbers of organizations choose to call the country by its Maori title, Aotearoa—"land of the long white cloud." (The Maori, a race with a more robust sense of humor than many of their more po-faced white—"pakeha"—fellow-countrymen, sometimes adapt this to "land of the wrong white crowd.")

In the mid-nineteenth century, Edward Wakefield, a more practical utopian than most, formed the New Zealand Association to recruit what he saw as a superior class of migrant, scathingly dismissing the "new people" who had sprung up already in the U.S., Canada, South Africa, and Australia as a people "who delight in a forced equality which rewards the mean rather than the great. . . . A people who become rotten before they are ripe." A prime difference between New Zealand and those older settler communities, however, was that this new

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colony was launched in an evangelical age which provided the Maori with a different fate from the North American Indian, the Bantu, or the Australian Aborigine. For, as Sinclair put it, "Imperialism and humanitarianism would henceforth march together. Even the Colonial Office, without much conviction, hoped that New Zealand would be the scene of a Utopian experiment."

The experiment was to be state led. "Without plenty of Government, the settlement of a waste country is barbarous and miserable work," Wakefield had said, and from the beginning plenty of government indeed characterized the country. In the mid-nineteenth century the government began to provide schools and hospitals for the Maori—the first roots of the later all-enveloping welfare state. Anthony Trollope, on a visit to New Zealand in 1872, wrote: "The colony is over-governed, over-legislated for, over-provided with officials, and over-burdened with debt." He might well have been describing the country one hundred years later.

THE LIBERAL government that ruled New Zealand for twenty years from 1891 went further and faster in this direction than any other state in the world. In 1893, it was the first country to give women the vote (though the state of Wyoming just pipped it). In 1894, compulsory state arbitration was imposed on industrial disputes. In 1898, the aged poor were given a pension. And the economy was driven by the simple formula of borrowing for development. British Prime Minister Sir Herbert Asquith described it as "a laboratory in which political and social experiments are every day made for the information and instruction of the older countries of the world."

The Labour government of 1935–49 completed what the Liberals had begun, introducing state control of credit; a commission of agriculture to regulate the production and marketing of all rural commodities; a statutory minimum wage; the building of state housing, let cheaply; invalid pensions; a national health service providing free medicine, medical treatment, and maternity benefits; payments to families for every child; funds to cushion farmers from falling prices; and a bureau of industry to control manufacturing through licenses. George Bernard Shaw, on a visit to New Zealand, described the country, presumably with approval, as "communist." The supreme leader of this utopia was Michael Joseph Savage, the Labour prime minister who told his parliament in 1935: "I believe that, in a fertile country, the standard of living of the people should not be influenced by any external factor whatsoever."

Savage's conservative successors did nothing to dismantle this closeted, hothouse world. Indeed, it reached its zenith—or nadir—under the prime ministership of Sir Robert Muldoon, a feisty rightist who—in power from 1975–1984—had to accommodate the dire twin effects of Britain's joining the European Community in 1972 and the 1973 oil shock. Britain was New Zealand's major market for its agricultural products. With diversification of the economy and of trading links, exports to Britain fell from 36 percent of total exports in 1970 to 7 percent in 1990. Agricultural protectionism in the major industrial economies—particularly and outrageously in the European Community—has put a stranglehold on New Zealand. During the Muldoon years, inflation zoomed to 18 percent, the foreign debt tripled in three years, and unemployment climbed steeply from virtually zero (in the 1950s and 1960s it was joked that the prime minister knew all those out of work by name). New Zealanders were horrified. They had enjoyed a thirty-year boom from 1940, never falling below fifth in international living standards and for a time enjoying the highest real per capita income in the world.

Muldoon's answer was to burrow deeper into the womb. He borrowed overseas, established job creation schemes, subsidized agricultural prices, froze wages and prices, controlled rents and dividends, offered tax cuts to encourage new industries and farm products selected by the government, and above

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all began to "Think Big"—the slogan for a grandiose program of energy and steel projects (harking back to the days in the nineteenth century when New Zealand exported oil to the Middle East). Muldoon wrote in his autobiography: "The whole concept of government is based on intervention." By the time he lost power to Labour's David Lange in 1984, the foreign debt had climbed from the half billion or so in 1970 to $NZ8 billion, a huge burden for a country of three and a half million people. Muldoon—who confounded the nation by appearing on stage, after his defeat, in the scatological musical "The Rocky Horror Picture Show"—was not so much a Kiwi Ceaucescu as a Peronist who believed (and still believes) in state-funded private enterprise, as today's Labour leader, Mike Moore, aptly describes him.

Rogernomics and Ruthanasia

THUS WAS the stage set for the recent period of extraordinary turbulence in the country's affairs. This began with the election in 1984 of the most revolutionary government in New Zealand's history, in which the dominant figures were the prime minister, David Lange, and the finance minister, Roger (now Sir Roger) Douglas. At home, Douglas inaugurated a privatizing revolution—promptly branded "Rogernomics"—of enormous scope, one that was to transform New Zealand from one of the most state-controlled societies outside the communist bloc (it even resisted joining the IMF until 1961, because of anxiety about foreign, Washingtonian, control) to arguably the most full-on, market-driven country in the world in less than a decade. At the same time, Lange abruptly switched the country from being a stout Western ally, with its war memorials and remembrance days still proudly maintained, to a Pacific island state drifting toward the non-aligned movement.

The measures taken by Labour after its defeat of National Party Prime Minister Muldoon in 1984 include: a 20 percent devaluation of the dollar, the floating of the dollar, and deregulation of the finance industry; dramatic income tax cuts, the top rate falling from 66 percent to 33 percent; the introduction of a 12.5 percent across-the-board goods and services tax; the elimination of subsidies and slashing of tariffs and import quotas, so that 90 percent of goods are now imported free of duty; the reorganization of the central bank along German lines, as an independent body given the overriding aim of reducing inflation (by January 1992 it had fallen to 1 percent, compared with the U.S.'s 3.1 percent); and the sale of government assets (many of which controlled monopolies) including Air New Zealand, the Bank of New Zealand, New Zealand Steel, Petrocorp, much of the national forestry plantations, Postbank, and the Shipping Corporation. David Richwhite, joint chief executive of the merchant bank that brokered the $NZ4 billion sale of New Zealand's Telecom to Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, believes the American companies bought into New Zealand in part to learn about running a business in the sort of deregulated environment they anticipate further down the track back home in the U.S.

Douglas, a son and grandson of leading Labour politicians, quit parliament at the last election, in October 1990, after being sacked in December 1988 as finance minister from an administration that will be fixed in history as the "Rogernomics" government, to the ire of Lange's not inconsiderable ego. But his revolution has continued. He believed speed was essential—taking quantum leaps before vested interests could mobilize. Michael Stutchbury, economics editor of the *Australian Financial Review*, says "Douglas is the only politician I ever met who, when I called him a zealot to his face, took it as a compliment." He believes, rightly, that few wish to turn the clock back to the days when, for instance, the state-owned railways employed 22,000 people. Today there is a staff of just 5,500—yet they carry 90 percent of the former tonnage at lower charges. New Zealanders deserve full marks for trying, even if economic rationalism was sometimes carried to absurd and callous lengths, as when

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New Zealand rail announced the termination of the "lifetime" free train passes given the country's two surviving holders of World War I Victoria Crosses, the highest order of military valor in the British Commonwealth.

Exhausted by this economic revolution, in 1990 the electorate threw Labour out of government in a devastating landslide. The National Party, led by Jim Bolger, a worthy if uncharismatic former farmer with nine children, won 67 seats, Labour 29. Half the Labour cabinet lost their seats. But the new government, eschewing its traditional agrarian conservatism, simply picked up where Labour had left off. The new finance minister, Ruth Richardson, came to office with her own brand of tough-minded economic rationalism, dubbed "Ruthanasia" by her legion of critics. The Bolger government continued along the path of its predecessor—slashing the size of government, dismembering the welfare state, introducing user charges for most government services, shifting effective control of state schools to the school boards and allowing parents to send their children to such schools in any locale they wish, introducing means tests for pensions, and repealing virtually all labor legislation in order to replace union membership with individual employee contracts.

The president of New Zealand's once all-powerful council of trade unions, Ken Douglas (no relation of Sir Roger), has protested bitterly that "The bastards in power have turned the country into a huge colony of white mice. The World Bank has supplied the designer drug—and the rest of the world has come to monitor our twitches." It is not only the unions that are outraged. Pensioners, traditionally conservative voters, have flocked to "gray power" protest rallies, as interest rates continue to fall and their "nest-egg" incomes diminish. Bolger's poll rating sunk in December 1991 to the lowest ever for a New Zealand prime minister: 7 percent.

Unemployment has doubled in five years to 11 percent. Between 1985 and 1990 the country's gross domestic product fell by 0.7 percent, the worst record inside the OECD. Indeed, union leader Douglas fears New Zealand will become a low-wage banana republic, and maintains that "It's only Anglo-Saxon arrogance that keeps New Zealand in the OECD." Last year government debt stood at $NZ40 billion, a $38,000 liability for every family in the country. Most New Zealanders have yet to see the gain that they have been told by politicians in both major parties must be preceded by pain (although some of the reforms have been widely welcomed, such as the deregulation that has brought into stores an unprecedented range of foreign goods, at relatively low prices). Finance Minister Richardson, whose favored motto is "Better a Warrior than a Wimp," argues:

> We used to be a country that experimented, that's true. In the 'sixties and 'seventies we experimented with high levels of debt and taxation, deficits and welfare spending. We've come off that extremism that condemned us and joined the world. That return to rationality is saving the country.

But the concepts presented to the electors over the last few years—that the country cannot afford its cradle-to-grave welfare system, that growth through privately owned export industries is the only way to avoid a Latin American decline—appear almost treasonous to those many new Zealanders who grew up revering Michael Savage as a folk hero.

Third Parties

LEADING THOSE among the National Party who smell blood is Winston Peters, a dapper, popular, somewhat demagogic part-Maori, sacked for disloyalty from Bolger's cabinet in October 1991. Winning a standing ovation from the Auckland pensioners a couple of months later, he described his own party's election manifesto of a year before as a series of convenient lies. He has become the protégé of Muldoon, who has announced that at age seventy he is quitting parliament, to protest current policies.

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They have little chance as yet in destabilizing the party leadership—though panic may start to set in if poll ratings fail to pick up nearer the next election, due in late 1994. Others have even less chance of changing the political agenda. For New Zealand has only a single parliamentary chamber, and has no state or county system to balance its central powers. And it has a first-past-the-post voting system that tends to freeze out minority parties. Nevertheless, disparate alienated groups have now formed an alliance to challenge the prevailing economic orthodoxy, articulated in different styles by both the major parties.

This new alliance of third parties comprises the Democrats, formerly trading as Social Credit, who believe government can borrow the country out of its problems; NewLabour (sic), a left-wing splinter group from Labour, led by the only third-party MP, Jim Anderton; the Greens, who polled strongly in 1990; and Mana Motuhake, a Maori party led by avuncular, veteran Maori politician Matiu Rata.

Rata's Maori people are benefiting from a level of bargaining power they have not enjoyed for generations—thanks to the act initiated by Labour in 1985 that enabled them to take complaints about the non-fulfillment of the terms of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi before a tribunal. Rata wishes to use the treaty to establish a Maori nation within New Zealand—enjoying a cultural identity, international sporting teams, and a civil courts structure similar to that which Scotland has within Britain.

By 2020 a quarter of New Zealanders will be Polynesians—a million people of Maori or South Pacific islands origin, where in 1896, decimated by Western illnesses and wars, only 42,000 survived. Portraits of dignified, elderly Maori painted at the turn of the century were conscious tributes to a doomed race; today, young Maori stare at them on the walls of New Zealand's art galleries. They have become something of an underclass, most threateningly through their biker gangs such as the Mongrel Mob, the Comancheros, and Black Power. And the high unemployment among the 85 percent of Maori under the age of twenty-five has given many time to re-discover traditions that had been dying. The Waitangi Treaty is New Zealand's only national myth, something every former colony needs. And to underpin it the government has to deal with promises made to the Maori, even if only at the rhetorical level.

But it is the support for the Greens that will determine the fate of the alliance. For while New Zealanders are in a state of economic shock, they know where they stand on the environment: they are for it, at whatever cost. Australia's third largest corporation, and one of the world's biggest miners, CRA (Conzinc Riotinto Australia) recently closed its New Zealand operations in frustration, despite the country's high prospectivity, because it was proving impossible to make any progress. New Zealand is obsessed with its "clean, green" identity, though it should be said that French nuclear testing at Mururoa in French Polynesia, over 3,000 miles away from New Zealand, is also opposed by Australia and other Pacific countries. The outrageous blowing up of the Greenpeace vessel *Rainbow Warrior* by French agents in July 1985 was widely resented and worked to strengthen the anti-testing case. New Zealanders believed "their" Pacific ocean was being polluted by such nuclear testing; if it was safe, why not on French soil? The country's very identity was seen to be bound up with its environmental virginity, constantly threatened by the bullies from Europe (for which Britain had already deserted its long loyal ally) and, of course, America.

Going it Alone

THE ECONOMIC agenda may have been grabbed by the Roger Douglases and Ruth Richardsons, concerned to enmesh New Zealand in the global trade network. But, not unnaturally, New Zealanders do not want to be taken for granted. They are determined—like most other small nations—to assert that they are not easy lays,

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that they still have their self-respect, and remain as virginal as possible, given their straitened circumstances (by no means all of their own making). In practice, this has meant, mainly, rejecting both the nuclear umbrella and the use of nuclear energy. Middle-class Kiwis might have been taken by surprise when then Prime Minister David Lange pushed through parliament the anti-nuclear wish list of his Labour Party's left wing (during the same period, Bob Hawke's Australian Labour government blithely disregarded most of the Left's agenda urged on Hawke by party conferences). But it served Lange's immediate purpose of offering the party a distractingly tasty morsel in the face of considerable unease about the free-market revolution his government was unleashing on the economy, and a surprisingly large number of people began to exult in Lange's smart-guy, lawyer's put-downs of New Zealand's critics, especially Americans.

The issue also gave the country an opportunity to demonstrate a degree of postponed disgust at having been abandoned by Britain, the mother country, for, of course, the ban also applied to British vessels. Thus was the country emboldened to accelerate its shedding of the constricting cultural effects of choosing to maintain a broadly British-only immigration policy after World War II, during a period when Australia had changed itself fundamentally in absorbing waves of Italians, Greeks, Lebanese, Turks, and Vietnamese. But ironically, if not really surprisingly, it is the scattering of American New Zealanders, many of them Vietnam era arrivals or refugees from the apocalypse-to-come, who have had an especially significant effect in cementing the anti-nuclear stand.

Lange consolidated his domestic position by travelling widely overseas to repeat his "Here I stand" credo after, in early 1985, he denied access to New Zealand ports to the USS *Buchanan*. "The ultimate threat to the environment is that posed by nuclear weapons," he told an audience at Yale University. "New Zealand is wholly committed to the development of greater regional self-reliance. . . . The rigid alliance framework of the post-war period is no longer a full answer to security needs." In harmony with the country's influx of Pacific islands migrants, its increased role for the Maori, and this focus on regional security, New Zealand looked for acceptance from the small, scattered South Pacific island countries as a re-born sister nation and leader—but has failed to find it. Only one of the thirteen independent island countries—Vanuatu—also banned American naval vessel visits. Overwhelmingly, these countries have continued to look to New Zealand, as they look to Australia, to provide aid, investment, trade, and personnel, and its opting out of Western alliances precipitated, if anything, a decline in the country's regional influence rather than the rise anticipated by Lange.

IN 1989, LANGE quit as prime minister; he was returned to parliament in the 1990 election, however, and is today shadow attorney-general. He claims his ambitions are behind him but he could well be back in the running if the popular Labour leader Mike Moore slips. Lange, who joined other Western "elder statesmen" in travelling to Iraq in late 1990 to beseech Saddam Hussein to release hostages, compounded the offence he caused Washington by the dry, sarcastic style in which he purveyed his anti-nuclear message. When Denis McLean, the former defense secretary who disagreed forcefully (and, after his resignation, publicly) with the Lange government about its strategy, was appointed ambassador to the United States by the new National Party government after the 1990 election, his entree to Washington—where New Zealand had been frozen out of influential circles—was greatly smoothed by Lange's denunciations of the appointment. Following his retirement as defense secretary, McLean wrote:

> The character of an island country is shown by overcoming isolation, by reaching out to work constructively with others to resolve common problems. . . . The independence of mind and spirit of New Zealanders is not demonstrated by lofty pronouncements on complex issues, in

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which the burden of the problem lies elsewhere. . . . In a curious way, an otherwise confident people have misread their own history. It should be clear that a small country has contributed much to the world in association with others.

The situation today is straightforward. Australia and the United States maintain a fiction that ANZUS—the Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance formed in 1951—persists, with one seat, that of New Zealand, merely temporarily vacated. Australia and the U.S. have maintained their annual top-level political exchanges, and their exceedingly close, functional military relationship facilitates considerable operational flexibility. The U.S. particularly looks to Australia to take the senior role in ensuring a strategic and economic equilibrium in the South Pacific islands region.

Australia has worked hard to maintain a military relationship with New Zealand that continues outside the formal parameters of ANZUS. When the U.S. announced in 1991 that it would cease arming naval vessels with nuclear weapons, there was conjecture that New Zealand would swiftly return to the ANZUS fold. But the anti-nuclear legislation passed by the Lange government covers nuclear propulsion as well as nuclear weapons, and until the law is changed the government has little room to manoeuvre. Prime Minister Bolger—who took the easy way out when still in opposition, by persuading the National Party to support the anti-nuclear status quo—has set up a committee to review the situation on nuclear propulsion, but appears unready to fight public opinion on this issue at a time when his popularity rating has slumped below 10 percent.

New Zealand, which has been spending an average of just over 2 percent of its GDP on defense, is cutting back its defense budget by a further 30 percent over three years, as part of an overall government belt-tightening. It is doing this at a time when New Zealand's shrugging off of its major alliance has compounded its defense shortcomings, for the shared intelligence, exercises, easy access to stocks, training, and other advantages that previously helped compensate for a very limited budget have been lost. While the New Zealand government looks to a restoration of ANZUS, in reality the alliance era is over, and bilateralization will advance—with Australia and the U.S. cooperating as closely as ever, and New Zealand clinging to some kind of residual international role largely through its economic and defense relationships with Australia.

Richard Baker, a former American diplomat who directed a calmly argued study on fifty years of alliance relations between the three countries (published by the East-West Center, Honolulu, in September 1991), maintains that the anti-nuclear confrontation, the symbolic end of the alliance era in the South Pacific, came as a historical coincidence. ANZUS was bound to fade in any case; and certainly there is no ground today, as there might have been in 1951, for a formal treaty with a country as marginal to U.S. interests as New Zealand.

But New Zealand continues to be a member of the Five Power Treaty (with Australia, Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore) which does provide it with some participation in exercises. And although Australia continues to be dismissive of New Zealand's anti-nuclear position—and did not especially welcome the restoration in 1990 of ministerial level contacts between the U.S. and New Zealand—discussions have begun between New Zealand and Australia with a view to establishing complementary military training facilities and defense industries. New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has been particularly anxious to re-establish abandoned links: "We're now so introspective as a nation that we miss the world going by, just beyond our shores."

The Bungee-Jumpers

NEVERTHELESS, many New Zealanders have found a source of distracting pride, even as they suffer from the pain of the massive restructuring of their economy, in forging a new sense of identity

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as "the tiny nation that said no to the Yanks." They resent being mistaken for Australians, whom they regard as brash and crass, and tend to be especially brittle about perceived slights from foreigners. When expatriate Australian TV *compere* Clive James—who works for the BBC in London—lightheartedly featured excerpts from New Zealand TV's "Crimewatch" show that earnestly re-enacted charmingly minor traffic offenses, irate Kiwis wrote to point out that their country had its share of murderers, and had even in late 1990 experienced a mayhem killing of thirteen by a gunman who was finally shot by police.

A collection of essays published in 1991—*Pakeha*, edited by Michael King—features testimonies (the fundamentalist parallel is apposite) by a string of middle-class New Zealanders who traveled into temporary exile (seeking what they call Overseas Experience) before rejecting in disgust the trappings of Old World civilization found in London or New York, and returning to rediscover their true selves in the pristine promised land. Experimental science, representative democracy, capitalism, and Christianity are typically rejected by one writer, Christine Dann, as tools of power "created in past times, in faraway places. As far as I am concerned, they are all up for reinterpretation, and perhaps rejection, by Pakeha seeking a more effective way of being in this land with its original people." Old policies aimed at assimilating the Maori are rejected by such writers, who encourage separate development for what is now seen as the Maori's superior culture. The Anglican (Episcopalian) Church, for instance, has long had a discrete Maori diocese.

Whatever else, New Zealand remains a vigorous democracy. Perhaps it demonstrates what will become a wider problem for Western countries—the disaggregation of viewpoints and policies, amplified in this case by their existence within such a small population. Labour leader Moore believes New Zealand might achieve the ultimate in disaggregation, and leap into East Asia-style economic takeoff while yet free-falling into Third World poverty: the top 30 percent of the population becoming richer than ever; the middle 40 percent treading water, and the bottom 30 percent—many of them Maori—sunk beneath the waves, the new underclass.

Few of the post-World War II verities appear to remain; even the country's highest peak, Mount Cook, lost ten meters over Christmas 1991, due to a massive landslide. Bungee-jumping, the death-defying sport of diving into chasms to be saved by a rubber chord, evolved in New Zealand; now the nation itself is out on a bungee-jumping bridge, scanning the abyss with increasing anxiety, wishing it could feel more assured of rebounding with exhilarating economic and strategic success.□

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On the Trail of America's Paranoid Class

Oliver Stone's JFK

Richard Grenier

IN 1965, HISTORIAN Richard Hofstadter published a celebrated and influential collection of essays entitled "The Paranoid Style in American Politics." Most honorably, he included in it an almost equally famous essay he wrote a decade earlier on the Joseph McCarthy phenomenon—about several key contentions of which he had changed his mind. The earlier essay, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," also about political paranoia, affirmed that Senator McCarthy received a disproportionate amount of his support from "Catholics and from the ill-educated, but also from Republicans, Irish-Americans, the lower classes, and the aged." This was indeed the prevailing wisdom of the time.

By the mid-1960s, however, Hofstadter had decided that his earlier emphasis on ethnic factors in analyzing what he called "pseudo-conservatism" was mistaken ("analogous to the strategy of generals who are prepared to fight the last war"), or perhaps that he had simply picked the wrong ethnic group. In retrospect, he wrote, he realized that even in 1954 feelings of dislocation were declining among Irish-Americans and German-Americans (another group he had cited). By the 1960s, he said, American "radical rightism" and political paranoia stood revealed as "predominantly a movement of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republicans." He regretted having almost ignored Christian fundamentalism in the earlier essay, making only a passing reference to it in a footnote. The new Hofstadter position, although learned and extremely well set out, was again the prevailing wisdom, as white Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republicans and Christian fundamentalists were notoriously the strongest support groups of the 1960s Goldwater movement and of Barry Goldwater himself, the central figure of *The Paranoid Style*.

Unfortunately, Richard Hofstadter died in 1970—having treated the 1960s radicals of the New Left with corrosive contempt and shown hints in his writing of what we now call neoconservativism—so we cannot know what he would have made of the subsequent career of the former Hollywood actor who delivered a famous campaign speech for Barry Goldwater on the eve of the 1964 presidential election. Contemplating the later career of Ronald Reagan, one suspects that Hofstadter might once again have had to revise his notion as to the prime locus of American political paranoia.

In examining the "great drama of the public scene" a quarter century after his influential book, the historian might conceivably have come to the conclusion that the most flamboyant exemplars of the qualities of "heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy" that in aggregate he called the "paranoid style" were no longer members of any

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ethnic group at all but of a professional group: this country's artistic class. But we shall first approach film director Oliver Stone from another point of view.

* * *

OLIVER STONE: "During that Woodstock thing, I felt like a rage, I felt like an anger inside that they were not serious about this counterrevolution, that if they really meant it, they had to get serious in order for it to work, that it had to be militarized and politicized. I felt like, stop screwing around with Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Yuppie or whatever his name is, Jerry Rubin. . . . If the war is being fought in Vietnam, then let's bring the war home, because you know, power comes from the barrel of a gun. . . . If you're going to do it, do it! Get together a cadre of tough soldiers, people who've been over there, and the jail population, and try to make the revolution."

Oliver Stone: "Jail immediately told me what was going on in America—with a capital 'K'. . . . I saw right away the problem, the civil war. . . . I saw the potential for revolution and the brewing underside, that the war was not just in Vietnam."

Oliver Stone: "I said, 'Let's get some fucking rifles and go up on the roof tops. Let's go for Nixon."

Oliver Stone to a critical journalist: "You're working for the Ministry of Information!. . . You could be a Russian working for Stalin in Pravda in 1935! You're liars! You just invent history!"

Oliver Stone later: "What's history? Some people say it's a bunch of gossip made up by soldiers who passed it around a camp fire. They say such and such happened. They create, they make it bigger, they make it better. . . . So, what's history? Who the fuck knows?"[1]

* * *

SIFTING THROUGH the reams of reports and interviews that have greeted the release of Oliver Stone's *JFK* with Kevin Costner—a film that has produced more copious and more violent political polemic than any motion picture in Hollywood history—one is struck by a number of statements from director Oliver Stone himself. All were made when his film was coming under scathing attack from the American press, an attack absolutely unprecedented in that the attackers, of an extraordinary unanimity in their condemnation of the film, were from every known political quarter. The unremarked aspect is a pattern that emerges from Stone's temperament and from his biography, a pattern that has appeared before:

Decorated for military valor. Wounded in combat. Academic failure. Prison. Ardent espousal of a radical reordering of society. Vague as to the details of how this society would be organized. Conviction that he was let down (betrayed) by others behind the lines who did not experience combat, weaklings, less valiant than he. A tendency to "heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy." Total immunity to all evidence that contradicts his views. Eagerness to use violence and paramilitary action to bring about his only sketchily defined New Order. Bitter antagonism toward father. Artistic temperament.

I am describing, of course, the leader of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, Adolf Hitler. Now the distinctive and defining fact about Hitler, what made him a monster, is not that he had paranoid fantasies—many people have those—but that a turn of the historical wheel allowed him to use the German nation and state to play out those fantasies on the world stage, with catastrophic and hideous consequences. This sets the post-1933 Hitler far, far apart from the Oliver Stones of this world, and any comparison must be restricted to Hitler's "armed bohemian" phase, before the Great Depression propelled him from the margin to the center of German politics.

Oliver Stone has said he has been able to "funnel [his] rage and [his] anger into mov-

[1]Of the above quotations, the first two appeared in *Esquire*, November, 1991, and the last three in the *Washington Post*, December 21, 1991.

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ies," but we shall never know what the world would have been like if Adolf Hitler had been able to funnel his energies into architecture, his chosen profession, instead of being refused admission to the School of Architecture of Vienna's *Akadamie der bildenden Kunste* and taking to politics. As it was, Hitler made lavish use of his artistic skills, designing the Nazi insignia and uniforms, and those who witnessed Nazi rallies (including Swedish film director Ingmar Bergman, at the time a Nazi sympathizer) say they were the greatest theatrical productions of the age: the night parades, marching men, cheering thousands, searchlights crisscrossing the sky. Suddenly at the orgasmic moment he would appear: *Der Führer*! Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*, a dazzlingly directed record of the first Nuremberg Party Congress after the coming to power of the Nazis, is to this day considered a film masterpiece.

* * *

RICHARD Hofstadter wrote at length about the tendency in modern politics to "secularize a religiously derived view of the world," coloring political issues "with the dark symbology of a certain side of Christian tradition." On the conspiratorial mind specifically, Sir Karl Popper has written:

> The conspiracy theory of society is the view that whatever happens in society—including things which people as a rule dislike, such as war, unemployment, poverty, shortages—is the result of direct design by powerful men or groups. This view is widely held, although it is, I have no doubt, a somewhat primitive form of superstition. It is older than historicism. . . and in its modern form is the typical result of the secularization of religious superstition. The gods are abandoned. But their place is filled by. . . sinister pressure groups responsible for all the evils from which we suffer—groups such as the Elders of Zion, or monopolists, or imperialists. . . . And people who sincerely believe that they know how to create heaven on earth are most likely to adopt a conspiracy theory, and to get involved in a counterconspiracy against nonexistent conspirators. For the only explanation of their failure to produce their heaven is the evil intention of the Devil, who has a vested interest in hell.[2]

While notions of all-embracing conspiracies on the part of Jesuits, Freemasons, Mormons, international bankers, or international arms merchants had been circling the globe for some time, coherent, systematic conspiracy-thinking in the modern world probably reached its consummate triumph with Hitler's dark belief in a plot to seize power by "World Jewry," and his vision of a society based on racial purity, with Aryan supermen, *Untermenschen*, and culture destroyers or Jews.

Judged by this high standard, Oliver Stone falls hopelessly short. His conspiracies are far less internally consistent, and it remains unclear just what kind of ideal society Stone's "cadre of tough soldiers" firing from rooftops at Richard Nixon was intended to achieve. But he shares with all extreme conspiracy addicts the craving to find dark forces at work behind everything that disturbs him, as he has shown in earlier films such as *Wall Street* and *Salvador*. Stone has the conspiracy addict's fanatic resistance to evidence that contradicts his hypotheses, the same willingness to commit pious frauds in the interest of what he clearly feels to be a higher truth, the same grandiosity, and he conveys—if more in his words than in his films—the same approval of violent methods, sometimes suggesting that what attracts him is not the need to rid the world of an alleged social evil but the violent means he feels are called for to bring about the evil's extermination.

* * *

THE THESIS of Oliver Stone's *JFK* is that President John Kennedy was assassinated because he had decided to withdraw American forces from Vietnam, and that the assassination was the product of

[2]Several similar overlapping passages by Karl Popper appear in *The Autonomy of Sociology*, 1945, and *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1962.

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a vast conspiracy at the highest levels of the U.S. government. This thesis has been demolished by political commentators. It has been taken apart piece by piece by scholars who normally do not concern themselves with motion pictures, and by men, many very distinguished, of all shades of political opinion: Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (in the *Washington Post*), columnists Tom Wicker and Leslie Gelb (*New York Times*), columnists Charles Krauthammer and George Will (*Washington Post*), historian and columnist Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (*Wall Street Journal*), Kenneth Auchincloss (*Newsweek*), John Leo (*U.S. News*), Chris Matthews (*San Francisco Examiner*, *Washington Times*), columnists R. Emmett Tyrrell, Harry Summers, and Sam Francis (*Washington Times*), Ronald Steel (*New Republic*), Alexander Cockburn (*Nation*), David W. Belin (*Wall Street Journal*), Michael Beschloss (*Washington Post*), Chief Counsel for the House Select Committee on Assassinations Robert Blakey (ABC's "Nightline").

Reporter George Lardner, who covered the Clay Shaw trial in New Orleans, wrote two articles for the *Washington Post* attacking *JFK*, one when he obtained an advance copy of the screenplay, a second when the film appeared. Hostile articles have been published in the *Economist*,[3] *Esquire*, *GQ* (two), and *U.S. News*. *Newsweek* devoted a full cover story to the film: "The Twisted Truth of *JFK*: Why Oliver Stone's New Movie Can't Be Trusted." A typical comment, from Professor Schlesinger, who served on the White House staff during the Kennedy administration, was that the Stone film is "reckless, paranoid, really despicable." The *Wall Street Journal*, in a lead editorial, also attacked *JFK* as "paranoid," and the *New York Times*, in still another lead editorial, while calling for further disclosure of assassination documents, wrote that Oliver Stone "is not engaged in fair-minded inquiry" and that he uses "specious evidence." ABC's "Prime Time" devoted a heavily negative segment to *JFK*. And even Norman Mailer in *Vanity Fair*, while paying tribute to the director's "moxie," called the film's conspiracy "a paranoid installation the size of a space city on the moon" and said, "it is all but inconceivable that a major plot involving the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, and the White House could ever hold together through the decades." In fact, except for a pathetic scattering of conspiracy fanatics, no one has stepped forward to defend Oliver Stone, and he has taken to railing against the press most venomously.

A final indignity was inflicted by NBC's "Saturday Night Live" after President Bush's visit and trade mission to Tokyo, during which he became ill and vomited partly on Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at a banquet. An Oliver Stone impersonator appeared in a "Saturday Night Live" parody of the event, brooding, lumbering about, in possession of the "secret tapes" of the Bush vomiting. We see an actor playing the president vomit, then see the tape played in reverse, with the vomit swiftly swallowed up again. Ha, ha! The actor impersonating Stone says darkly: "Now I ask you only three questions. Who was there? Who could have done it? And who stood to gain?" His befuddled straight man gives looks to indicate, "This guy's wacko," but finally says: "The Japanese?" Stone rumbles: "No, you fool!

[3]The account in the *Economist* was based on *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1961–1963: Volume III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963; and Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, published by the State Department. These volumes are based on long-classified documents from the Kennedy Library, State Department, National Security Council, CIA, and Defense Department, including records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The editors, despite a small number of required and carefully noted deletions, affirm in the introduction that they are "confident that they have had complete access to all presidential written records bearing on Vietnam." If Kennedy was in the process of changing his mind on Vietnam, wrote the *Economist*, these volumes contain not the slightest indication of it.

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Everybody would suspect the Japanese right away! Think again!" Stone somberly repeats his three questions, ending with an ominous, "Who stood to gain?" and finally bursts out, "Iacocca! Iacocca did it!" And off he wanders, looking for some new conspiracy. Somehow one has the feeling that Oliver Stone never imagined he would become a figure of fun on "Saturday Night Live."

* * *

THERE IS NO evidence that President Kennedy was assassinated by a vast conspiracy "at the highest levels of American government," and none whatever that he had decided to withdraw American forces from Vietnam. The thesis is not original with Stone, but borrowed from one-time New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison—until Stone America's most prominent "conspiracy buff," and author of *On the Trail of the Assassins*, on which the film *JFK* is ostensibly based. In his book, Garrison tosses off Kennedy's supposed plan to withdraw from Vietnam almost casually, in a few words, with not the slightest indication as to how he came upon such a pivotal piece of information. It provides Garrison with a necessary *cui bono*, but he furnishes nothing to support it. Once the thesis is taken over by Oliver Stone, however, evidence of a planned Vietnam withdrawal is plentiful—all of it fabricated.

The general circumstances of the Kennedy assassination are of course well known, those of District Attorney Garrison's crusade somewhat less. Kevin Costner plays the Garrison role much like the parts Jimmy Stewart used to play in the Frank Capra movies, a simple, unaffected, virtuous man—endearingly American in fact—caught up in a struggle with a corrupt society. This is not at all the picture of Garrison that appears in other accounts, including his own. In 1971 Garrison was arrested by federal agents and charged with participating in organized crime, specifically with allowing payoffs on pinball gambling. This is naturally omitted in Oliver Stone's movie. The Kennedy assassination took place in Dallas, moreover, and Garrison was District Attorney in New Orleans, but Lee Harvey Oswald had lived in New Orleans at an earlier period, and soon Garrison—in his Jimmy Stewart mode—is off, investigating characters from the dark underside of New Orleans life.

Garrison's crowning achievement, and the high point of the film, was to indict and try wealthy New Orleans businessman Clay Shaw (Tommy Lee Jones) for participation in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The collection of "evidence" shown in the movie is so gripping, and Garrison's summation before the jury is so eloquent—with hired killers employed by America's all-powerful "military-industrial complex" behind every bush and America teetering on the brink of "fascism"—that movie audiences might well wonder why the New Orleans jury took under an hour to throw the case out. Oliver Stone, unhumbled, dedicates his film grandly "to the young, in whose spirit the search for truth marches on."

* * *

THE EVIDENCE Stone produces in his film is of such egregious quality, and has already been thrashed out in such detail, that I shall summarize it here only briefly. The witnesses in the Clay Shaw affair, in either real life or the film, fall into three categories: 1) incredible, 2) disreputable, and 3) sheer fiction.

A star witness for the prosecution in the real Clay Shaw trial was a New York accountant named Charles Spiesel, a psychopath who periodically fingerprinted his daughter to make sure occult forces had not substituted another girl. Although Spiesel figures prominently in Jim Garrison's *On the Trail of the Assassins* to explain why Garrison lost his case against Shaw, in Oliver Stone's movie version he has been vaporized. In an article in the *National Review*, Tom Bethell, who happened to be one of Garrison's researchers for the Shaw case, has interestingly revealed that Garrison knew perfectly well that Spiesel was insane but used him as a key witness

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anyway, and that it was only Bethell's tipping off of the defense that allowed it to destroy Spiesel's credibility as a witness. In any event, we see neither hide nor hair of Mr. Spiesel in Oliver Stone's film.

On the other hand we see quite a bit of a certain homosexual prostitute who says he was present when Shaw and other rabid anti-Communists discussed not only assassinating President Kennedy, but the manner in which the assassination should be carried out. Unfortunately, there is no such homosexual prostitute. Conspicuous as he is on the screen (played by Kevin Bacon), he is entirely the product of Oliver Stone's imagination. But such fictional embellishments to allegedly "true" stories are not new to Oliver Stone. In *Born on the Fourth of July*, the "real life" autobiography of Vietnam War opponent Ron Kovic, protagonist Kovic (Tom Cruise) visits a small town in Georgia to apologize to a dead soldier's family for having inadvertently killed him by "friendly fire." The incident never took place. In his book, Kovic records no such death by "friendly fire." He makes no such visit to Georgia. And there is no such town. It is not on the map.

But a retired U.S. Army colonel named L. Fletcher Prouty is a very real person. Although identified in the film as only "Colonel X," the movie's "Deep Throat," Prouty is very important in providing the clearest articulation of the movie's ultimate thesis, the dark conspiracy behind the Kennedy assassination. Unfortunately for Stone, Prouty has extraordinarily disreputable political associations (he was a member of the national policy advisory board of the Populist Action Committee of the extremist Liberty Lobby) and would not have made a much better witness than Charles Spiesel at the Clay Shaw trial in New Orleans. Prouty believes, for example, and has said many times, that the United States is governed by a "High Cabal" of rich, powerful, mysterious men which gives orders to such subservient flunkies as major U.S. politicians, members of government commissions, and even the press, who all obediently follow its orders. "Colonel X" (Donald Sutherland), his thinking obviously in perfect harmony with the way Prouty views the world, tells Garrison in the movie that the Kennedy assassination was a dark plot, a coup d'état, with Lyndon Johnson "waiting in the wings." In actual fact, Garrison never set eyes on Prouty, and his meeting with Colonel X in Washington is yet another fiction. Oliver Stone, on the other hand, not only met Prouty but employed him as one of *JFK*'s principal researchers.

FEW IN THE movie audience have heard of L. Fletcher Prouty. Few have heard of Charles Spiesel. But many have heard of legendary television anchorman Walter Cronkite, who, two months before Kennedy was assassinated, interviewed him on CBS. We indeed see a snippet of this interview in the *JFK* movie. But the snippet is just a snippet, and what Oliver Stone deliberately omits—although he must know perfectly well that Kennedy said it to Cronkite—is this forthright statement from Kennedy on Vietnam: "I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake." Only three weeks before his own assassination, furthermore, Kennedy gave the go-ahead for an American-backed coup against South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem—in the name of winning the war. Lyndon Johnson, who had opposed this coup against an allied government but who kept all Kennedy's closest advisers, was left to carry on.

But the movie *JFK* surges virtuously onward, carried by fictions, deceptions, omissions, with characters misrepresented, suppressed, or simply invented, made up out of whole cloth. In argument, Stone constantly shifts his ground, sometimes calling his film a "myth," a "speculation," involving "leaps of faith," sometimes maintaining its utter truth. He remains consistent only in the grandiosity of his conspiratorial vision and in his hostility to the United States. Even now Oliver Stone firmly believes, with Prouty, that America is run by a "covert, shadow-type government" that "dictates what we must hear and see."

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Some two hundred years of history notwithstanding, he finds the United States as prone to military coup d'etat as any country in Africa or Latin America. When on the defensive, Oliver Stone may say, "What's history? Who the fuck knows?" But he seems to have the deepest conviction that he himself knows, and that in dealing with a historical event he is entitled to distort and fabricate and just plain lie to present a vision that in its essence he feels must be true. But why must it be true? Why does he feel this?

* * *

EARLIER quoted Karl Popper on what he calls the "conspiracy theory of society." But I hasten to add that Popper does not mean to suggest that conspiracies never occur—on the contrary they are quite common—but that comparatively few are ultimately successful given "the unwieldiness, the resilience or the brittleness of the social stuff, of its resistance to our attempts to mould it or work with it." This is the same point made by Senator Moynihan in his lucid article, "The Paranoid Style," in which (with Hofstadter) he quotes British historian L.B. Namier: "The crowning attainment of historical study" is to achieve "an intuitive sense of how things do not happen." But conspiracy theory becomes important, wrote Popper, above all when people who believe in conspiracies "get into power." The most obvious example in recent history is the leader of the Third Reich himself. For when people who believe in conspiracies attain political power, the Devil is loose.

Now no major Western country that I know of is at present under the control of conspiracy theorists. And no one needs reminding that Oliver Stone is not in power. Nor, judging by the hostile reaction to *JFK* of America's political class—both politicians and political writers—is Mr. Stone held in very high regard by those even close to power. But Oliver Stone has a power of sorts in America's artistic class, not only among cinema artists but in the minor leagues of the entertainment world (in charge however of spewing out "entertainment" to millions of Americans for thousands of hours weekly via television). The appeal of Stone's thesis to Hollywood's elite film community may be judged by the number of celebrated and talented actors who were willing to play even very minor roles in *JFK*. In addition to Kevin Bacon (the homosexual prostitute) and Donald Sutherland (Colonel X), we have Joe Pesci (Academy Award winner for *Goodfellas*), Jack Lemmon, Walter Matthau, Ed Asner, Tommy Lee Jones, Sally Kirkland, and another Academy Award winner, Sissy Spacek. As I write, the film community as a body has just given *JFK* a rousing endorsement by nominating it for no fewer than eight Academy Awards, including best picture, best director, and best screenplay.

Moreover, Oliver Stone apparently also has a magnetic power over film critics, who seem to have the same psychological temperament as the film artists about whom they write. It is certainly not the first time that movie reviewers of the nation's leading publications have thrown themselves into ecstasies over propositions that the political staff and editorial boards of these same publications find reprehensible. Julie Salamon, a quite minor critic but writing for a major newspaper, the *Wall Street Journal*, was perhaps the most servile reviewer in the whole country in her acceptance of the thesis of Robert de Niro's *Guilty by Suspicion* that the hero, blacklisted by Hollywood in the early 1950s, was an innocent victim. (The film was a fiasco and the blacklistees were in fact all Communists.)

And now, despite a hostile lead editorial in her own newspaper ("What sells it seems is precisely the hatred for the U.S. government and institutions that saturates *JFK*"), Miss Salamon's artistic sensibilities again came to the fore. Noticing in *JFK* no "hatred for the U.S. government and institutions," although noting prudently that the film might be "dubious history," she wrote: "The political assassination that lies at the heart of this detailed account of conspiracy and cover-up hasn't been fictionalized at all. . . . it's pow-

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erful film making that at the very least accomplishes what Mr. Stone said he set out to do—to offer the world an alternate myth."

Again, running against the thrust of his own magazine's cover story, David Ansen of *Newsweek* wrote: "Oliver Stone's heretical history is a stunner. . . .A powerful radical vision of America's drift toward covert government." The kindest account of *JFK* was from *Time* magazine, which devoted to it what news magazine people call an "inside cover"—that is, a piece the length of a cover story but without the actual cover (which went to Mikhail Gorbachev because of an "exclusive interview"). *Time*, perhaps coincidentally owned by Time Warner, the parent company which produced the $40 million *JFK*, took a somewhat spoofing tone toward the movie's plot line (Who done it? "Everybody! High officials in the CIA, the FBI, the Dallas constabulary, all three armed services, Big Business and the White House. Everybody done it—everybody but Lee Harvey Oswald.")

But *Time*'s Richard Corliss, not at all coincidentally a film critic, managed to get enough enthusiasm into his magazine's "inside cover" to be quoted in advertisements as saying *JFK* is: "Electrifying. A Knockout. Breathless. Enthralling. Sensational. Terrific." In his article, Mr. Corliss wrote that "through his art and passion, Stone makes *JFK* plausible" and concluded that, although *JFK* might only be a movie, it's "a terrific one"—and "plausible" enough, one might think, to leave millions of uninformed young American moviegoers with the impression that they are being told a true story.

In the *New Republic*, Stanley Kauffmann, although admitting that *JFK* "distorts facts," wrote that throughout his two viewings of the three-hour "cascading" film, he "kept wanting to see more, more, more. . . " Left to their own devices, without the dozens of cautionary pieces by political writers, one can only imagine what the country's film critics—who normally confine their research on a historical movie to seeing the movie—would have had to say about *JFK*. As it was, throughout the country, film critic after film critic listed *JFK* among the year's ten best movies.[4]

Dissension between political journalist and film journalist reached a ludicrous nadir when Pat Dowell, a writer of miniature "reviews" for *Washingtonian* magazine, resigned her post in high dudgeon when the magazine's editor, Jack Limpert, refused to run her extremely laudatory if brief (thirty-four word) notice of *JFK*, which Limpert considered not only an "extremely dumb movie," but an "absolutely preposterous movie." While a number of major U.S. critics probably watered down their enthusiasm for *JFK* because of the huge amount of negative political reporting on the film, Miss Dowell announced that *Washingtonian*'s refusal to run her mini-review left her in a morally untenable position regarding her readers.

Invited to take part as a panelist in a forum on *JFK* held at the end of January at American University in Washington, Miss Dowell joined fellow panelist Colonel Prouty ("Colonel X") in confidently declaring that the United States is not governed by its elected officials but by Colonel Prouty's "High Cabal" of rich, powerful, mysterious men pursuing purposes that in Miss Dowell's and Colonel Prouty's formulations are not entirely clear. It should be noted that, despite her difficulty with *Washingtonian* magazine, Miss Dowell ran a glowing review of *JFK* in the *Army Times*, to which she contributes. What the *Army Times* is doing employing a movie critic who thinks this country is governed by a shadowy "High Cabal" is an interesting question.

Sustained, withering fire directed against his film by political journalists seems to have induced Oliver Stone to adopt Colonel

[4]Movie critics ranking *JFK* among the ten best films of the year were from the *Washington Post* (both critics), *Los Angeles Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Chicago Sun-Times*, *Miami Herald*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Baltimore Sun*, *Detroit Free Press*, *Kansas City Star*, *Pittsburgh Press*, *Newsday*, National Public Radio, *Time* magazine, and dozens more.

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Prouty's view that the press itself is part of the all-embracing dark conspiracy. Colonel Prouty told the audience at American University, where the term "High Cabal" was batted back and forth a dozen times, that rich, powerful, shadowy men (usually referred to simply as "they") "ordered" George Lardner of the *Washington Post* to attack *JFK*, much as they "ordered" former president Gerald Ford to approve of the findings of the Warren Commission. Who these shadowy men are who give the press and Mr. Ford these orders we don't know, of course, but, for Colonel Prouty, Oliver Stone, and much of America's artistic class, they are plainly there.

A LARGE PART of America's artistic class finding *JFK* compelling might tell us more about the artistic class than about the nation as a whole, however. And exactly how many uninformed young moviegoers will be drawn to see *JFK* by the indispensable "word of mouth" remains to be seen. As of early February, despite a truly prodigious amount of free publicity, *JFK* stood only tenth in box-office returns among movies released since Thanksgiving, the beginning of the holiday season. For a $40 million film, on which an additional $15 million has been spent in advertising, this is not an unduly impressive score.

With the enduring interest in the Kennedy assassination, opinion polls showing a majority believing in some sort of conspiracy, and the average American's supposed current distrust of his own government (and *JFK*'s star, Kevin Costner, riding high), it is still uncertain how many millions of young Americans will happily suspend their disbelief in a movie that is the very embodiment of the "heated exaggeration, suspiciousness,and conspiratorial fantasy" that Richard Hofstadter defined as the paranoid style in politics. A conspiracy of sorts perhaps. But a massive conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy "at the highest levels of the U.S. government?" A conspiracy that would have had to include vast numbers of people at the top of all U.S. intelligence services, police services, military services, medical services, major weapons manufacturers, the Joint Chiefs, FBI, CIA, Mafia, Cubans, Vice President Johnson? And none of it has ever leaked? No John Dean has emerged? No Joe Valachi? And who set this infernal machine in motion? Who gave the order? Who gave the command: "Execute"?

So we have our artistic author, renowned film director Oliver Stone, a full-service conspiracy theorist. And then we have our film critics, the only spokesmen for the artistic class who have so far spoken "ex cathedra." Nearly all seem utterly enslaved by the dark vision of *JFK*, which is sobering. For there are those who remain skeptical of the highly dramatic Jewish conspiracy recounted in *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. But between *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Stone's *JFK* it would be hard to choose.

Early February trade figures on the release of *JFK* overseas suggest that the film might turn out to be a far greater triumph abroad—where of course the details of the Kennedy assassination are far less well known. And viewing the cheerful babbling of young moviegoers as they come out of *JFK* even in the United States puts an observer in mind of an alternative explanation for whatever success *JFK* is to have with the general public. Among people who combine a high notion of themselves with a low level of information the attitude is quite widespread that things in this world are being "hidden" from them, and that only a fool would take the public record of events for the truth. So perhaps another dictum might be apposite here: that conspiracy theory is the sophistication of the ignorant.□

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Arendt on Totalitarianism

Robert Nisbet

Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (original publication, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951; current publication, Magnolia, MA: Peter Smith, 1983).

HANNAH ARENDT'S book was published in 1951. It is fair to say that the title of the book, along with the contents of its third section, gave the word "totalitarian" a currency and even popularity it had never had before.

"Totalitarianism" was not a ready concept in the minds of American political scientists and historians during the first three decades of totalitarianism's history in Europe. We were prone whenever some nondemocratic state arose with a clearly identifiable leader to give it the label of "dictatorship" or "tyranny" or "despotism," thus tending to interpret it as a recidivism, a lamentable throwback to the Louis XIVs and Cromwells of Western history. That in fact the new total states in the twentieth century were as modern as anything else in the century didn't often occur to us in the 1930s when we considered the matter.

Most comical were the representations of Nazi Germany as an eruption in the German collective mind of dark primeval forces, of a reversion of contemporary Germany to the forests and heroes and villains of the mythic Germany of the distant past. One read Freudian analyses, not of individuals but of the whole German people. There were serious ascriptions to Germans of pre-rational states of mind, of tribalism and blood rites from forests primeval. In the progress-intoxicated American mind, if something on the horizon looked evil it had to be a recrudescence of the past and above all a regression to irrationalism.

The word "totalitarian" had little more use in the 1930s at Berkeley where I was studying history and sociology than did the now vanished word "brutalitarian" in application primarily to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, rarely if ever to the Soviet Union. When the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* came out mid-decade in the 1930s, there was no entry for totalitarianism. Communism, Fascism, Socialism, yes, but without the slightest hint that there were significant likenesses between these collectivisms. Franz Neumann's *Behemoth* (1942) was a neo-Marxist effort to deal with the rise of Nazism in Germany. He refused to see Nazism and Soviet Communism as even structurally similar.

There was much resistance in American universities to any use of "totalitarian" that covered alike the Soviets and Nazis and their states. I recall publishing in May 1943 an article in the *Journal of Politics* entitled "Rousseau and Totalitarianism." The article was mostly about Rousseau's political thought, but at least half a dozen pages went into the totalitarian perspective through which both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany could be seen. It treated the two political powers as virtually identical in structure. The article created no splash apart from an appreciative review by Dwight McDonald in his *Politics*. There were, however, at least a dozen letters, all sharply, even bitterly, critical of the article: as much because of its lumping of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany under the category of totalitarianism as its then heretical view of Rousseau.

Our minds began to drop some of these absurdities when scholarly refugees from Eu-

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rope started to arrive in this country in the late 1930s. I think particularly of Albert Salomon, Peter Drucker, C.J. Friedrich, and Hannah Arendt. Their writings and lectures on the nature of totalitarianism began to appear publicly in the late 1930s. The first use of the word totalitarian I came upon was in Peter Drucker's 1939 book, *The End of Economic Man*, a brilliant analysis of Hitler's Germany; its subtitle was "The Origins of Totalitarianism." The term was less prominent in Drucker's next book, *The Future of Industrial Man*, in 1942. I also remember coming across Emil Lederer's *The State of the Masses* (1939), in which Nazism in Germany is explained in terms of the transformation of the traditional classes into shapeless, passive, and helpless masses.

IN SPITE of works like these, the climate was not yet propitious in the 1930s and early 1940s for the use and wide acceptance of the idea of totalitarianism. A substantial number of Americans, however bitterly opposed they may have been before the war to a Russia of dictatorship, planned famine, purge, and godlessness, managed to work up a heightened appreciation of Communist Russia simply for its astonishing recovery from initial failures to stop the Nazis on their march eastward and its eventual destruction of the hated Germans.

By V-E Day, there were more than a few Americans, especially in the newspaper, entertainment, and academic spheres, who believed strongly that Soviet-American ties had been formed in war which would last far into the postwar era. Averell Harriman in his war memoirs has told of the time after the European war had ended when, at a press conference, he warned Americans against too easy an acceptance of effortless coexistence with Russia. Among the press who got up and ostentatiously walked out on Harriman were the esteemed journalists Walter Lippmann and Raymond Gram Swing. Churchill's now historic speech at Westminster College in the spring of 1946 warning of an iron curtain between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was not popular in the press or on the campus.

It is often said that the Cold War was responsible for Western fascination with the idea of totalitarianism and its application to both Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. Certainly, it was only in the very late 1940s and early 1950s that the word totalitarianism began to catch on widely in this country as a concept or perspective which could readily assimilate both the vanished Nazi Germany and the very much alive Soviet Union. During this time, Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) played a major part in preparing the popular mind for the concept, with its nightmarish picture of Oceania (England projected in time)—its monolithic Party, its omnipotent and omniscient Leader, the terrifying O'Brien, the evocation of Trotsky in the symbolic presence of Goldstein's manuscript, the ruthless penetration of the state's power into the most intimate details of human life, and such totalitarian devices as Double Think, Big Brother, and Hate Week.

Of all the books on this subject, Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was surely the most perceptive and illuminating. Her bold linkage of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as equal manifestations of the totalitarian mind, movement, and state was then still uncommon. Since the 1930s it had been an article of faith for most intellectuals that the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany were not only different but diametrically opposite. National Socialism, it was widely said, could not possibly be akin to the Soviet Union, for it was a corrupt final phase of capitalism and imperialism whereas, even with its warts, the Soviet Union could only be seen as a vanguard of socialist modernism, a creation of rationalism, rather than the kind of irrationalism that underlay Hitler's works.

It was in this intellectual atmosphere that *Origins* was published. The book quickly reached a level of influence that no previous study of the total state had. In 1972, *Foreign Affairs*, in a Fifty Year Bibliography, declared Arendt's book the most illuminating and influential of all the works thus far written on

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totalitarianism. I believe it remains to this moment the most influential.

The Origins of "Origins"

IN HER SEARCH for the origins of the totalitarian state, Arendt might have turned to such background forces as the French Revolution and its long legacy, to statism, Bonapartism, utopianism, and relentless growth of the military. None of these, however, is to be found in the first two sections of *Origins* which supposedly are laying the groundwork for the investigation of the phenomenon, the total state.

The only explanation for this I can offer comes largely from a perusal of some of the biographical details provided by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (1982). From Young-Bruehl's account of Arendt's life after she came to the United States as a refugee in 1941, we have the very clear impression of a vibrant mind in search of a subject for a book, which would be her first, not counting her German doctoral dissertation. It was to be a book that would clarify in her own mind and the minds of others the causes of the world crisis of the mid-twentieth century, a crisis she saw, understandably, largely in terms of Nazi Germany's capture of a large part of Europe and its imposition of the principles of Nazism upon the European mind—and perhaps, in time, the mind of the whole world.

According to Young-Bruehl, Arendt began writing drafts of a book in late 1944, three years after arriving in this country. Apparently there was no hint in these drafts—which she sent to Houghton Mifflin from time to time—of a book on either the origins or developed reality of totalitarianism. At one point in her outlines and drafts she gave her planned book the title of *The Elements of Shame: Antisemitism, Imperialism, Racism*. At another time she tried *The Three Pillars of Hell*, the "pillars" being identical with the "elements of shame." Not for six years did Arendt hit upon the title, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, thus elevating what had been Peter Drucker's subtitle in 1939 into her bold and unequivocal title. (It certainly was more memorable than *The Burden of Our Time*, the tea-and-crumpets title her book was given, over her protests, when it was first published in Britain.)

Originally, it seems, Arendt conceived of nothing more than a treatise on Nazism; the sections were to be "Antisemitism," "Imperialism," and, finally, "Racism." But at some point she became attracted to the theme of totalitarianism and, under this heading, the third and final section of the book was written. Although this was a valuable change in conception, given the very considerable importance of her treatment of totalitarianism's fundamental structure, it has to be admitted that as a result the unity of the book disappeared. The first two sections, "Antisemitism" and "Imperialism," were excellent leads to the third and final section on racism. But when, for whatever reason, she converted the third section to "Totalitarianism," the first two sections lost their real structural importance. What we have in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is essentially three separate essays, with little or no pretense that the first two are the "origins" of the subject of the third, totalitarianism. (The publisher, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, at one time brought out a printing of three separate small volumes entitled *Antisemitism*, *Imperialism*, and *Totalitarianism*.)

However good each of the first two essays may be intrinsically as a study of its subject, neither qualifies as a successful explanation of the totalitarian state—a category, after, all, that included China, Albania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union as well as Nazi Germany. Anti-Semitism clearly played a role in the history of German Nazism that it didn't play in the Soviet Union and China. As for imperialism being a force in the rise of totalitarianism, we might echo Churchill's provocative comment to FDR that far from there being "an irrepressible conflict between imperialism and democracy, I make bold to suggest that British imperialism is spreading democracy more widely than any other system of government since the beginning of time."

Neither anti-Semitism nor imperialism qualifies as a realistic cause or origin of total-

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itarianism, though each may well have been among the many forces that accompanied the rise of totalitarianism in any given area. Totalitarianism is at bottom simply the internal invasion by the state of its civil society. It represents the desire to subjugate, and where possible exterminate, the groups, associations, statuses, and roles that are the building blocks of civil society and, ideally, to replace them all by relationships entirely of the state's creation. Propaganda, anti-Semitism, colonialism, terror, the secret police, and concentration camps may variously accompany the rise of the total state but they are not of its essence.

Atoms and Masses

MORE THAN any other thinker of the 1940s and 1950s, Hannah Arendt was responsible for the eventual recognition that totalitarianism was a brand new type of state, one without proper reference to any previously known. That in the development of this form of government there are bound to be differences from one nation to another, she never doubted for a moment. Clearly the alcoholism and chronic incompetence of Russian labor—against which Stalin vainly railed—had no significant place in Hitler's Germany or in Mao's China. Social, cultural, and economic differences are bound to be apparent from one totalitarian state to another. "Absolute monarchy," Arendt wrote, "was no doubt a different affair in Spain, in France, in England and in Prussia; still it was everywhere the same form of government."

"Decisive in our context is that totalitarian government is different from dictatorships and tyrannies," she wrote. Fundamental in Arendt's anatomy of totalitarianism is her conceptual use of the "masses," by which she means a national population that has become or is in the process of becoming increasingly atomized and rootless, its traditional associations and communities of diminished importance in the lives of individuals, rendering them less resistant to social pathologies and more vulnerable to the lure of the absolute state.

Arendt's use of the idea of massification was far from new when her book was published. This concept was one of several specters that hung over much nineteenth-century writing as a consequence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic mass armies. In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, toward the conclusion of his indictment of Revolutionary intellectuals and politicians, Edmund Burke wrote: "They have attempted to confound all sorts of citizens as well as they could into one homogeneous mass and then they divided this their amalgam into a number of incoherent republics. They reduce men to loose counters. . . . "

In the mid-nineteenth century the writings of Taine and Kierkegaard contain numerous references to the pulverizing effects upon the social order of doctrines of egalitarianism and populism. In *Revolt of the Masses* (1930), Ortega y Gasset explained the rise of Bolshevism in Russia and Fascism in Italy as political expressions of the masses—conceived of human beings, in however small a number, that had become dislocated from the social order, that is, civil society, and hence prime fodder for the Lenins and Mussolinis. The rise of Hitler to power in the early 1930s stimulated the production of books and articles on the masses, conceived not as the traditional lower classes but as essentially classless, desocialized human beings. Herman Rauschning's *The Revolution of Nihilism*, published in the late 1930s, made the affinity between the rootless masses and Hitler fundamental to totalitarianism.

No one, though, ascribed to the desocialized masses the critical importance that Hannah Arendt did. She emphasized the dependence of both Hitler and Stalin on large majorities of the people.

> Hitler's rise to power was legal in terms of majority rule and neither he nor Stalin could have maintained the leadership of large populations, survived many interior and exterior crises. . .if they had not had the confidence of the masses.

She dismisses ideas of sinister conspiracies as animating forces in the rise of Hitler, Stalin,

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Mussolini, and Mao: "For the propaganda of totalitarian movements. . .is invariably as frank as it is mendacious."

So vital are the masses to the inception of totalitarian rule, Arendt argues, that where they don't exist in proper degree, they must be created. For the revolutionary dictatorship of Lenin to change into full-blown totalitarianism, it was necessary for Stalin to create through terror and irresistible force the kind of atomized society that must exist if totalitarian government is to be instituted. Thus under Stalin the internal war against economic and social classes, the remnants of the Soviets, and other intermediate associations which by their mere existence threaten the totality of power that is prized by the rulers.

It is in this calculated, forced creation of the masses that the most shocking acts of totalitarianism become manifest. Masses already existing or clearly coming into existence may be virtually ignored by the departments of terror and propaganda. But not the people still living in the contexts of the traditional social order. For the persistence of civil society, with its complex of groups and associations ranging from the family and village or neighborhood to the church, the economic association, trade union, school, university, even sports and hobby clubs, militate against that degree of passivity that is the ideal of the totalitarian despot. Arendt wrote:

> Mass atomization in Soviet society was achieved by the skillful use of repeated purges which invariably precede actual group liquidation. In order to destroy all social and family ties, the purges are conducted in such a way as to threaten with the same fate the defendant and all his ordinary relations, from merest acquaintances up to closest friends and relatives. . . . In the last analysis, it has been through the development of this device to its farthest and most fantastic extremes that Bolshevik rulers have succeeded in creating an atomized and individualized society the like of which we have never seen before and which events or catastrophes alone would hardly have brought about.

New Structures

THE CREATION of the raw masses through indoctrination and terror is not, however, the final objective of the totalitarian zealot. It is only the necessary preliminary step toward the creation of new forms of organization, new structures of belonging and belief which in their entirety are the totalitarian state.

> The true goal of totalitarian propaganda is not persuasion but organization. . . . The forms of totalitarian organization, as distinguished from their ideological content and propaganda slogans are completely new. They are designed to translate the propaganda lies of the movements woven around a central fiction—the conspiracy of the Jews, or the Trotskyites, or 30 families etc.—into a functioning reality, to build up, even under nontotalitarian circumstances, a society whose members act and react to the rules of a fictitious world.

Early in his political career Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*:

> The mass meeting is necessary if only for the reason that in it the individual who in becoming an adherent of a new movement feels lonely and is easily seized with the fear of being alone, receives for the first time the picture of a greater community, something that has a strengthening effect upon most people.

The great strength of Arendt's *Origins* thus is its unerring aim at the very heart of totalitarianism: the effort of the state, using whatever techniques may be available and seem necessary, to destroy civil society, all the way from the family and church to the constitutive ties of the historic nation itself. Totalitarianism, as Arendt repeatedly stresses, requires for its complete success the demolition of as much of civil society as possible. Not until civil society has been severely crippled through propaganda and terror does it become possible to create new, meaningful structures which are the conception and development of the absolute state: "The struggle for total domination of the total population of the

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earth, the elimination of every competing nontotalitarian reality, is inherent in the totalitarian regimes themselves."

The heterogeneity of ordinary society and the absolute, unbanishable uniqueness of each human being on earth are both regarded with some fear and boundless hostility by the totalitarian mentality. One reason for the fondness of military symbols in every totalitarian state we have known is the unifying effect that war, or the suggestion of war, with an external enemy can have on the divisions that always threaten to arise in a population. As Arendt wrote:

> Apart from the importance of the elite formations to the organizational structure of the movement. . .their paramilitary character must be understood in connection with other professional party organizations, such as those for teachers, lawyers, physicians, students, university professors, technicians, and workers. . . . It was characteristic that the more clearly European Communist parties became branches of a Moscow-directed Bolsheviki, the more they too used their front organizations to compete with existing purely professional groups.

In her constant emphasis upon the masses and upon organizations at all levels to capture the masses, Arendt is not oblivious to the operations of some of the forces that, before her book appeared, had been widely cited as sufficient causes. I refer to dictatorship, the single party, secret police, terror, political centralization, and domination of the military. Obviously these played vital parts in the creation of Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China, etc. But so had they played, throughout history, roles in nontotalitarian despotisms and tyrannies. In her conclusion she wrote:

> In the preceding chapters we emphasized repeatedly that the means of total domination are not only more drastic but that totalitarianism differs essentially from other forms of political oppression known to us as despotism, tyranny and dictatorship. Wherever it rose to power it developed entirely new political institutions and destroyed all social, legal and political traditions of the country. No matter what the specifically national tradition or the particular spiritual source of its ideology, totalitarian government always transformed classes into masses, supplanted the party system not by one-party dictatorship but by a mass movement, shifted the power of the army to the police and established a foreign policy openly directed towards world domination.

Arendt and 1989

ONE GLARING question remains. If, as Arendt argues, the most fundamental aim of the totalitarian state is the destruction, so far as possible, of civil society and its groups, leaving instead the inert, passive masses, how then do we account for what we have just witnessed in what was once the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union: the precipitate collapse, after anywhere from forty to seventy years of Soviet domination, of communist regimes both in Russia itself and its satellites, with hardly any serious resistance by the totalitarians? Doesn't this amazing—and marvelous—spectacle undermine, indeed falsify, the Arendtian concept of totalitarianism?

Arendt's answer (as I construe it from her not always lucid commentary) is twofold. First, human beings are saved from the direst consequences of the pulverization of civil society by the ineffaceable facts of diversity and spontaneity. Both of these human characteristics are biological in root and hence beyond the efforts of even the most despotic and fanatical of totalitarians to create the absolutely inert and passive masses.

Second, there is the nature of revolution, or at least of the major revolutions we have known in this century: the Communist, Fascist, and Nazi. Neither these nor any other revolutions in history are at bottom products of the masses. Revolutions (never more obviously so than in both of the Russian revolutions, 1917 and 1989) are characteristically effected from the top down by elites. No

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matter how pulverized and bovine the masses may become, how incapable they may be of stimulating anything beyond occasional futile mutinies, totalitarian regimes create and require elites to run the system; and by their nature those elites retain the capacity to take initiatives and inaugurate change. Elites are absolutely indispensable to full-fledged revolutions. The pictures on the evening news of joyous people in Red Square do not mean that this most recent of Russian revolutions was caused by their enthusiasm. Like the revolution of 1917, this revolution proceeded—is proceeding—from the top down, with Gorbachev and Yeltsin taking the place of Lenin and Trotsky.

The society such leaders are now trying to reform is the product of the total state. As they, and the peoples who were for a half-century under Soviet propaganda and terror, seek desperately to transform the poetry of freedom into its institutional reality, we can contemplate the true gravity of the plight of a pulverized society struggling to create the structure and the infrastructure of a free economy, free elections, a free family—in a word, a reborn civil society, after seventy-eight years of rule by the most totalitarian of all twentieth-century governments.

For this reason, Hannah Arendt's short treatise on totalitarianism is more than a historical documentary. It is also a valuable preface to an understanding of the kind and the depth of the problems facing the East Europeans, the Russians, and the world. The communist elite that destroyed the Soviet Union and now rules over the successor states is an elite of a peculiar kind—a totalitarian elite. The future of a vast stretch of Eurasia is now in its hands, which is hardly reassuring. For as Arendt observed of this class:

> The elite is not composed of ideologists; its members' whole education is aimed at abolishing their capacity for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, between reality and fiction. Their superiority consists in their ability immediately to dissolve every statement of fact into a declaration of purpose.□

Robert Nisbet's forthcoming book is Teachers and Scholars: A Memoir of Berkeley in the 1930s.

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Books

The Litany of Anti-Americanism

Paul Johnson

Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 515 pp., $35.00.

PAUL HOLLANDER, professor of sociology at Amherst, has made a heroic contribution to the great ideological debate of our time. He has conducted an intense and detailed investigation into what progressive intellectuals say and do, and how they reason. He must have marvelously organized files and computer-banks. The result is to be found in *Political Pilgrims* (1981), which describes how over the decades the progressives sought moral sustenance from Lenin's and Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, Castro's Cuba, and other gruesome places, and has proved one of the most useful books of our time. Now he has produced another mighty and related tome, one that covers the development and nature of anti-Americanism over the past quarter-century. I fell upon it eagerly and studied it with relish.

Readers should not expect too much. Hollander is much more a compiler than an analyst. It is true the book has a structure. There is an introduction, showing how radical attacks on Western, especially American, societies have persisted despite the manifest failure of socialist-totalitarian alternatives. Then, in turn, he considers the roles of the churches, the universities, and the mass media in encouraging this radicalism. He next looks at the domestic consequences, paying special attention to "The Pilgrimage to Nicaragua" and what he calls "the world-view of college students." Then he examines anti-Americanism abroad, first in the Third World, next in Western Europe, and finally among America's two most important neighbors, Mexico and Canada. A concluding chapter surveys continuing anti-Americanism against the background of the collapse of the entire communist system. Within each section, however, a vast number of facts and quotations—Hollander is one of the sharpest quotemen of the day—is presented rather than organized. This is a volume to be dipped into, to be consulted, to be used, to have constantly on one's shelf for reference, rather than to be read through from start to finish.

It occurred to me, reading Hollander's book, that clever people need to have objects of hate, rather than love. I remember an old don saying to me: "Notice how, when the fellows file in for High Table, most of them are looking for people they should *not* sit next to, rather than people they should." Although we have come to regard anti-Americanism as a permanent fact, it was not always so. Indeed, from its inception, for at least a hundred years, the United States itself was a place of pilgrimage for progressive intellectuals. French writers, including even many on the Right, were overwhelmingly pro-American. Lord Byron, a typical progressive of his day, wrote: "I would rather have a nod from an American than a snuff-box from an Emperor." He always went out of his way to shake hands with any American he met. He thought America "a Model of force and freedom and modera-

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tion." Progressives brought up their children to admire America. John Stuart Mill recorded that, at the age of eight, "When I came to the American War, I took my part, like a child as I was (until set right by my father) on the wrong side because it was called the English side."

Progressives, just like the political pilgrims to the USSR in the 1930s, were willing to overlook or even justify American shortcomings which, in any other context, they deplored. Thus the adult Mill did not hesitate to defend President Jackson's atrocious Indian removal policy: "The conduct of the United States towards the Indian tribes has been throughout not only just, but noble," he wrote. (Contrast this with a case quoted by Hollander of a progressive New England couple in the late 1980s who, acting on an "insight" from the "radical historian Howard Zinn," decided not to celebrate Thanksgiving "since it commemorates what in reality was the genocidal extermination of the Indians.") As late as the early 1870s, Lord and Lady Amberly, the parents of the progressive Bertrand Russell, who figures largely in Hollander's book, took a special trip to the United States, being advanced liberals, in a spirit of adulation.

Now why should this be, granted the propensity of intellectuals to hate rather than love? It was because there were plenty of hate-figures and hate-regimes in Europe already, in the shape of the imperial monarchies, above all Russia's czar who was known as "The Autocrat." America, by contrast, was then seen not so much as capitalist as republican; it was *the* republic. It is hard for us now to imagine how intense the hatred for the Russian system then was, especially after the great pogroms which began in 1881, sending into the West, and not least into America itself, countless clever propagandists for anti-czarism. Hence the overthrow of the czar in 1917 was, to progressives, the most important and welcome event since 1789. From that point onward, it is possible to note a shift in progressive allegiance toward the USSR with a compensating growth of anti-Americanism, which gradually became the dominant emotion on the Left. As late as February 1929, a typical American progressive like Lincoln Steffens felt able to suggest that both the American and the Soviet systems were justified: "The race is saved one way or the other and, I think, both ways." That ended with the stock market crash six months later, and from the early 1930s modern anti-Americanism began, now identified with the failures and excesses of capitalism.

I GIVE THIS historical background because it is important to grasp, in making sense of the phenomenon Hollander describes in such detail, that we are dealing with emotions, not reason. Most twentieth-century intellectuals have no religious faith; their politics, which dictate their ethical assumptions, form a substitute for it. The undertone is Calvinist; they think in terms of sin and damnation—though they never use such words—rather than goodness and salvation. Theodore Draper, reviewing a study of academic attitudes in the 1980s by two left-wing professors, wrote that its "attitude appears to be that communism was a venial sin, for which one need have no regrets, but anti-communism was a mortal sin which cannot be forgiven." America, as the primary source of anti-communism, was therefore the source of evil, the Great Satan, to use the Ayatollah Khomeni's term. Intellectuals even, at times, actually describe themselves as a kind of hieratical caste, chosen (though they do not say by whom) to castigate evil. Thus Norman Birnbaum, writing in 1988, saw intellectuals as the moral elite:

> Installed, with all due modesty, in the vanguard of an aroused citizenry, we may set forth once again to redeem a not quite fallen world. . . . We secular thinkers will find ourselves in the midst of those who take their social conscience and. . .their self-definition from ecclesiastical tradition.

To such people, the fact that America was and is not only the greatest democracy in the world but, in its practices, the most thor-

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oughly democratic, was no mitigation of the sin. On the contrary. For their concept of the "vanguard" is Leninist. They do not actually like democracy. As voters, each is only one, counting no more than millions of other voters whose habits of mind, opinions, tastes, and ethics they despise. However, behind their word processors, at their university podiums, in their pulpits and TV studios, each is many more than one. Democratic head-counting often—usually in fact—runs counter to their elitist power and influence. That is why, in their hearts, they equate democracy with populism, a term in their vocabulary only slightly less abusive than fascism.

Equally, progressive intellectuals are not really interested in curbing the abuses that undoubtedly arise under American capitalism. That is "reformism," a substitute for radical change. The abuses merely serve as items in anti-American litanies, part of the undifferentiated liturgical background of abuse. Here is a typical one from Irving Howe in 1989:

> Beneath the surface of affluence and the ideology of "free market" there is taking place in this country a steady grinding process of social decay. Drugs, violence, poverty, gangs, homelessness, shootouts are but few of the symptoms. Malaise, disintegration, pathology, "underclass": these are some of the key words. The reality is a terrible dehumanization, the worst we have known in fifty years.

But intellectuals do not propose to tackle these particular evils one by one, and thus become "drawn into the system." They are concerned only with the general evil of America itself. Hollander thinks that "At the heart of the protest is unhappiness about living in a basically secular, excessively individualistic society which, while providing a wide range of choices and options, offers little help for its members to make their lives more meaningful."

There have always been intellectuals so disgusted by the society in which they live that, citing various justifications, they have sought to contract out of it. Diogenes (c.400–325 B.C.), disgusted by the excesses of Athenian materialism, in which he had participated, began to practice the greatest austerities, finally moving into a large earthenware jar or tub. For similar reasons, Simeon Stylites (c.390–459 A.D.) spent thirty-seven years on top of various pillars, which gradually increased in height; he was followed by hundreds of other stylites. Hermits and anchorites abounded throughout the dark and middle ages; later came the first colonists, pursuing idealism as well as loot. When the young poets Coleridge, Southey, and Wordsworth became disgusted with unreformed England in the 1790s (they were so politically correct that they sweetened their coffee and tea with honey, sugar being slavery-tainted), they planned to set up a Pantisocracy, in the United States of course. But that option is no longer open.

HOLLANDER quotes Todd Gitlin on the alienation of progressives: "Contempt even for the conventions of flag, home, religion, suburbs, shopping, plain homely Norman Rockwell order had become a rock-bottom prerequisite for membership in the movement core." Gitlin said that, returning from an uplifting visit to Cuba, he had to change seats at the Mexico City airport because he could not bear looking at a billboard advertising Cutty Sark—"Capitalist propaganda disgusted me."

Yes: but if he was part of a movement, where was it moving to? There were no more virgin places in which to set up utopias. Storming the White House was too dangerous. And by the end of the 1980s, there were not even shrines to visit. The USSR, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua—all in turn, and for various reasons, were unavailable. So there remain only rage, abuse, and that great solace of unquiet spirits, attending conferences. Hollander describes one held at Harvard in November 1988 entitled "Anti-Communism and the United States: History and Consequences." Just to read the list of speakers and sponsors made me laugh out

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loud. The whole army of anti-Americans, from generalissimos to footsoldiers, not forgetting the camp-followers, was there.

It is this domestic army, of course, that fuels anti-Americanism abroad. As Professor Kenneth Minogue has pointed out, "It is Americans themselves who supply most of the materials on anti-Americanism." If a new grievance is voiced in New York, one may be sure that within six months it will be echoed by Harold Pinter in London. Underlying it all, however, is the same unifying complaint. Anti-Americanism is merely the most obvious and blatant external sign of irresistible modernization, and not only intellectuals but all educated people are bound, from time to time, to wish to reject the modern world, even as they benefit from it.

Hollander quotes the Mexican author Jorge Castenada: "The United States plays too large a role in my country's life. . . . the American presence is overwhelming. It obsesses Mexico, drives us to distraction." One reason is that, as a Venezuelan journalist (also quoted by Hollander) puts it, Americans

> have a mania for uniformity. . . .Everywhere are the same gas-stations, the same supermarkets, the same food, the same churches, the same press, the same people. The American cultural mosaic is in fact a monolith, a monochrome, a monotone. . . . Little by little all the nations of the world are becoming more alike one another in their Americanization.

Yet here we come to the real paradox, and the humbug. America's poor are not anti-American. They simply want a slice of the action. The world beyond is full of poor people, outnumbering the affluent many times over. Yet these countless millions of poor people are not anti-American either. Quite the reverse: they would very much like to become Americans, tomorrow if possible. I recall a friend, a habitué of left-wing conferences, telling me that he attended one in Mexico City at which speaker after speaker excoriated the United States. Bored, he moved to a window and saw, in the street beneath, an immense line of peons, stretching round the corner, seemingly to infinity. What were they doing? "Señor, they are people lining up for U.S. visas."

ANTI-AMERICANISM is a preoccupation, a disease if you like, almost exclusively confined to the well-to-do middle classes. Its domestic exponents, almost without exception, hold tenured jobs in universities, are well-paid lawyers, or are people who make a good living out of the media or publishing. Foreign anti-Americans come from the same categories and are only too glad to pick up visiting professorships on U.S. campuses, or royalty checks from New York publishers. Being anti-American is a hobby, a self-justification, a quasi-religious sideline, something, to use a phrase of Dr. Johnson's, "to fill the vacancies of life."

It is an aspect, perhaps the most important aspect, of intellectual conformity. No one, we may be sure, is going to give away their worldly goods, let alone sacrifice their lives, for their anti-American principles. Graham Greene, one of the outstanding phoneys of the century, and a leading anti-American for sixty years or more, once wrote a letter to the London *Times*, which Hollander quotes: "If I had to choose between life in the Soviet Union and life in the United States I would certainly choose the Soviet Union." But then he didn't have to choose did he? Being a millionaire, he lived on the French Riviera.□

Paul Johnson's most recent book is The Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815–1830.

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Imperial Preferences

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire—Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 360 pp., $35.

THIS BOOK is one of several recent efforts of American scholars to study something they call "imperial overextension" or "overexpansion." Like Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Snyder treats as comparable cases of "overextension" a wide variety of states and relationships: German experience from Bismarck through Hitler, Japan before World War II, Victorian Britain, the Soviet Union from Stalin to near the end of Gorbachev's tenure, and the United States during the Cold War.

Snyder's goal is to explain the "counter productive aggressive behavior" which, he tells us, comes in two general forms: "self encirclement" and "imperial overextension." To this end, Snyder attempts to "test" three popular theories about why rulers adopt these self-defeating strategies: the "realist" explanation which explains the search for "security by expansion" as a reasonable response to an objective threat; the "cognitive" explanation which explains expansion as a consequence of lessons learned from experience about the world; and the "domestic" explanation which interprets external expansion as a consequence of internal politics in which "imperialist" groups with special interests prevail over broader, more different interests.

It would be an ambitious book if testing these theories were its only goal, but Snyder is concerned not only with explaining why states pursue policies of expansion "beyond the point where costs begin to outstrip benefits," but he is also interested in identifying the main "determinants" of overexpansion, and the associated "myths of empires"—that is, the reasons decision-makers give for their policies. Snyder's ultimate goal is still more ambitious. He aims at a "theory of the link between domestic politics and foreign policy" and a new understanding of the "domestic political origins of strategic myths."

Persons familiar with the tradition in which Snyder writes will not be surprised that he finds the explanation for overexpansion mainly in domestic politics rather than in international conditions facing the state (as realists argue) or in lessons from the past (the cognitive explanation). For Snyder, the ideal is not the real. The real is not the rational. It is, more often, "interests" which drive governments to aggressive overexpansion, and counterproductive aggrandizements.

Snyder knows his case studies do not offer a "conclusive test" of the main theories of "overexpansion" but believes, nonetheless, that they "go beyond mere illustrations of theoretical points" and are at least "a preliminary test."

Though some of his conclusions are credible, there are many problems with the study. The most important of these are in the selection and interpretation of his "cases" of overexpansion and in his self-aggrandizing assumption that his judgements of reality (and those of historians whom he respects) are more reliable than the judgements of participants. The two are closely related. Snyder's selection of cases of "imperial" behavior is based in large measure on the judgement of historians who see "imperial" behavior much as Snyder does. Snyder knows better than some of his sources that British and American "expansion," in the periods he studied, was not the same as that of Stalin, or Hitler, or the Japanese, and he is clear that a well-established democratic system is better able than a dictatorship to resist irrational pressures to aggression. (Democracy, he says, is "a strong deterrent to imperial overextension.")

Nonetheless, he sees much of U.S./Soviet Cold War behavior as mirror-imaging.

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And while he thinks the U.S. ultimately avoided overexpansion, he believes that the Soviet Union also avoided overexpansion after having flirted with it in the early Cold War, during Khrushchev's Cuban diplomacy, and during Brezhnev's adventures in the Third World. Each time, Snyder says, Soviet leaders backed off before significant damage was done. These are strange judgements. If the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and the Third World is not an example of overexpansion, what is? The answer apparently is that overextension is an effort to exert power that fails—such as the U.S. war in Vietnam. The circularity involved here—with the consequences to be explained becoming the essence of the definition—robs the concept of much of its interest.

SNYDER IS NOT a determinist. He does not see a single simple factor as invariably the cause of overexpansion, but more often than not, he tells us, overexpansion is the consequence of domestic imperial interests "hijacking" state policy. Occasionally, as in Nazi Germany, ideology drives policy. Reason is almost never a principal determinant. Unfortunately, Snyder and most other newer studies of "overexpansion" mistake prejudices for reality—and see their own views as exhausting the possibilities of rationality.

In the process of comparing empires, Snyder and others ignore interesting and important differences among concrete cases of extended control or influence. It is, for example, past time for a dispassionate investigation of the differences between the old colonialism and the new imperialism.

The literature on empires that treats all expansion as equal and never really defines relationships, misses the differences between Japan's relationship with Korea or the Soviet relationship with Poland, on the one hand, and the French relationship with, say, Senegal, or the British relationship with Canada, India, or Barbados. It ignores the enduring ties between former colonial powers and their colonies manifest in UN votes, in the Lomé Accords, and in, for example, the congresses of "francophonie."

The evidence so far suggests that the Soviet empire created none of the ties of affection characteristic of the colonialism of an earlier century—and for this reason, may have less lasting influence than did British or French colonialism. When the power relationship between Moscow and its satellites ended, virtually nothing else remained—no cultural residue, no valued institutions, no intellectual or educational ties, no pool of admiration or affection, no desire to emulate or preserve. Only bitterness and rejection. Contrast that with, say, the British legacy to India—a legacy so substantial and so pervasive that Malcolm Muggeridge was able to say, comically, but with some plausibility, that the last authentic Englishman would be a middle-class Indian. Who will venture to say, even as a joke, that the last Russian will be a Czech or a Hungarian?

Distinguishing between the varieties of relationships of subordination and superordination among states would require taking more seriously the colonialists' conceptions of what they were doing. And that Snyder is apparently not willing to do.

But until scholars are serious about the purposes and practices of rulers, they are likely to understand little about empires, or myths of empire, or "overexpansion" in any of its forms.□

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Democracy's Prospects

Morton Kondracke

Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 366 pp., $24.95.

EVERYONE KNOWS that a democratic revolution is sweeping the world. Presidents, presidential candidates, members of Congress, think-tankers, and pundits tell us so practically every day, sometimes to maintain American morale in hard times and sometimes to urge that we maintain our national commitment to democracy-building abroad despite other claims on the federal budget. Only a few scholars have peered behind the broad statement to examine how this democratic revolution came about. A few have tried to propose how the United States and the new democracies can help to keep it going. Harvard's Sam Huntington, however, has given us the most systematic and wide-ranging analysis of the subject yet written. It is an exceptional work both of history and political science.

Huntington's "third wave" is a sixteen-year period between 1974 and 1990 when thirty formerly authoritarian countries became democracies—meaning, at a minimum, that they began choosing their leaders through free and fair elections. Huntington identifies two previous "waves"—the period from 1828 to 1926, when the United States and twenty-eight other countries established governments based on universal suffrage; and the period from 1943 to 1962, when the allied victory in World War II and the postwar process of decolonization converted twenty previous dictatorships into democracies or quasi-democracies—in many cases, all-too-temporarily.

Huntington's book primarily concerns the whys and hows of the third wave, but one of its signal contributions is to remind us all that each wave of democratization has been followed by a period of reversal. Between 1922 and 1942, the number of democracies in the world fell from 29 to 12. Between 1962 and 1973, the number of democracies fell from 36 to 30 and the number of non-democracies increased from 75 to 92 as various former colonies and fresh democracies fell to military coups and other forms of authoritarian takeover. As of 1990, Huntington calculates, there were 58 democracies in the world and 71 non-democracies. In 1990, the percentage of all countries that were democratic was 45—just about exactly what it was in 1922. In 1920, James Bryce said that the "trend toward democracy now widely visible is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress." Many casual observers of the current wave of democratization say similarly optimistic things. Huntington warns that democracy's advance has been a "two steps forward, one step back" process.

WHY AND HOW did the "third wave" happen? Huntington has closely examined the democratization process in each of the thirty countries that transited in the last decade and a half, but he has used the history as the underpinning for social science—the development of general principles that apply more or less across the board and may be predictive of where democracy might advance in the future, and where it may retreat.

Huntington is modest about claiming certitude for his findings, but he seems on safe ground attributing the success of the third wave to (1) a loss of legitimacy by authoritarians, whether Communists, Latin military regimes, or personalized dictatorships such as Ferdinand Marcos' in the Philippines, often as a result of disastrous economic performance in the mid and late 1970s; (2) economic growth during the previous twenty-five years in which many Third

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World countries moved into a "transition zone" of between $1,000 and $3,000 per capita GDP, allowing for the development of a stable middle class; (3) religious changes, chiefly the Vatican II-inspired shift of the Roman Catholic Church from a bastion of traditionalism to a force for liberalization; (4) other outside influences from such quarters as the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev; and (5) the "snowballing effect" of successful transition to democracy in one country (Spain, for one instance, and Poland for another) on other countries. Huntington explores each of these factors both in depth and interestingly. His most useful contribution is to make Americans aware that, even though the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan were indispensable to the establishment of democracy in many cases, American leadership was not the entire cause of democratization.

Ninety-five percent of Huntington's book consists of dispassionate, meticulous, and creative analysis, but Huntington makes clear he believes that democracy is the best form of government and that the spread of democracy is in the interests of the United States and of world peace. In five places he drops his analytical stance and posits sets of guidelines for democratizers based on the examples that have worked elsewhere. He advises reformers, for instance, to be prepared for "standpatters [authoritarian reactionaries] to take some extreme action to block change," such as staging a coup. He advises that reformers perhaps even stimulate them to do so, then "crack down on them ruthlessly, isolating and discrediting the more extreme opponents of change." He also advises that democrats "cultivate generals" as a shield, and also "practice and preach nonviolence" to win over security forces and troops. Huntington has an entire series of additional recommendations for keeping the military on the side of democracy, including increasing their pay and giving them "toys." Huntington invites comparison to Machiavelli. His work may not be as ageless, but in places it certainly is as unsentimental.

This book was completed in 1990, prior to the Soviet coup attempt of last August and prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Huntington's advice on dealing with reactionaries thus was prescient. One can use his book to compile one's own checklist of the progress that Russia and other ex-Soviet republics are likely to make toward democracy. The prognosis would not seem to be very good for any of them, insofar as they have no prior experience with democracy, lack (in most cases) a western Christian heritage, are not as subject to decisive outside influence as Latin America was to American intervention or Eastern Europe was to Soviet nonintervention, and all face horrible economic difficulties that are likely to lower per capita income, not increase it.

FINISHING Sam Huntington's excellent book, then, one is left expecting the worst, at least in the short run—a failure of democracy and a return to authoritarianism in the former Soviet republics, possibly creating a negative "snowballing" effect that carries down weaker democratic experiments in Eastern Europe and retards or halts progress toward democracy in other parts of the world. If Huntington's wave theory is correct, we might expect a post–1990 "reversal" to reduce the number of democracies from 58 to 40 or less before a "fourth wave" occurs and the march toward worldwide democracy begins anew. This is the apparent logic of Huntington's book. It would be well if the book went into a second edition so that Huntington himself could furnish his own analysis of events in the former Soviet Union and, perhaps, a more optimistic analysis. In any event, this book is a major work in the field of democratic studies. And is fascinating to read.□

Morton Kondracke is a senior editor of the New Republic *and host of PBS's* "American Interests."

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Claiming Defeat

The War and the American Press

Fred Barnes

ONE YEAR after the start of the Persian Gulf War, the *New York Times* took a second look at Desert Storm and found its way to Norman Madison in Monessen, Pennsylvania. Madison's son, Andrew, was one of thirteen Army Reservists killed by a Scud missile that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Dhahran was defended by a Patriot missile battery, but it malfunctioned and no Patriot was fired at the Scud. "What burns me up is that nothing has changed over there," Madison told the *Times*. "Hussein is still in control. Our President sits around waving his flag like he did something. He didn't do anything. Nothing. My son is dead. What did he die for?"

Madison's grief is understandable. What's surprising is that most of the American press agree with his conclusion that practically nothing was achieved in Desert Storm. The *Times* piece quoting Madison was entitled "Faded Glory—Looking Back at the Gulf War." It said: "With Saddam Hussein still in power in Iraq, peace still elusive in the Middle East, horrible environmental costs and questions about Iraq's nuclear intentions, some second thoughts can be heard on whether the war ended too quickly, or whether it should have been fought at all." Heard? On the first anniversary of Desert Storm, the media bellowed the revisionist line. "New questions are coming up about what the U.S., in the end, finally accomplished with the war," said Dan Rather of CBS. The new line was neatly captured in the title (but not the contents) of a recent book by reporters from *U.S. News & World Report*—*Triumph Without Victory*.

Why no victory? Because Saddam Hussein remains ruler of Iraq, and that makes all the difference. Saddam's survival, even in neutered condition, offsets everything that might have been gained by the air and ground wars. According to the media line, the Middle East isn't any better off either. It's still an unstable mess. Peter Jennings of ABC packaged the Saddam and Middle East points succinctly in an early stab at revisionism last September. "The conquerors returned home triumphant, but tonight Saddam Hussein is still in power and the Middle East is still on fire. . . . What did America win?" The new line also holds that the absence of democracy in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is a failure of Desert Storm. Then there's the arms race in the Middle East. It persists despite the war. Even the performance of the U.S. military has lost its sheen. The Pentagon was lucky to have such a pathetic foe as the Iraqis. They wouldn't fight. So any lessons learned won't be applicable to future crises.

I could go on, but notice what's not present in the press line. There's no sense of what the Middle East or the world would be like in the absence of Desert Storm. And that, of course, is what the success of the war

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should be measured against: are we better off than we would have been otherwise? To answer that, you have to envision Saddam's position minus the war. His military would be intact, his program to build a nuclear bomb successful or nearly so, his neighbors intimidated, etc. But the press ignores all this as if it's irrelevant. There's also no distinction made between a hope and a goal, or between who was doing the hoping and goal-setting. That American-style democracy would rub off on the Saudis and Kuwaitis was neither a hope nor a goal of the Bush administration. It was a media-created hope, sure to be dashed. But when it was dashed, reporters didn't flail themselves for being unrealistic. They added another item to the list of Desert Storm's shortcomings. Finally, major progress toward a goal is written off as failure. The war produced the first region-wide peace talks between Israelis and Arabs (including the Palestinians) ever. That wasn't enough for Ralph Begleiter of CNN. "The Middle East remains a cauldron," he declared a year after Desert Storm.

The effort to debunk the Gulf War involves more than the media's penchant for accentuating the negative. Reporters have been willing to grope for an unfavorable spin. Take Jennings again. He set up his September 12 show ("A Line in the Sand: What Did America Win?") this way:

> Do you remember how much expectation the war created? Saddam Hussein would become a nobody. The Arabs and Israelis would see the futility of war and finally agree to negotiate their differences peacefully. The American hostages would be released. Certainly the Middle East wouldn't need to be choking any longer on all those weapons. America's defense of Saudi Arabia, the liberation of Kuwait, the suffocation of dictatorship in Iraq. It would all herald a new order, and inspired by American example, democracy would begin to flourish. Well, hold on.

Viewers were hardly being set up to hear that Saddam was no longer a threat to his neighbors or that Israel's security had been enhanced or that the price of oil had dropped in half. Nope, they got a straw man instead. "There hasn't been that much change in Saudi Arabia," Jennings said. "As we'll see in detail in this hour, the U.S. has liberated the Kuwaitis from Iraq, but democracy in Kuwait is as much a mirage as it has been for years and Saddam Hussein is still in power." Jennings then dwelt on the failure to impose democracy in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as if a paramount objective of the war had been thwarted. And he cited Iraq's reluctance to cooperate fully with United Nations inspectors of nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities as evidence "the war didn't completely teach Hussein the lesson which so many others had intended." Not mentioned was the fact that Saddam had been forced to sign a humiliating ceasefire agreement under which his facilities to make nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are being dismantled.

JENNINGS spoke too soon on Middle East peace negotiations and a hostage release. Both occurred, but after his show. Both were a consequence of the Gulf War. But since they are positive results of Desert Storm, the press has largely treated them as isolated events, unrelated to the war. Were Saddam massively armed and still in command of the radical Arab front against Israel, peace talks would be impossible. After Desert Storm, however, American influence was ascendent in the Middle East and sufficient to bring the Arabs in. They didn't have to worry about Saddam's opposition. Israel was more inclined to join negotiations because its security had been improved. Hostage Thomas Sutherland encountered firsthand the effect of the war on his captors in Lebanon. For years they told him America was "scared" of militant Arabs. After Desert Storm, he never heard that again, and subsequently was released.

The most egregious error perpetrated in the media's revisionist line is the notion that because Saddam survives in power, nothing has changed. The press refuses to draw the comparison between pre-war and post-war

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Saddam. Before Desert Storm he was a threat to his neighbors and the West. Now he's merely a nuisance, an annoyance.

In first anniversary pieces on Desert Storm, the media harped on President Bush's decision to stop the war on February 28, 1991. I think Bush acted too soon, probably by a day or two. At least two heavily armed Iraqi divisions averted encirclement and Saddam was not deposed. But that wasn't the most critical decision of Desert Storm by a long shot. Yet the press treats it as such and jumps to the conclusion that, as *U.S. News* trumpeted, it was a "triumph without victory."

Newsweek, in its cover story headlined "The Day We Stopped The War," insisted that Saddam "now seems to be as firmly in control of Iraq as ever." Despite his military losses, "many Western analysts believe the dictator has rebounded politically and that he is newly determined to reassert himself as a player in the gulf region." He may be determined, but in truth Saddam will be lucky to stay alive another year. His nation is a wreck, his people demoralized, his regime riddled with dissension. Only in the imagination of the press does this Saddam match the pre-war dictator.

The obsession with the survival of Saddam's regime reached the TV network morning shows. When Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared on NBC's "Today" for separate Desert Storm anniversary interviews, they were badgered on the subject. Host Katie Couric began her questioning of Cheney with this: "The Gulf War is increasingly being viewed by many analysts as quote 'unfinished business.' Was the ceasefire in your view called too early?" Cheney said no. O.K., then why wasn't the Iraqi army totally obliterated? Cheney said slaughter wasn't the goal. Aren't the troops that escaped "a cause for concern?" Not really, said Cheney. Isn't Saddam free to wipe out the Kurds now? No, said Cheney. Isn't it wishful thinking by President Bush to believe that Saddam might be ousted in a popular uprising? Cheney said Saddam would be gone soon. But what about the analysts who think the U.S. will have to send troops in to depose him? Not a chance, answered Cheney. To Powell, Couric suggested that more American lives will be lost in the future because the war was called off too soon. "Saddam Hussein is firmly in power, seems to be as strong as ever," she said. "He recently said, 'We have emerged triumphant.' There are many analysts who believe he will reassert himself in the next three to five years." Powell responded with the obvious. "Yeah, but that's mostly nonsense. He is not as strong as he was a year and a half ago. He is no longer scaring his neighbors." This may be news to "many analysts." My guess is "analysts" is a pseudonym for "journalists."

TWO EXAMPLES of the new revisionism deserve special mention. One is the book *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War*. The book, as an excruciatingly well-reported history of the build-up in the Gulf and the war, is excellent. Its re-enactments of battles are vivid. It covers the decision to halt the war on February 28 amply. It also discloses that a special bunker-busting bomb had been dropped the day before in hopes of hitting Saddam. (Alas, he wasn't in that bunker.) After twenty-one chapters of describing an American (and allied) victory, the book suddenly in chapter twenty-two denies that one took place, pointing to the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions that escaped:

> For a military operation that had been born of such extraordinary deft and successful diplomacy and prosecuted with such skill and vision, it was a tragic conclusion, one that no amount of postwar celebration could disguise. There could be no doubt that America and its allies had triumphed over Iraq's army on the battlefield. But inasmuch as victory suggests the decisive defeat of an opponent, there was none. This triumph without victory was perhaps the most striking irony of the entire conflict.

No decisive defeat? The most striking irony of the war is that the press doesn't think there

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was one. Folks at *U.S. News* err by equating defeat with one man's death. Emperor Hirohito was alive in 1946. Does that mean Japan wasn't decisively defeated? Saddam's army was crushed to the point where it's no longer an offensive threat, his air force was rendered all but harmless, and his ability to produce weapons of mass destruction was stamped out. That sounds decisive to me. *Newsweek* takes a more ingenious tack to downsize the victory. The logistical performance wasn't that great. "A longer war, or a tougher foe, might have played havoc with the supply lines," *Newsweek* argued. It added: "History suggests that losers learn more from wars than winners." By reading its rave reviews this time, the military could get in trouble. "How much trouble? American warriors may not find out until the first battle of the next war."

THE OTHER revisionist of note is Theodore Draper, who wrote two pieces on the war in the *New York Review of Books*. I might have ignored the *New York Review* as out of the mainstream. But Draper's articles were serious, well-researched, and raise a moral argument against the war. More important, Draper exhibited all the contradictions of the mainstream media. He blamed Bush for doing too much and too little. "By bombing Iraq so heavily and indiscriminately, and then leaving Saddam Hussein in power, the administration produced the worst possible outcome for the Iraqi people." The war was "politically futile and morally indefensible."

Draper's idea of indiscriminate bombing is an attack on a target that's not purely military. That means you can't go after the electric grid, the telecommunications system, bridges, etc. The military presented the bombing as "a clean and chaste technical exercise," he wrote. True, but the military didn't try to hide the fact that civilians were being hurt when, say, electricity was knocked out. Draper said the U.S. used too much force and sent a "grotesquely excessive" number of troops "against an enemy that was so outclassed and did not fight."

Well, why didn't it fight? The reason is that it was terrorized by the bombing and overwhelmed by the large allied force, cleverly deployed on the ground. Less bombing and fewer American troops would have led to greater Iraqi resistance. Draper said it didn't make sense for Bush to rush a few thousand troops to Saudi Arabia, and when Iraq didn't attack them, send more. Sure it did. Had Saddam seen that the U.S. was sending only a small force, he would have acted differently, perhaps by invading Saudi Arabia. Draper criticized the U.S. military for the massacre of fleeing Iraqis on the "Highway of Death" north of Kuwait City. (It was mostly equipment that was massacred, according to *Triumph Without Victory*.) But the military would have been forced to wreak the same kind of havoc on other retreating Iraqi divisions if it wanted to cut off Saddam and drive him from power. The victors of Desert Storm can't win with Draper. Like I said, he acts like the rest of the press on this one.□

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We are US

ETHAN KAPSTEIN ("*We* are US," Winter 1991/92) accuses me of overstating the speed and extent to which the American economy—like those of other advanced nations—is merging into a single global economy (I have made these arguments in "Who is US?" *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1990, and more fully in *The Work of Nations*, 1992). Mr. Kapstein believes it's not happening, or at least not to a significant degree, and that, therefore, "The power of the home country over the multinational has not diminished; if anything, it has continued to increase." Your readers should not be left to the mercy of Mr. Kapstein's enchanting notions.

First, by almost any measure, foreign direct investment in the United States has increased dramatically in recent years. Relative to U.S.-based stock, the cumulative stock of foreign direct investment here, adjusted for inflation and economic growth, increased by a factor of *five* from 1977 (when it was 2 percent) to the end of 1990 (when it stood at 10.5 percent). Almost 17 percent of the assets of all manufacturing corporations within the United States are now foreign controlled. Even these measures understate the extent of foreign control because they do not reflect foreign claims through less than full ownership and through borrowings from third parties. Nor do these measures include joint ventures, alliances, and long-term supply contracts between foreign firms and American-owned firms.

There has been a similar, though less steep, increase in the percentage of the American manufacturing workforce directly employed by foreign firms—now totalling just under 10 percent. If account is taken of dealer networks in the United States that serve foreign-owned manufacturing affiliates, the number of Americans indirectly employed by foreign-owned firms is significantly larger.

American direct investment abroad has also increased substantially during this interval. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the market value of U.S. direct investment abroad went from $228.3 billion in 1982 to $807.7 billion in 1989. Once again, these figures understate the true extent of U.S. investment because they do not include U.S. claims through less than full ownership and through third-party borrowings, nor do they include joint-ventures, alliances, and long-term supply contracts across borders.

In 1987, 1988, and 1989, the foreign operations of American-owned firms accounted for more than $1 trillion in sales—or roughly four times the total export of goods made in the United States. In fact, the trade deficit turns into a net surplus when the foreign sales of American-owned firms are included, compared with the total purchases by Americans of the products of foreign-owned firms. Mr. Kapstein's data showing that the proportion of foreign to domestic employees in American manufacturing peaked in 1977 and has declined since then does not suggest, as he would have us believe, that American manufacturers have been moving home since then. It simply reflects the strategic shift among American manufacturers—observable within the United States as well as across borders—from vertically integrated supply networks (in which foreign employees show up on their own payrolls) toward joint-ventures, long-term supply contracts, and partial ownership of their suppliers and foreign distributors (in which foreign employees are not included on their payrolls). In economic terms, the interdependence is the same.

Mr. Kapstein's data also obscures the significant impact of foreign direct investment on sectors of the U.S. economy characterized by high-wage jobs. Foreign-owned firms now control one-half of America's consumer electronics industry, one-third of the chemical industry, and 20 percent of the automobile industry. If "control" is defined

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to include any foreign ownership in excess of 10 percent of the outstanding shares of stock (a measure used by several federal government agencies), foreign-owned firms now "control" vast segments of America's banking, steel, machine tool, robotics, and telecommunications industries as well.

In fact, direct investment is rapidly supplanting trade as the glue that binds national economies together. During the second half of the 1980s, world trade grew at about 5 percent a year compounded, while foreign direct investments grew by about 20 percent a year compounded. Between 1983 and 1989, outflows of foreign direct investment among the G–5 rose seven-fold—to the point where approximately *one-half* of all trade among advanced industrial nations was carried on between corporations and their foreign affiliates. Official trade data is slow to catch up with this new reality. According to a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences, the U.S. trade deficit for 1987 was actually 57 percent below the officially reported figure—$64 billion instead of $148 billion—because the U.S. government's obsolete accounting methods did not fully account for exports by U.S. companies to their foreign affiliates.

These developments help to explain why so many public officials these days—mayors, governors, presidents, prime ministers—are furiously bidding for the capital, know-how, and jobs that these global entities provide, without concern for the flag that flies over the factories or research labs they may get. It has become a common practice for government officials to offer millions of dollars (or their equivalent) in subsidies and tax concessions in order to lure to their jurisdictions the affiliates of companies headquartered in other nations; and it has become just as common a practice for global firms to contrive bidding wars between such officials in order to elicit even better deals. Meanwhile, and for much the same reason, governments all over the world are busily lifting domestic-content requirements and capital-export controls (that is, unless several governments pool their bargaining leverage by threatening to withhold access to the vast multinational market they share, as the European Community is beginning to do). In light of all this, Mr. Kapstein's belief that national governments have as much power over multinational corporations today as ever is rather odd.

I do not find these trends particularly worrisome. Global economic integration is, by and large, a good thing for the people of all nations. The point of my argument has been that, as such integration proceeds apace, governments inevitably are paying more attention to the sorts of jobs their citizens undertake within these global webs of enterprise—and to the training and experience their workforces obtain as a result—than to the profitability of companies headquartered within their borders. Mr. Kapstein seems ignorant of what public officials the world over are coming to learn: In the emerging global economy, the standards of living of a nation's citizens depend less on what they own than on what they are able to do.□

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Ethan Kapstein Responds:

ROBERT REICH has aimed a shotgun full of data at my article, but alas he has missed the target. The point of my article was not to deny global interdependence but rather to argue that this phenomenon reflects the preferences of powerful states. Mr. Reich's numerology has instead led him to a borderless world ruled by corporate executives. Yet this vision would seem to undermine the economic policy prescriptions that Reich has articulated over the past decade. Indeed, if there is any hope for an improvement in living standards, especially for the world's poorest citizens (wherever they may be), it will be the result of state action rather than the largesse of corporations.□

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An Exchange on Proliferation

Comments on Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz's article in the Winter issue. The authors respond.

Kenneth Adelman:

MAYBE I'M congenitally optimistic, but I do not share Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz's "depressing conclusion that the present regime of proliferation control may be among that rare set of entities—a fit object for catastrophe theory."

We've heard such a "theory" and reached the same "depressing conclusions" before, and it never came to be. Security literature in the 1950s was filled with doomsday forecasts of a world with scores of states brandishing the bomb. In 1963 even President John F. Kennedy publicly warned of a world with fifteen to twenty nuclear weapons states by 1975. He spoke when there were four such states. China made it five the next year. A surprisingly few have joined since then.

Not that states weren't tempted. In the late 1950s, Canada, West Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden each toyed with the notion of building a bomb, and most did more than toy. In at least two of these countries—Sweden and Switzerland—the military made firm decisions to go nuclear, and (as Clancy and Seitz demonstrate) none of them would have faced serious technical difficulties had they decided to proceed.

Yet they did not proceed. To understand why they did not, it is necessary to give much more weight than Clancy and Seitz do to the fact, which they rightly recognize, that Hiroshima "created a powerful taboo against their [nuclear weapons] future use."

Indeed the most remarkable feature of the nuclear age has been the strong and ever-strengthening nuclear curse. That nuclear weapons are totally distinct from all other weapons has penetrated deep into the modern consciousness. Although nuclear weapons can yield a smaller blast than many modern conventional arms, they have come to be seen as something radically different. They portend such potential power as to make them virtually unusable, except when a nation's very survival stands at stake. And even then, their use would be with a sense of resignation to doom rather than anticipation of victory.

So strong has the nuclear curse become that it is difficult to believe that it was once weak. President Harry Truman slept soundly after bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and most Americans cheered afterwards. When Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House, he chatted about nuclear weapons while standing before television cameras: "Now, in any combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason they shouldn't be used just exactly as you'd use a bullet or anything else." Were such a statement made by any president today, it would trigger a veritable eruption, if not calls for impeachment.

In the military too the nuclear curse has proved powerful. So powerful that, in recent years, it has become impossible to design war games that "went nuclear." Whether played by top military or civilian leaders, no matter how dire their predicament on the battlefield—with the Red Team tanks storming the English Channel for example—Blue Team members would resist pushing the button.

Granted, Third World tyrants may not share their views or values. But even here things are not quite as bad as they are often presented. When, in January of this year, CIA Director Robert Gates presented Congress

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with worrisome testimony about the brain drain of ex-Soviet scientists and technicians, he said that, "Cuba, India, Syria, Egypt, and Algeria are most likely to have the contacts and resident scientists to assist emigrating Soviets" in weapons technology. I don't find that list particularly terrifying. India already has the bomb. Egypt and Algeria seem unlikely to develop it clandestinely. Syria would be well advised not to attempt too much, given Israel's interest in the question and its ability to do something about it. And the dire state of Cuba's economy makes it unlikely that Castro will pursue a nuclear program.

I do not want to sound Pollyannish—the proliferation problem is real and it needs constant attention and action. But I do feel that the anti-proliferation effort has been far more successful for far longer than anyone expected. Indeed, employing Parkinson's most astute law—that the success of any policy is measured by the catastrophes which do not ensue—its success has been outstanding.

Moreover, I do find it consoling, as Clancy and Seitz mention, that "the residue of repugnance. . .led even Adolf Hitler to refrain from risking the use of nerve gas, and a return to the chemical warfare of World War I."□

Kenneth Adelman, vice-president of the Institute for Contemporary Studies and a syndicated columnist, was director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1983 to 1987.

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.:

TOM CLANCY and Russell Seitz have accurately described a yawning security nightmare—a world in which it is the exceptional nation whose arsenal *does not* include some sort of weaponry of mass destruction. They document with characteristic precision the various trends that prompt concerns of an imminent and horrifying Age of Proliferation: the surfeit of relevant knowledge, computational power, manufacturing capacity, and requisite raw materials among less, as well as more, developed nations; the prospect of thousands of former Soviet "weaponeers" entering the international labor force; and the dawning appreciation that low-end instruments of genocide are far easier to acquire and far more difficult to detect than are the higher-end nuclear devices.

The authors say rather less about what should be done about proliferation. Presumably, this is because they are persuaded that nothing can be done about it. They may be right, given present and prospective conditions that offer both incentives and abundant opportunities to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons "wannabe" states.

Still, it is incumbent upon us to consider ways in which the threat inherent in such proliferation can be managed, even if it cannot be entirely prevented. The following are among the steps that should be taken:

Systemic Arms Control: The best protection against the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by nations inclined to threaten—or, worse yet, to actually engage in—their use lies in the transformation of such nations. Typically, these are authoritarian or totalitarian states characterized by: the absence of parliamentary checks and balances, a free press, or respect for human rights; undue secretiveness and militarism; and an economy firmly in the control of the ruling elite and at the service of (legal and illegal) weapons acquisitions programs.

If such states can be transformed with Western assistance into democratic and free market states, the risk that weapons of mass destruction programs will be pursued is considerably attenuated. After all, where governments are accountable to their publics for allocation of resources, they tend to be reluctant to make the sorts of investments required to develop nuclear weapons indigenously—at immense sacrifice to their civilian populations. What is more, if the market, rather than the government, acts as the preponderant force in determining and effecting the society's spending priorities, that society

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ceases as a practical matter to have the mechanisms necessary for the routine and covert diversion of funds to excessive military activities.

Deter Proliferation Activities: Wherever they face nations resistant to such transformation, the United States and other civilized nations must undertake measures that will discourage proliferation-related activities. These measures fall into three broad categories. First, direct action against proliferating countries. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recently publicly thanked Israel for destroying Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, an action that—while internationally reviled at the time—clearly prevented Saddam Hussein from having operational nuclear weapons when he invaded Kuwait. The U.S. response a decade later also served as a warning to states contemplating the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction: aggression by an incipient nuclear weapons state would be dealt with harshly.

Second, discourage former Soviet scientists from trafficking in the weapons and technology of mass destruction. The newly independent successors to the USSR should be required, as a precondition for any aid requests, to provide a list of individuals in a position to transfer significant information about nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile technologies. Then such scientists, engineers, and physicists should be engaged in the immense task of disabling and destroying *Soviet* weapons of mass destruction, and notice should be served that *they will be held responsible and punished* if discovered aiding pariah states' programs.

Third, punish Germany and other nations that have engaged in flagrant assistance to states bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Companies involved in such assistance should lose the right to trade with the United States (and others) for a protracted period—if not permanently.

Strategic Defenses: Finally, the United States must proceed to acquire competent strategic defenses against threats that range from ballistic missiles to aircraft-delivered weapons to the use of chemical or biological weapons by terrorists. While a *perfect* defense against any one of these dangers—let alone all of them—may be unlikely and/or unaffordable, it is both irresponsible and a powerful incentive to would-be proliferators for America to persist in its present posture of absolute vulnerability.

Clancy and Seitz have done a public service with their catalogue of the emerging dangers of global proliferation. There is now no excuse for failure to adopt policies and programmatic steps urgently needed to address, if not to prevent, this dangerous prospect.□

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., acted as the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in the Reagan administration. He is currently the director of the Center for Security Policy.

Patrick Glynn:

TOM CLANCY and Russell Seitz do a good job of scaring us all to death. They succeed in dispelling complacency; I hope they don't mean to promote defeatism. To point out that export controls and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are weak and cannot solve the proliferation problem is one thing; to imply that such measures are worthless is another. Clancy and Seitz have done a fine job of dramatizing the problem. Now comes the hard part: figuring out what to do. A few basic points.

First, though knowledge is diffusing, there is a difference between "knowing" how to build a bomb and building one. Even at this late date, creation of an atomic bomb is a massive industrial undertaking involving vast resources. In this sense, the Iraqi bomb program was the exception that proved the rule. For example, the inefficient "calutrons" that Saddam Hussein built to enrich uranium cost billions. Although export controls and IAEA inspections that impose costs and delays on renegade bomb efforts are not great bulwarks, they are of value nonetheless. During

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the 1980s, COCOM never stopped the bulk of technology transfers to the Soviet Union, but it did help matters greatly by slowing things down. (Of course, if corrupt officials of the former USSR sell warheads to Middle Eastern states, then all bets are off. But one problem at a time.)

Second, more should be done to centralize our own government's non-proliferation efforts. At present, non-proliferation activity is spread among several offices and interagency committees. Much of it is in the hands of the State Department, even though it is chiefly a defense issue. Perhaps the president should create an undersecretary of defense for non-proliferation policy, giving a single, high-ranking official the largest responsibility for directing and coordinating our non-proliferation efforts. Our government is still organized to meet the threat of Soviet expansion; it should be reorganized to meet the number one defense priority of non-proliferation.

Third, non-proliferation should be given higher priority in our broader diplomacy. Many states that are now seeking or potentially seeking atomic or other mass-destruction weaponry—Iran, states of the former Soviet Union—are also seeking normalization of economic relations with the West. Strict adherence to non-proliferation standards should be one major price of admission to the Western economic community. The Bush administration has already begun an experiment with such carrots and sticks in the case of North Korea, with as yet indeterminate results. More thought should be given to such approaches.

Fourth, since everything we do in this field (as Clancy and Seitz rightly suggest) may be doomed to fail, we need to get going on defenses. Instead of uselessly debating "mutual assured destruction," we should be moving on a crash basis to develop strategic defenses for both ourselves and our allies. We may already be too late. The next war in the Middle East is almost certain to be a missile war and could easily involve weapons of mass destruction. We should be trying to get something in place, for both ourselves and for the Israelis, before this terrible eventuality occurs. From the point of view of cost-effectiveness and discouraging global missile proliferation, a combination of limited space-based and land-based defenses would be ideal. But at this point even land- or sea-based systems would do.

Finally, we need to think more about the nature of deterrence in the post-Soviet age. Before Saddam sent Scuds against Tel Aviv and Riyadh, he had to start a war. And before starting a war, he had to calculate that he would gain more from war than he would lose. Our diplomacy, unfortunately, played a role in this. Are we strengthening peace in the Middle East by cozying up to the Syrians even as they add to their missile arsenal? Or are we weakening deterrence by trying to maintain even-handedness between the parties? The problems of deterrence are far more complicated today than they were during the Cold War, and, given the increasing presence of mass-destruction weapons in the hands of less responsible states, miscalculations about deterrence could have more immediate and terrible consequences than in the past.□

Patrick Glynn is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Leonard S. Spector:

AFTER THE demonstrated inadequacies of international non-proliferation controls in halting Iraq's nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz's depiction of growing Third World scientific capabilities and the increasing availability of nuclear-weapons know-how is sobering indeed.

Their basic premise, however, appears to be that the spread of technological capabilities will ineluctably lead to more nuclear weapon states. History does not support this analysis, and there is no reason to assume that it will prove apposite in the future.

A better view is that while the spread of relevant capabilities—particularly the ability

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to manufacture weapons-grade nuclear materials—can indeed stimulate proliferation, countervailing factors often succeed in suppressing it. The list of states that could have built the bomb by now but have refrained from doing so, for example, is a long one. It includes not only most of the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, but also states like Sweden, Switzerland, Egypt, Indonesia, and Taiwan that have not always been able to rely on a superpower's nuclear umbrella.

In December 1991, similarly, Argentina and Brazil accepted international controls over their previously open-ended nuclear programs, and six months earlier, South Africa—which probably built a small nuclear arsenal over the past decade—agreed to renounce nuclear arms and place all of its nuclear affairs under international monitoring. Clearly having the relevant capabilities was not the decisive factor in determining the nuclear posture of these states.

National decisions to "go nuclear" are complex. They depend not only on capabilities, but on a host of other influences, including a state's security requirements, the economic costs of the undertaking, domestic political imperatives, and the risk of international criticism, external diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and pre-emptive military intervention. Currently, North Korea and Algeria are in the process of weighing these very issues, as they decide whether to accept across-the-board international inspection of their respective nuclear programs.

Since 1970, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), bolstered by U.S. activism on the issue, has inculcated a norm against the acquisition of nuclear arms that has unmistakably influenced many of the countries noted above. More than 140 non-nuclear-weapon states—including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria—are now parties to the pact, which requires them to renounce nuclear arms and accept International Atomic Energy Agency inspections on all of their nuclear activities.

To be sure, the IAEA's failure to ferret out Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War exposed serious weaknesses in its inspection system. Efforts are now under way to strengthen that system by activating the organization's authority to conduct challenge inspections of suspected undeclared nuclear sites. Argentina and Brazil, moreover, are supplementing IAEA safeguards with a program of bilateral inspections, and North and South Korea are committed to similar measures.

These four countries and South Africa have also declared that they will not operate nuclear plants to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, reducing the danger that any of them might one day decide to convert a stockpile of such material into a nuclear arsenal. President Bush has proposed similar restraints for the Middle East. Limits on plutonium separation would also prevent the extraction of neptunium—a fissile material that has never been used for nuclear weapons but which Clancy and Seitz fear might be. Their scenario seems far-fetched. A country that is extracting neptunium from spent reactor fuel could just as easily extract plutonium; the latter is more abundant and far less of it is needed for a nuclear device. Moreover, a first-time proliferator is likely to be very reluctant to base its nuclear arsenal on a material that neither the major nuclear powers nor any of the emerging nuclear states have used in theirs.

In addition, U.S. intelligence gathering efforts, which have quietly backstopped the non-proliferation regime over the years, but which missed key parts of the Iraqi nuclear weapons effort, are being substantially augmented. Finally, U.S. diplomatic efforts—most apparent in the pressure Washington is applying to curb North Korea's nuclear program—have been significantly intensified.

It remains to be seen whether these initiatives and parallel efforts to buttress international non-proliferation controls will measure up to the challenges Clancy and Seitz describe. The key point, however, is that the spread of the bomb is not inevitable. Preventing proliferation is an achievable goal in many cases and, given the stakes involved, deserves to be pursued vigorously.

This said, Clancy and Seitz close with a

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deeply disturbing comment that even the most die-hard non-proliferator must take to heart: the present non-proliferation regime may indeed be "a fit object for catastrophe theory." The regime is akin to a dike that has done a reasonable job of holding back pressures for proliferation over the years. The dike is getting a little taller as additional states join the NPT or accept similar commitments, and efforts are under way to plug a number of recently found gaps in the barrier. Unfortunately, the entire structure could be inundated if a flood of nuclear scientists, technology, materials, or nuclear weapons themselves begins to pour out of the Soviet Union. Inspections, norms, and treaties could all be swept away in this tide. Today, shoring up nuclear controls within the successor republics of the former superpower and dismantling as many Soviet nuclear weapons as possible must be the top U.S. non-proliferation priority.□

Leonard S. Spector is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of the Endowment's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Program.

Peter D. Zimmerman:

TOM CLANCY and Russell Seitz correctly point out that potential proliferators can make use of older technologies, which have long since escaped the control of the industrialized nations, to produce weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. The weaponry that results may be second or even third rank; but in the world of proliferation, going for the bronze beats being shut out every time. Nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them at Scud-type ranges are technologies of the 1940s, not the 1990s, and it is foolish to believe that the great powers can keep them under lock and key indefinitely. Indeed, blueprints of perfectly satisfactory missiles are available at modest fees.

Seitz and Clancy are on the mark in their observation that the laws of physics are invariant under a change of country or continent. There is but one science, and most of its results are, and must be, freely available to all comers. Nevertheless, some of the design and engineering details of nuclear weapons in particular are not obvious, even to a competent physicist with an interest in the subject. Although *Sakharov Remembered* is a reasonably available volume, it might not be a good idea to point out to potential weapons designers that they can save a fair amount of time, and avoid blind alleys, in the most sensitive realm of the nuclear weaponeer's art by just going to the library—particularly when the correct books are cited in full.

In a similar way, if neptunium isotopes had proven to be as explosive as Seitz initially believed, it would have been a bad idea to point fledgling nuclear powers at heaps of radwaste. It was a point which did not need to be made explicitly, a point not in *The National Interest*.

The democratization of satellite reconnaissance is an area in which the United States has been served due notice of the dangers ahead. India's thirty-six-meter images of the Gulf War do not qualify in my mind as "high resolution," but the five-meter pictures of Kuwait and Dhahran sold by the Soviet Union's remote sensing agency do. The pictures of Dhahran that I studied showed U.S. aircraft on the runway at Dhahran with enough clarity to distinguish C–5 from C–141 transports, and to show F–15s lined up wingtip to wingtip. While the time delay to bring down a piece of Russian film from space is too long to allow accurate tactical targeting, all of the American installations were laid bare to the sky. Even India's imagery was probably good enough to have revealed the flanking movement to the west before the ground war began; Iraqi defenses were easy to see in American Landsat pictures that were sold throughout the war.

The dangers posed by the spread of twenty- or thirty-year-old technology throughout the world were masked by the overwhelming threat from the Soviet Union. The world has *not* become more dangerous, technically, in

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the last few years; we have simply become better able to view those threats since August 1991. While a certain amount of technical detail must be revealed in order to make the argument that bronze-medal technology is perfectly suitable to the design of nuclear warheads or guided missiles, a cautious writer might well exercise a bit more restraint when writing fact than when writing a plausible (but not factual) techno-thriller.□

Peter D. Zimmerman, a nuclear physicist, is senior fellow for arms control and verification at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz Respond:

WHEN VIEWS on so controversial an issue as proliferation converge on a net assessment, the fact of that convergence counsels urgent action. We are therefore in general agreement with the commentators—only an expanded and more constant vigilance by all of the responsible signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty stands between the inexorable growth of technical sophistication and the ubiquity of weapons of mass destruction.

But just as Kenneth Adelman is no Pollyanna, we are not Cassandra. Our goal is self-unfulfilling prophecy—so we took the liberty of communicating to those in government the technical and demographic facts unearthed in researching the Middle Eastern nuclear proliferation scene for *The Sum of All Fears* months before it was published or "Five Minutes Past Midnight" was drafted. We hope that in raising this subject's profile we have indeed contributed to extending the reign of Parkinson's Law. But in the less than Keynesian long run, we are afraid that Parkinson could be overtaken by Murphy.

Since the unity of physics is strong indeed, Iraqi nuclear scientists and engineers, no less than others, are strongly constrained in the course that they are objectively compelled to follow. The art of systems analysis rather than any gift of prophecy is to be credited with any convergence of techno-thriller and national intelligence estimates in this case.

Leonard Spector is justified in downgrading neptunium—to our chagrin we have discovered that the isotope tables we consulted were partly erroneous. Rather than accepting the biblical authority of an aging (1974) edition of *The Handbook of Chemistry and Physics*, we should have double-sourced our physics database. But plutonium looks worse than ever in the light of technical comments by Peter Zimmerman and others.

Still, we find Spector's failure to mention Pakistan curious. Its program is far advanced and its motivation—deterring India—is both strong and historically cogent. But we appreciate his mentioning Indonesia, whose burgeoning population pressure and proximity to Australia's empty northlands militate against an uneventful twenty-first century in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the existence of on-line library catalogs that can search for keywords and summon up in seconds all of the books and documents whose publication disturbs Peter Zimmerman, we think it is rather late in the game to deal with the problem by ignoring it.

The blame belongs with those who have travestied the Freedom of Information Act by compiling, in elaborate and explicit technical detail, user-friendly guides to the weapons industry. By publishing thousands of copies of its four volume Baedeker *The Nuclear Weapons Databook*, the Natural Resources Defense Council has demonstrated how the literature of disarmament can metastasize into a virulent part of the problem of proliferation. But adding a cadre of ostriches to the scene will help neither hawks, doves, nor owls.□

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

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